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CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-APPLICATION OF SEPARATE BUT EQUAL DOCTRINE
TO RACIAL SEGREGATION IN LOWER PUBLIC SCHOOLS. [Delaware]

The origin of the "separate but equal doctrine" is commonly traced
to the decision of Plessy v. Ferguson' in which the Supreme Court upheld a Louisiana statute2 which required raliroads to provide separate
but equal facilities for white and colored patrons and provided criminal penalties for any member of either race using the facilities of the
opposite race. The contention that the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 3 was defeated by the
finding that the regulation was based on a reasonable classification,
the Court declaring:
"In determining the question of reasonableness [the legislature]
is at liberty to act with reference to the established usages, customs and traditions of the people, and with a view to the pro-

motion of their comfort, and the preservation of the public
peace and good order. Gauged by this standard, we cannot say
that a law which authorizes or even requires the separation of
the two races in public conveyances is unreasonable.. .. '4
'1163 U. S. 537, 16 S. Ct. 1138, 41 L. ed. 256 (1896). While this case is usually
thought of as the origin of the doctrine, the Court, in support of its upholding of
segregation in common carriers, noted that the state courts had upheld similar
statutes requiring segregation in education. Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36, 17 Am. Rep.
405 (1874); Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327, 17 Am. Rep. 738 (1874); Roberts v. City of
Boston, 59 Mass. 198 (1849); Lehew v. Brummell, 1o Mo. 546, 15 S. W. 765 (1891).
-La. Acts (189o) No. iii, p. 152, as amended, La. Gen. Stat. Ann. (19s9) § 813o.
3
U. S. Const. Amend. XIV, § i. "No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."
'Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 550, 16 S. Ct. 1138, 1143, 41 L. ed. 256, 26o
(1896). "Laws permitting, and even requiring, [the] separation [of Negroes and
whites] in places where they are liable to be brought into contact do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other ... " Ibid, at 544, 1140, 258
"We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to consist in the
assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race
with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in
the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it."
Ibid, at 551, 1143, 261 [italics supplied]. Compare the languge of Justice Harlan in
dissent, Ibid, at 560, 1144, 264. "The destinies of the two races, in this country, are
indissolubly linked together, and the interests of both require that the common
government of all shall not permit the seeds of race hate to be planted under the
sanction of law. What can more certainly arouse race hate, what more certainly
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In the nearly six decades which have elapsed since this decision, its
rule has been extended to many fields other than common carriers, 5
and in 19o8 the philosophy of the separate but equal doctrine was applied to a controversy involving public education facilities. In Berea
College v. Kentucky, 6 without even touching upon the Fourteenth
Amendment question, the Supreme Court held that a Kentucky statute
requiring segregation was a valid exercise of the State's reserved power
to amend the corporate charter of the college. In 1927, in Gong Lum
create and perpetuate a feeling of distrust between these races, than state enactments, which, in fact, proceed on the ground that colored citizens are so inferior
and degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by
white citizens? That, as all will admit, is the real meaning of such legislation as
was enacted in Louisiana."
Real Estate: Prior to 1948 state courts had generally upheld the validity and
enforceability of private agreements, covenants, or conditions imposing restriction
upon the alienation of land to persons not of the Caucasian race. Corrigan v.
Buckley, 55 App. D. C. 30, 299 Fed. 899 (1924); Steward v. Cronan, 1o5 Colo. 393,
98 P. (2d) 999 (1940); Porter v. Johnson, 232 Mo. App. 115o, 115 S. W. (2d) 529
(1938); Ridgway v. Cockburn, 163 Misc. 511, 296 N. Y. Supp. 936 (1937). State
courts have also generally upheld convenants barring persons of certain races from
occupying restricted land. Waytt v. Adair, 215 Ala. 363, 11o So. 8oi (1926); Fairchild v. Raines, 24 Cal. (2d) 818, 151 P. (2d) 260 (1944); Parmalee v. Morris, 218
Mich. 625, 188 N. W. 330, 38 A. L. R. 118o (1922); Doherty v. Rice, 240 Wis. 389,
3 N. W. (2d) 734 (1942). However, in 1948 the United States Supreme Court held
that state court enforcement of such covenants and restrictions constituted state
action and as such was violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. Shelley v. Kraemer,
344 U. S. i, 68 S. Ct. 836, 3 A. L. R. (2d) 441 (1948).
Passenger Transportation: State statutes requiring segregation on carriers
in intrastate commerce have been held constitutional. McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.
F. R. Co., 235 U. S. 151, 35 S. Ct. 69, 59 L. ed. 169 (1914); Chiles v. Chesapeake &
0. R. R., 218 U. S.71, 30 S.Ct. 667, 54 L. ed. 936 (191o); Chesapeake 8- 0. R. Co. v.
Kentucky, 179 U. S. 388, 21 S. Ct. 101, 45 L. ed. 244 (1900); Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U. S.537, 16 S. Ct. 1138, 41 L. ed. 256 (1896). Recent tightening of the doctrine
is seen in: Henderson v. United States, 339 U. S. 816, 7o S. Ct. 843, 94 L. ed. 13o2
(1950); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U. S. 373, 66 S. Ct. 1050, 90 L. ed. 1317 (1946);
Mitchell v. United States, 313 U. S. 80, 61 S. Ct. 873, 85 L. ed. 12oi (1941). For a
general discussion of racial discrimination and of race as affecting the right to vote,
regulation of business, competency of witnesses, etc., see Note (1949) 94 L. ed. 1121.
0211 U. S. 45, 29 S. Ct. 33, 53 L. ed. 81 (19o8). Cf. Cumming v. Richmond
County Board of Education, 175 U. S. 528, 20 S. Ct. 197, 44 L. ed. 262 (1899). In
neither case did the Supreme Court feel that the precise question of the constitutionality of the state police power in requiring segregation was before it. "It was said
at the argument that the vice in the common-school system of Georgia was the
requirement that the white and colored children of the State be educated in
separate schools. But we need not consider that question in this case. No such
issue was made in the pleadings." Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education, 175 U. S. 528, 543, 20 S. Ct. 197, 2oo, 44 L. ed. 262, 266 (1899). See Justice
Harlan's dissent in Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U. S.45, 58, 29 S.Ct. 33, 36, 53 L.

ed. Si (i9o8).
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v. Rice7 the Court held that a girl of Chinese descent had not been
denied equal protection of the laws under a Mississippi statute which
resulted in denial of her entrance into "white" public schools of that
state. In recent years, the Supreme Court has had the opportunity to
review the question specificallys and though it has refused to overrule
the doctrine expressly, 9 the Court, in cases dealing with education in
graduate schools, has emphasized the "equal" factor of the doctrine,
making it clear that the standard of equality is a real one and not a
legal fiction, and that segregation in fact must fall where inequality
is manifest. 10
In Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada-' the Supreme Court refused
to consider the relative advantages or opportunities of study at the
University of Missouri and the universities of neighboring states which
plaintiff might have attended at state expense, but held that laws requiring separation must be tested in light of the equality of facilities
offered the two groups within the state, thus overthrowing the state's
policy of segregaion without a "clear and unmistakable" showing that
inequality did exist.1 2 In i95o, the Court, in Sweatt v. Painter,13 re-

versed the Texas Court of Civil Appeals in ruling that equality could
not be found as between an old, established law school and a newly
7275
8

U. S. 78, 48 S. Ct. 91,

72

L. ed.

172 (1927).

McLaurin v. Oklahoma Board of Regents, 339 U. S. 637, 70 S. Ct. 851, 94 L. ed.
1149 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629, 70 S. Ct. 848, 94 L. ed. 1114 (1950);
Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631, 68 S. Ct. 299, 92 L. ed. 247 (1948); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337, 59 S. Ct. 232, 83 L. ed. 208 (1938).
"Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629, 635, 70 S. Ct. 848, 851, 94 L. ed. 1114, 1120
(1950): "We cannot... agree with respondents that the doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson... requires affirmance of the judgment below. Nor need we reach petitioner's
contention that Plessy v. Ferguson should be reexamined in the light of contemporary knowledge respecting the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
effects of racial segregation."
1"McLaurin v. Oklahoma Board of Regents, 339 U. S. 637, 70 S. Ct. 851, 95 L. ed.
1149 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629, 70 S. Ct. 848, 94 L. ed. 1114 (1950).
Ransmier, The Fourteenth Amendment and the "Separate but Equal" Doctrine
(1951) 50 Mich. L. Rev. 203.
11305 U. S. 537, 59 S. Ct. 232, 83 L. ed. 208 (1938).
"Upon this standard, since Missouri provided no separate facilities for Negroes
in the study of law, inequality was inevitably found to exist. It certainly seems possible that the facilities at the out-of-state universities were substantially equal
to those at the University of Missouri, and it cannot be assumed that attendance
at one of them would have been less convenient to plaintiff; but the Court precluded such considerations. See Justice McReynolds' concurring opinion, 305 U. S.
337, 353, 59 S. Ct. 232, 238, 83 L. ed. 2o8, 215 (1938).
"3339 U. S. 629, 70 S. Ct. 848, 94 L. ed. 1114 (195o), reversing Sweatt v. Painter,
210

S. W.

(2d) 442 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).

19531
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instituted one. 14 Then, in McLaurin v. Oklahoma Board of Regents15
the Court held that, once admitted, plaintiff could not be accorded any
6
different treatment than that of other students of the University.
While the Court did not in these cases rule upon the constitutionality of
segregation, the rules enunciated have so tightened the standard of
equality that racial separation in public graduate and professional
17
schools has been, in practical effect, foreclosed.
In the field of primary and secondary education, the effect of the
doctrine has been largely shaped by the state and lower federal courts.
It has been generally held by these courts that there is a lack of requisite equality where the schools for each race fail to conduct terms
of the same length,1s or do not furnish similar courses of study,' 9 or
"'"Whether the University of Texas Law School is compared with the original
or the new law school for Negroes, we cannot find substantial equality in the educational opportunities offered white and Negro students by the State. In terms of
number of faculty, variety of courses and opportunity for specialization, size of
student body, scope of the library, availability of law review and similar activities,
the University of Texas Law School is superior. What is more important, the
University of Texas Law School possesses to a far greater degree those qualities
which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in a
law school. Such qualities to name but a few, include reputation of the faculty,
experience of the administration, position and influence of the alumni, standing
in the community, traditions and prestige. It is difficult to believe that one who
had a free choice between these law schools would consider the question dose."
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629, 633, 70 S. Ct. 848, 850, 94 L. ed. 1114, 1119 (1950).
'5339 U. S. 637, 70 S. Ct. 851, 94 L. ed. 1149 (1950).
"".. he was required to sit apart at a designated desk in an anteroom adjoining the classroom; to sit at a designated desk on the mezzanine floor of the library;
but not to use the desks in the regular reading room; and to sit at a designated
table and to eat a different time from the other students in the school cafeteria."
339 U. S.637, 640, 70 S.Ct. 851, 853, 94 L. ed. 153 (1950).
"7In the McLaurin case, the ruling that McLaurin must be given the exactly
identical treatment as other students would seem to be a recognition by the Court
that there are no basic differences between the two races as far as education is
concerned, and would seem to destroy the premise upon which separation has
been held constitutional-i.e., that race is a material and reasonable basis for classification in the field of education.
For a general discussion of the separate but equal doctrine see: Ransmier, The
Fourteenth Amendment and The "Separate but Equal" Doctrine (sg5i) 5o Mich.
L. Rev. 2o3; Roche, Education, Segregation and the Supreme Court-A Political
Analysis (1951) 99 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 949; Notes (1949) 17 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
'o8; (1948) 46 Mich. L. Rev. 639; (1947) 56 Yale L. J. 1o59. For a discussion of
group discrimination see: Berger, The Supreme Court and Group Discrimination
Since 1937 (1949) 49 Col. L. Rev. 2o; Note (1949) 49 Col. L. Rev. 630.
"Claybrook v. City of Owensboro, 16 Fed. 297 (D. C. Ky. 1883); Lowery v.
Board of Graded School Trustees, 14o N. C. 33, 52 S. E. 267 (igo5); Jones v. Board
of Education, go Okla. 233, 217 Pac. 400 (1923).
"*Inequality of facilities was found to exist where Negroes were not given
similar instruction: Davis v. County School Board, 103 F. Supp. 337 (E. D. Va. 1952)
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where by taking advantage of such similar courses, pupils encounter
unequal circumstances. 20 And it has been held that a state may not
constitutionally discriminate in salaries paid as between teachers
of each race, where their qualifications and training are substantially
equal.21 In this connection the ratio of teachers to students and the
relative competence and training of teachers as between the two school
systems, while not conclusive, have usually been given due consideration.2 2 However, it has been agreed that identity of school plants, in
respect to size, cost, and number, is not necessary in order to insure
equal facilities, particularly where there is considerable variance in the
number of pupils.2 3 The fact that certain colored pupils must travel
(physics, world history, Latin, advanced typing, wood, metal and machine shop
work and drawing): Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F. (2d) 212 (C. C. A.
4th, 1945) (library training course); Graham v. Board of Education, 153 Kan. 840, 114
P. (2d) 313 (1941) (departmentalized teaching system and alphabetical grading
system, and in music and athletics); Jones v. Board of Education, 90 Okla. 233,
217 Pac. 400 (1923) (in blacksmithing, auto repairing, banking and commercial
courses).
Cf. State ex rel. Cheeks v. Wirt, 203 Ind. 121, 177 N. E. 441 (1931).
20 Pearson v. Murray, 169 Md. 478, 182 Ad. 590 (1936) (granting of insufficient
number of scholarships to Negroes to attend law schools outside of state which
subjected them to more expense than would attendance at state university).
21
Discrimination found: Morris v. Williams, 149 F. (2d) 703 (C.C.A. 8th, 1945)
(where based on custom or policy of school board); Alston v. School Board, 112 F.
(2d) 992 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940) (where shown by a salary schedule); Davis v. Cook,
55 F. Supp. 1004 (N. D. Ga. 1944); McDaniel v. Board of Public Instruction, 39
F. Supp. 638 (N. D. Fla. 1941). But the fact that Negro teachers received a lower
salary is not violative of Fourteenth Amendment where such is not based upon the
difference in race: Reynolds v. Board of Instruction, 148 F. (2d) 754 (C. C. A. 5 th,
1945) (lacking in experience and education); Thompson v. Gibbs, 6o F. Supp. 872
(E. D. S. C. 1945) (difference in professional attainments shown by lower grades
made by Negroes on state examination).
-Claybrook v. City of Owensboro, 16 Fed. 297 (D. C. Ky. 1883); Graham v.
Board of Education, 153 Kan. 840, 114 P. (2d) 313 (1941); Board of Education v.
o
Ballard, 299 Ky. 370, 185 S. W. (2d) 538 (1945); Jones v. Board of Education, 9
Okla. 233, 217 Pac. 400 (1923)2'Davis v. County School Board, 103 F. Supp. 337 (E. D. Va. 1952). No discrimination found: State ex rel. Hobby v. Disman, 250 S. W. (2d) 137 (Mo. 1952)
(less convenient physical arrangements and lack of gymnasium and auditorium at
Negro school); Reynolds v. Board of Education, 66 Kan. 672, 72 Pac. 274 (1903)
(building for large white school was larger than commodious building for a small
colored school); Lowery v. Board of Graded School Trustees, 14o N. C. 33, 52 S. E.
267 (igo5). Discrimination was found: Claybrook v. City of Owensboro, 16 Fed.
297 (D. C. Ky. 1883) (number of white schools were disproportionate to colored
schools according to enrollment); Graham v. Board of Education, 153 Kan. 840,
114 P. (2d) 313 (1941) (lack of auditorium, music and athletic facilities at Negro
school); Jones v. Board of Education, go Okla. 233, 217 Pac. 400 (1923) (value of
colored school building vastly lower than value of white school building, and so
crowded that classes met only half-time). See also, Corbin v. County School Board,
177 F. (2d) 924 (C. A. 4 th, 1949).
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farther to reach school than any white pupil is required to travel to
reach his school, or must travel through dangerous or difficult accesses to reach school does not necessarily indicate inequality of facilities.' 4 Furthermore, the educational advantages afforded, as between
25
white and Negro Schools, need not exist in the same school district.
The recent Delaware case of Gebhart v. Belton,26 involving segregated primary education, is outstanding as an illustration of meticulous state court regard for the precise holdings of the United States
Supreme Court in this field and of consequent refusal to anticipate a
possible overruling of the separate but equal doctrine. The case was
composed of two separate bills in equity which, though substantially
different in their factual situations, were consolidated because of the
similarity of the questions of law involved. The relief sought in each
case was two-fold: (i) a declaratory judgment that the provisions of
the Delaware Constitution 27 and laws regarding segregation in the
public schools of the state 28 were in contravention of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and (2) an injunction
restraining the defendants, members of the State Board of Education,
from denying the plaintiffs admittance to schools maintained in their
districts for white children.
The trial court 29 concluded from the evidence that in Delaware,
state-imposed segregation resulted in inferior educational opportunities for Negro children as a class, and expressed the opinion that
the separate but equal doctrine should be rejected. 30 Recognizing,
'Disparity in distance and conditions of travel was not found to be discrimination: Winborne v. Taylor, 195 F. (2d) 649 (C. A. 4th, 1952) (round trip of about
thirty miles per day, where transportation facilities adequate); Corbin v. County
School Board, 177 F. (2d) 924 (C. A. 4 th, 1949); McSwain v. County Board of
Education, 104 F. Supp. 861 (E. D. Tenn. 1952) (travel over a fine highway in a
new bus for one-way distance of nineteen miles); Roberts v. City of Boston, 59
Mass. 198 (1849) (plaintiff required to travel one-fifth mile further to colored
school than she would have to travel if allowed to attend nearer white school).
Lehew v. Brummell, 103 Mo. 546, 15 S. W. 765 (s8gi) (colored children required
to travel three and one-half miles to reach a colored school, while no white child
in district had to travel further than two miles).
-3Winborne v. Taylor, 195 F. (2d) 649 (C. A. 4 th, 1952); Pearson v. Murray, 169
Md. 478, 182 Atl. 590, 1o3 A. L. R. 706 (1936).

2gi A. (2d) 137 (Del-

1952).

2Del. Const. (1897) Art. X §§ 1, 2.
-Del. Rev. Code (1935) § 2631.
n"Belton v. Gebhart, 87 A. (2d) 862 (Del. Ch. 1952).
w'...by implication, the Supreme Court of the United States has said a
separate but equal test can be applied, at least below the college level. This
Court does not believe such an implication is justified under the evidence. Never-
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however, that Supreme Court decisions31 in the field of primary education had applied the separate but equal doctrine, the state Supreme
Court affirmed the trial court's refusal to enter the declaratory judgment argued for and declined to review that court's position that segregation should be held illegal per se, saying:
"The Supreme Court of the United States has said that the
states may establish separate schools if the facilities furnished
are substantially equal for all. To say the facilities can never be
equal is simply to render the Court's holdings meaningless-in
effect, to say that that Court's construction of the Constitution
32
is wrong. If so, it is for that Court to say so and not for us."
The court then proceeded to a review of the evidence which plaintiffs submitted in an attempt to show that the facilities offered them
were inferior to those offered white pupils similarly situated. In the
first suit, plaintiff, colored and of high school age, was denied admittance, solely on grounds of race or color, to Claymont High School, a
school maintained in plaintiff's school district for white students only,
and was required to travel nine miles to Howard High School in a
nearby city, the latter being the only high school maintained in plaintiff's county which offered a complete high school course to Negroes.
33
The lower court found that with respect to teacher training, pupil3
3
34
teacher ratio, extra curricular activities, physical plants and aestheless, I do not believe a lower court can reject a principle of United States Constitutional law which has been adopted by fair implication by the highest court
of the land. I believe the 'separate but equal' doctrine in education should be rejected, but I also believe its rejection must come from that Court." Belton v. Gebhart, 87 A. (2d) 862, 865 (Del. Ch. 1952).
3Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U. S. 78, 48 S. Ct. 91 (1927). See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U. S. 537, 544, 16 S. Ct. 1138, 1140 (1896).
"Gebhart v. Belton, 91 A. (2d) 137, 142 (Del. 1952).
3'reacher training: Claymont: 59 per cent held Master's degrees, 41 per cent
had Bachelor's degrees, none were without degrees. Howard: 37.73 per cent had
Master's degrees, 52 per cent held Bachelor's degrees, 9.4 per cent held no degree
(one teaching a vocational subject, another wood-working, another physical education). Belton v. Gebhart, 87 A. (2d) 862, 867 (Del. Ch. 1952).
Howard
Claymont
'"Size of classes:
32.26
25.56
English ....................................................
31.10
25.75
Foreign Languages ..........................................
24.71
16.2
Home Economics ...........................................
23.9
17.14
Industrial Arts ..............................................
33.25
30.60
Mathematics ...............................................
32.26
34.87
Natural Sciences ............................................
43.67
24.28
Physical Education .........................................
32.05
33.88
Social Studies ...............................................
The "average" teacher at Howard carried a teaching load of 178 pupils per week;
Claymont, 149. Belton v. Gebhart, 87 A. (2d) 862, 867 (Del. Ch. 1952).
nlaymont, School newspaper, Art Club, Drivers Club, Mathematics Club,
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thetic considerations, 30 and travel conditions,37 Howard was inferior to
Claymont. And the position was taken that if the educational opportunities provided for Negroes are, as to any substantial factor, inferior
to those offered to white children similarly situated, the separate but
equal doctrine is violated. The Delaware Supreme Court, finding this
latter point of view too severe and likely to lead to the magnifying of
minor differences, decided that plaintiffs should be entitled to relief
only if they were actually injured by such inequalities as might exist.
Reviewing the evidence with unbaised care, the upper court found
that the trial court's findings were too sweeping and concluded that,
as regards the pupil-teacher ratio, formal teacher training, and average size of classes, the differences were only such as might be found
between any two schools, whether white or Negro, and that none of
these factors was such as to create substantial inequality of facilities.
However, the upper court agreed that in respect to the course of
physical education at Howard, the classes were so large as probably to
prevent satisfactory instruction s due to a lack of proper gymnasium
facilities, and that since physical education was a necessary and required course, substantial inequality did exist in this respect. It also
concurred in the finding of inferiority in the physical plants, but
qualified the finding based upon aesthetic considerations. 39 It agreed
that travel conditions were inferior, and emphasized that these shortSquare Dance Club, Leaders Corps. Howard: Story Hour, Science Club, French
Club. Belton v. Gebhart, 87 A. (2d) 862, 867 (Del. Ch. 1952).
3While the Howard building as compared with the Claymont building was
fairly good, it lacked a proper gymnasium. The Carver building, however, an integral part of the Howard plant, was an old building without a regular cafeteria,
gymnasium, or auditorium, and contained but one lavatory which had an unsanitary cement floor.
Howard was located on three and one-half acres of land, without adequate
playground facilities. It and Carver are surrounded by industrial buildings and
"poor housing." Belton v. Gebhart, 87 A. (2d) 862, 866 (Del. Ch. 1952).
3rWhile the court does not say that the state does not provide transportation,
its opinion implies such. The court found that plaintiff had to ride to school each
morning and back in the afternoon, each way taking about fifty minutes. Plaintiff
was also required to take a fifteen minute walk twice a week in order to take
business courses. Belton v. Gebhart, 87 A. (2d) 862, 866 (Del. Ch. 1952).
"In Physical Education the average class at Claymont was 24.88 and at Howard,
43.67, one class having an enrollment of 88. Gebhart v. Belton, 91 A. (2d) 137, 146

(Del.

1952).

n0"We are inclined to agree that if these two schools were substantially equal
in all other respects such a difference [in sites, based upon esthetic considerations]
would hardly justify a finding of substantial inequality; but in this case esthetic
considerations do not stand alone." The court felt that the Howard playground
facilities were inadequate. Gebhart v. Belton, 91 A. (2d) 137, 145 (Del. 1952).
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comings occurred not alone because of differences in comparative
distances, but also because of a lack of adequate state-provided transportation to and from Howard, while transportation facilities to and
from Claymont were adequate. As regards extra-curricular activities,
the divergencies were found to be merely reflections of differences in
interest and tastes and not the result of inadequancy of facilities in the
Negro school. The court concluded that there were in existence such
major inequalities-in plant and buildings, in physical facilities and
instruction, and in the transportation systems-that the separate but
equal doctrine was not satisfied.
The second suit was instituted on behalf of an eight year old Negro.
In the county of her residence 'the State maintained two elementary
grade schools, School No. 29, a four-room building with four teachers
and one hundred and eleven pupils; and School No. 107, a two-room
building with two teachers and forty-four pupils. The evidence disclosed that prior to 1951 the State had discriminated against School
No. 107 in the allocation of funds, the value of School No. 107 had
depreciated while the value of School No. 29 had appreciated, reflecting differences in maintenance, upkeep and improvements; 40 that No.
29 had an auditorium, basketball court, accepted forms of drinking
fountains, sanitary toilet facilities, adequate fire protection, and
adequate transportation, while School No. 107 had none of these; and
that teacher training at No. 29 was superior to that at No. 107. The
upper court concluded that on the evidence the facilities of School
No. 107 were, to the extent set forth, substantially unequal to those at
School No. 29, and that plaintiff had suffered injury.
As a result of the findings that the separate facilities were not equal
and that the plaintiffs were therefore being denied the equal protection of the laws, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the granting
of an injunction requiring that plaintiffs be admitted to Claymont and
School No. 29, even though the defendants had shown that facilities
at Howard and School No. 107 would be equalized by September,
1953. In regard to this latter point the court relied upon pronouncements of the Supreme Court of the United States that the right to
equal protection of the laws was a "personal and present" right, and concluded that plaintiffs could not, therefore, be denied such relief as was
41
currently available.
*°School No. 29: Original cost (1932) was $55,000 while the present value is
$77,ooo. School No. 107: Original cost (1922) was $2i,ooo, while the present value was
found to be only $13,ooo. Belton v. Gebhart, 87 A. (2d) 862, 870 (Del. Ch. 1952).
"Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629, 70 S. Ct. 848, 94 L. ed. 1114 (1950); Shelley
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The Delaware court in disposing of those cases emphasized that it
was under a duty to uphold the state constitutional requirement of
separate schools for white and colored children and not to abrogate the
requirement except insofar-and only insofar-as required to do so
by a ruling 6f the Supreme Court of the United States. The state
court correctly asserted that the Supreme Court has refused, thus far,
to overrule the separate but equal doctrine applied in Plessy v. Ferguson, though expressely urged to do so. And in reply to the argument
that "the cases of Plessy v. Ferguson and Gong Lum v. Rice... are
without force today and that we should assume that they will be overruled,"4 2 the Delaware court said, "We can make no such assumption.
'It is for the Supreme Court, not us, to overrule its decisions or to
hold them outmoded'." 43 In its approach to the problem of conflict between state and federal constitutional provisions with consequent federal supremacy, the Delaware court wisely followed the Supreme Court's
own canons in refusing to "anticipate a question of constitutional
' 4
and in declining to
law in advance of the necessity of deciding it,"
"formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by
the precise facts to which it is to be applied." 45 The ultimate fate of
the separate but equal doctrine and of state separate school laws must
await the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the
segregation cases presently before it.46
WILLIAM C. GUTHRIE, JR.

v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 836, 92 L. ed. 1161 (1948); Sipuel v. Board of
Regents, 332 U. S. 631, 68 S. Ct. 299, 92 L. ed. 247 (1948); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada, 305 U. S. 337, 59 S. Ct. 232, 83 L. ed. 2o8 (1938). However, other courts
have not reached the same conclusion of requiring immediate matriculation, and
have allowed the state time in which to equalize facilities. Wrighten v. Board of
Trustees, 72 F. Supp. 948 (E. D. S. C. 1947); Davis v. County School Board, 103 F.
Supp. 337 (E. D. Va. 1952); Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529 (E. D. S. C. 1951).
'-Gebhart v. Belton, 91 A. (2d) 137, 141 (Del. 1952).
"3Gebhart v. Belton, 91 A. (2d) 137, 141 (Del. 1952)"Brandeis' concurring opinion in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297
U. S. 288, 346, 56 S. Ct. 466, 483, 8o L. ed. 688, 711 (1936).
'-Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 347, 56 S. Ct. 466,
483, So L. ed. 688, 711 (1936) (concurring opinion).
4OCertiorari granted-Nov. 24, 1952 (21 U. S. L. Wk. 3144); case argued-Dec. ii,
1952 (21 U. S. L. Wk. 3161); case restored to docket for reargument at next term of
court in the fall of 1953-June 8, 1953 (21 U. S. L. Wk. 1189).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PROTECTION AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY AS ELEMENT OF DUE PROCESS UNDER FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. [United
States Supreme Court]

Although it has been urged that the Fourteenth Amendment was
intended to guarantee to citizens of the States the same rights as against
the state governments that are guaranteed in the first eight amendments
to federal citizens as against the federal government,' the Supreme
Court has repeatedly ruled that "due process of law" does not embrace
all rights enumerated in the federal Bill of Rights.2 The test usually
adopted for determining whether an alleged right is one to be protected under the Fourteenth Amendment turns on whether the right
claimed by the accused involves a "principle of justice so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental, ' 3 or, differently stated, a principle "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty." 4
As a result of case-by-case determination of the scope of due process
by the Supreme Court, rights held to be fundamental are the right to
just compensation when private property is taken for public use under
the power of eminent domain, 5 freedom of speech, 6 freedom of the
press, 7 free exercise of religion, 8 the right of peaceable assembly, 9 the
right to assistance of counsel in special circumstances,1 0 and the right to
'Black, J., dissenting in Adamson v. California, 322 U. S. 46 at 71, 67 S. Ct. 1672
at 1686, 91 L. ed. 19o3 at 191 9 , 171 A. L. R. 1223 at 1239 (1947).
2
Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 67 S. Ct. 1672, 91 L. ed. 19o3, 171 A. L. R.
1223 (1947); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 58 S. Ct. 149, 82 L. ed. 288 (1937);
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 29 S. Ct. 14, 53 L. ed. 97 (1908).
3
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325, 58 S. Ct. 149, 152, 82 L. ed. 288, 292
(1937); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278, 285, 56 S. Ct. 461, 464, 8o L. ed. 682, 686
(1936); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 105, 54 S. Ct. 330, 332, 78 L. ed. 674, 677
(1934). Also Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312 at 316, 47 S. Ct. 103 at 104, 71 L. ed.
270 at 273 (1926).
4
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325, 58 S. Ct. 149, 152, 82 L. ed. 288, 292

(1937)uChicago, B & Q. R. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 17 S. Ct. 581, 41 L. ed. 979
(1897).

'Herndon v. Lowry, 3o U. S. 242, 57 S. Ct. 732, 81 L. ed. io66 (1937); De Jonge
v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 57 S. Ct. 255, 81 L. ed. 278 (1937).
7Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 56 S. Ct. 444, 8o L. ed. 66o
(1936); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 51 S. Ct. 625, 75 L. ed. 1357 (1931).
sHamilton v. Regents of University, 293 U. S. 245, 55 S. Ct. 197, 79 L. ed. 343
(1934)'Herndon v. Lowery, 301 U. S. 242, 57 S. Ct. 732, 81 L. ed. io66 (1937); De Jonge
v. Orgeon, 299 U. S. 353, 57 S. Ct. 255, 81 L. ed. 278 (1937).
"Townsend v. Burke, 334 U. S. 736, 68 S. Ct. 1252, 92 L. ed. 16go (1948) (defendant was prejudiced either by the prosecution's submission of misinformation
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be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.'1 On the other hand,
the general right to assistance of counsel, 1 2 the right to presentment or
indictment by grand jury,' 3 freedom from self-incrimination,' 4 the
right to a jury trial,'5 freedom from the use of illegally seized evidence, 16
and freedom from being placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense 17
have been held not to be such fundamental rights as to receive the
sanction of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court in the recent case of Brock v. North Carolina,5
by a 6 to 2 vote, has reiterated and extended its earlier ruling'0 that
the Fourteenth Amendment does not embrace protection against double
jeopardy as a fundamental right within the due process provision.
Here, the petitioner and two others, all of whom were striking mill
employees, were arrested for allegedly firing five shots from a passing
auto into the home of a watchman employed by the same mill. Upon
being arrested, one of the petitioner's companions stated that the petitioner had helped plan the assault and had fired the shots. The two
companions were tried and convicted, but before sentence was pronounced on them, the petitioner was placed on trial and the two comregarding his prior criminal record or by the court's careless misreading of that
record); Wade v. Mayo, 334 U. S. 672, 68 S. Ct. 1270, 92 L. ed. 1647 (1948) (defendant was an inexperienced youth incapable of adequately representing himself);
De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U. S. 663, 67 S. Ct. 596, 91 L. ed. 584 (1947) (seventeen
year old defendant was hurried through trial, nothing was said in his defense
and the court did not inform him of the consequences of his plea of guilty).
"Wolf v. Colorado, .38 U. S. 25, 69 S. Ct. 1359, 93 L. ed. 1782 (1949).
'Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455, 62 S. Ct. 1252, 86 L. ed. 1595 (1942).
"Gaines v. Washington, 277 U. S. 81, 48 S.Ct. 468, 72 L. ed. 793 (1928); Hurtado
v. California, 11o U. S.516, 4 S. Ct. 111, 28 L. ed. 232 (1884).
"'Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 29 s. ct. 14, 53 L. ed. 90 (9oS). Cf. Brown
v. Mississippi, 297 U. S.278, 56 S. Ct. 461, 8o L. ed. 682 (1936); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S.97, 54 S. Ct. .30, 78 L. ed. 674 (1934).
2"Wagner Electric Co. v. Lyndon, 262 U. S. 226, 43 S.Ct. 589, 67 L. ed. 961 (1923);
New York Central R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 37 S.Ct. 247, 61 L. ed. 667 (1916);
Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 20 S. Ct. 448, 44 L. ed. 597 (1900); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S.90, 23 L. ed. 678 (1875).
"GWolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 69 S. Ct., 1359, 93 L. ed. 1782 (1949). Such evidence is excluded in federal prosecutions for federal crimes. Weeks v. United States,
2.12 U. S.38., 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L. ed. 652 (1914).
2IBrock v. North Carolina, 73 S.Ct. 349, 97 L. ed. 317 (1953); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S.319, 58 S.Ct. 149, 82 L. ed. 288 (1937).
"73 S. Ct. 349, 97 L. ed. 317 (1953)"Palko v. Connecticut, 3o2 U. S. 319, 58 S. Ct. 149, 82 L. ed. 288 (1937) held
constitutional a state statute providing for a new trial on appeal by the state from a
trial in which there were errors of law. This case is distinguishable from the
Brock case in that a statute was involved, and the statute concerned a trial in
which there were errors of law.
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panions were called as witnesses by the state. When they refused to
testify on grounds of self-incrimination, the prosecution requested and
was granted a mistrial. Sentence later having been pronounced on the
companions and their conviction upheld by the Supreme Court of
North Carolina, the petitioner was again brought to trial. Although
North Carolina has no constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy, the petitioner objected that he was being placed twice in jeopardy
and therefore deprived of federal due process of law, but the trial court
overruled the objection. At the second trial, one of his companions
testified as a witness for the prosecution, and the petitioner was found
guilty, which conviction was affirmed on appeal to the highest court of
the state.
Justice Minton delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court of the
United States which affirmed the judgments of the state courts holding
that the petitioner had not been deprived of due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment. The majority opinion, joined in by four other
Justices, 20 relied on a long-standing North Carolina rule that a trial
court has the discretion to declare a mistrial and later cause the defendant to be tried again "if it be in the interest of justice to do so,"21
22
and on the 1937 Supreme Court decision in Palko v. Connecticut
that freedom from double jeopardy is not a fundamental right. Prior
decisions 23 of the Court were cited for the proposition that, consistent
with the North Carolina view, "This Court has long favored the rule
of discretion in the trial judge to declare a mistrial and to require
another panel to try the defendant if the ends of justice will be best
24
served."
"The majority of the Court consisted of Justices Minton, Clark, Reed, Jackson,
and Burton. Justice Frankfurter concurred in a separate opinion. Chief Justice
Vinson and Justice Douglas wrote separate dissenting opinions. Justice Black took
no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
nBrock v. North Carolina, 73 S. Ct. 349, 350, 97 L. ed. 317, 319 (1953).
23o2 U. S. 319, 58 S. Ct. 149, 82 L. ed. 288 (1937).
-'Wade v. Hunter, 336 U. S. 684, 69 S. Ct. 834, 93 L. ed. 974 (1949); Thompson
v. United States, 155 U. S. 271, 15 S.Ct. 73, 39 L. ed. 146 (1894). These cases arose
under the Fifth Amendment. In the Wade case, the defendant was tried by a general court-martial of the Third Army which continued the case in order to
hear certain civilian witnesses. When the witnesses became available the Third
Army had progressed so far from the scene of the act that the case was transferred
to the Fifteenth Army for a new trial. This was held not to be double jeopardy.
In the Thompson case, after the jury was sworn and one witness examined, the
court discovered that one of the jurors was disqualified by virtue of having been a
member of the grand jury that returned the indictment. It was held not to be
placing the accused in double jeopardy for the court to discharge the present jury
and order another jury to be called.
"Brock v. North Carolina, 73 S.Ct. 349, 350, 97 L. ed. 317, 320. (1953).
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Justice Frankfurter in a concurring opinion attempted to define
more generally the scope of due process in this relation by stating
the point beyond which double jeopardy would be a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. "A State falls short of its obligation when it
callously subjects an individual to successive retrials on a charge on
which he has been acquitted or prevents a trial from proceeding to a
termination in favor of the accused merely in order to allow a prosecutor who has been incompetent or casual or even ineffective to see if
he cannot do better a second time." 25 However, he did not feel that
the record justified overthrowing the decision of the trial judge that a
second trial would be fair and not oppressive to the petitioner.
Justice Douglas dissented, pointing out that as early as 1795, the
North Carolina court, recounting the conditions in England which
led to the fear of double jeopardy in the colonies, had concluded that
the practice of allowing the prosecution to have a mistrial in order
to prepare better evidence for a second trial of the accused for the
same offense, is "so abhorrent to every principle of safety and security
that it ought not to receive the least countenance in the courts of this
20
country."
Chief Justice Vinson in a very thorough dissenting opinion stated
that "For the first time in the history of this Court it is urged that a
state could grant a mistrial in order that it might present a stronger
case at some later trial and, in so doing, avoid a plea of former jeopardy
in the second trial." 27 The Chief Justice observed that North Carolina
is one of only five states which have no provision in their constitutions
forbidding double jeopardy, 28 yet include such protection as part of
their common law.2 9 He quoted extensively from two early North
Carolina cases30 which point up the injustice of being placed twice in
jeopardy for the same offense, and followed by observing that no case
has been cited from another state which would allow a mistrial and
a second trial in the circumstances of this case. The Palko case was distinguished on two grounds: first, a statute was involved there, and the
'Brock v. North Carolina, 73 S. Ct. 349, 351, 97 L. ed. 317, 321 (1953).
2
-°State v. Garrigues, 2 N. C. 241 (1795), quoted at 73 S. Ct. 349, 357, 97 L. ed.
317, 327 (1953).
"Brock v. North Carolina, 73 S.Ct. 349, 352, 97 L. ed .117, 322 (1953).
sThe others named were Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Vermont.
OState v. Benham, 7 Conn. 414 (1829); Gilpin v. State, 142 Md. 464, 121 At.
354 (1923); Commonwealth v. McCan, 277 Mass. 199, 178 N. E. 633, 78 A. L. R. 1208
(1931); State v. Clemmons, 207 N. C. 276, 176 S. E. 76o (1934); State v. O'Brien, Lo6
Vt. 97, 17o Ad. 98 (1934).
:,In re Spier, 12 N. C. 491 (1828); State v. Garrigues, 2 N. C. 241 (1795).
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Supreme Court has often recognized that such considered action by a
state legislature "places the issue of constitutionality in a different posture in respect of due process of law," 31 and second, under the statute,
the state was seeking a second trial that would be free from error by the
court prejudicial to the state. The Chief Justice added that while Palko
does not control the present case, the following language from justice
Cardozo's opinion in the earlier case comforted him: "What the answer would have to be if the state were permitted after a trial free
from error to try the accused over again or to bring another case
32
against him, we have no occasion to consider."
The dissenting Justices failed to stress the fact that Brock v. North
Carolina is a non-capital felony case in which situation the North
Carolina rule has always been that the trial judge has discretion to
declare a mistrial and continue the case to a later date. 33 The two
North Carolina decisions on which the dissenting Justices rely are
capital felony cases, 34 and state the rule applicable only to such
cases. Though it may be questioned that the distinction between
capital and non-capital felonies is a logical one in this connection,
it is difficult to see why a North Carolina rule which has been followed
for over one hundred years should now be struck down because it suddenly would threaten "the hard-won victory achieved in the field of
'double jeopardy'. 3 3
The idea of due process in the procedural sense has become identified with the concept of fairness, 36 and the difference of opinion between the Justices in the principal case seems to arise basically from
their divergent views as to whether the procedure followed was so
lacking in fairness that it violated fundamental principles of justice
31

Brock v. North Carolina, 73 S. Ct. 349, 356, 97 L. ed. 317, 325 (1953).
3Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 328, 58 S. Ct. 149, 153, 82 L. ed. 288, 293
(1937), Cited by Chief Justice Vinson in Brock v. North Carolina, 73 S. Ct. 349, 356,
97 L. ed. 317, 326 (195).
"State v. Bass, 82 N. C. 570 (188o) (non-capital felony); State v. Tilletson, 52
N. C. 114 (1859) (larceny; jury failed to agree and was dismissed) reference at p. 115
to In re Spier, 12 N. C. 491 (1828): "These cases may be considered as settling the
law in respect to the class of felonies of which they treat, but the restricted range
of judicial power, as established in them, has never been applied to offenses of inferior grades whether felonies or misdemeanors, and we think it is not applicable."
State v. Weaver, 35 N. C. 203 (1851) (misdemeanor); State v. Morrison, 2o N. C. 114
(1838) (misdemeanor).
2In re Spier, 12 N. C. 491 (1828); State v. Garrigues, 2 N. C. 241 (1795). Both
were murder cases.
3Brock v. North Carolina, 73 S. Ct. 349, 355, 97 L. ed. 317, 325 (1953).
"Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. ed. 158, 84 A. L. R. 527
(1932).
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and ordered liberty. Independent of the question of fairness, the
Supreme Court early decided that in the procedural field, process
which was historic, even though by modern standards harsh, was yet
due process and would be upheld.3t The majority of the Court seems
to have had something of this principle in mind when it stressed the
long continued use of the mistrial procedure in North Carolina. And
the dissents' reliance on the North Carolina practice in capital felony
cases decided early in the state's history was apparently prompted by
the same consideration.
The general prohibition against double jeopardy is recognized
by all the states, in forty-three by constitutional provision and under
the common law in the other five. This widespread acceptance would
seem to give the rule at least a near approach to being a fundamental
principal of justice. The cases which have arisen concerning the specific
point of mistrial have with only a few exceptions held that such a proceeding is a violation of the law of the jurisdiction,3 8 and this was
especially true in the few cases where the mistrial was due to the inability of the prosecution to present testimony.3 9 Since other states
faced with the same problem hold that the accused is placed under
double jeopardy when subjected to a second trial following a mistrial
'Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 54 S. Ct. 330, 78 L. ed. 674 (1934) (pointing out specific objects on a viewing of scene by jury held proper historic process not
overturned by Fourteenth Amendment); Corn Exchange Bank v. Coler, 280 U. S.
218, 50 S. Ct. 94, 74 L. ed. 378 (193o) (property of an absconding husband can be
taken over and applied to support of wife and children prior to a judicial decree);
Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U. S. 94, 41 S. Ct. 4.33, 65 L. ed. 837, 17 A. L. R. 873
(1921) (defendant not allowed to defend a foreign attachment suit where he did not
first furnish required security); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 29 S. Ct. 14,
53 L. ed. 97 (19o8) (freedom from self-incrimination not historically a protected
right). In this regard, it should be noted that while historic process is held to be
due process, the converse, that no type of process is due process unless it be historic,
has not been adopted.
nAllen v. State, 52 Fla. 1, 41 So. 593 (19o6); State ex rel. Meador v. Williams, 117
Mo. App. 564, 92 S. W. 151 (19o6); People v. Barrett, 2 Caines (N. Y.) 304 (1805);
State v. Richardson, 47 S. C. 166, 25 S. E. 220 (1896); Pizano v. State, 2o Tex. Crim.
139 (1886); State v. Little, 120 W. Va. 213 , 197 S. E. 626 (1938). Cf. State v. Parker,
66 Iowa 586, 24 N. W. 225 (1885). Contra: Hughes v. State, 35 Ala. 351 (186o); State
v. Nelson, 7 Ala. 61o (1845).
=Allen v. State, 52 Fla. 1, 41 So. 593 (19o6) (witness to testify for both prosecution and defense not present at first trial; jury discharged; plea of former jeopardy
upheld at second trial); State ex rel. Meador v. Williams, 117 Mo. App. 564, 92 S. W.
151 (19o6) (prosecuting attorney withdrew cause from consideration of jury because
of absence of material witness); People v. Barrett, 2 Caines (N. Y.) 304 (1805) (mistrial
because the prosecution did not have sufficient evidence); State v. Richardson, 47 S.
C. 166, 25 S. E. 220 (1896) (prosecutor withdrew case from jury on finding a witness
not present); Pizano v. State, 20 Tex. Crim. 139 (1886) (prosecutor requested discharge of jury on ground that principle witnesses for prosecution were not in court).
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granted under the circumstances of the principal case, and since those
states not having double jeopardy provisions in their constitutions include such protection as part of their common law, it seems that state
legislatures and state courts almost universally regard this protection
as a fundamental right. Furthermore, the application of Justice Frankfurter's test to the principal case points squarely to a violation of
due process, for the North Carolina trial court has obviously prevented
"a trial from proceeding to a termination in favor of the accused
merely in order to allow a prosecutor who has been incompetent or
casual or even ineffective to see if he cannot do better a second time." 40
The majority opinion can be defended on the ground that even
with respect to ancient rights specifically protected by the Bill of
Rights as against federal encroachment, the presumption of constitutionality that attaches to state procedures having historic local sanction can be overcome only by convincing proof of essential unfairness
to the accused in the particular instance-unfairness so patent as to
contravene fundamental principles of justice.
For the second time, the Supreme Court has held that state procedure subjecting an accused to double jeopardy does not deprive him of
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Although dicta in
both cases indicate that a flagrant imposition of double jeopardy would
be held to violate the due process guarantee, 41 on neither occasion did
the Court draw a precise line as to where deprivation of due process
begins. However, the strong dissent in the present case, together with
Justice Frankfurter's special concurrence, 42 gives indication that the
43
North Carolina procedure "went to the verge of the law."
ROBERT

E.

GLENN

1"Brock v. North Carolina, 73 S. Ct. 349, 351, 97 L. ed. 317, 321 (1953).
""What the answer would have to be if the state were permitted after a trial
free from error to try the accused over again or to bring another case against him, we
have no occasion to consider. We deal with the statute before us and no other. The
state is not attempting to wear the accused out by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials.... There is here no seismic innovation. The edifice of justice
stands, its symmetry, to many, greater than before." Palko v. Connecticut, 3o2 U. S.
319, 328, 58 S. Ct. 149, 153, 82 L. ed. 288, 293 (1937). There is no such inference raised
in the Court's opinion in the Brock case, but Justice Frankfurter, concurring, said,
"A State falls short of its obligation when it callously subjects an individual to successive retrials on a charge on which he has been acquitted...." Brock v. North Carolina, 73 S. Ct. 349, 351, 97 L. ed. 317, 321 (1953).
"Justice Frankfurter's attempt to set a standard in his concurring opinion
has not helped to clarify the situation materially, inasmuch as it seems that the
instant case should have been decided the other way under this very test.
"Justice Holmes, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 26o U. S. 393, 416, 43 S. Ct.
158, 16o, 67 L. ed. 322, 326, 28 A. L. R. 1321, 1326 (1922).

CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-RECOvERY OF DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF RACIAL
RESTRICTIVE COVENANT IN DEED AS
AMENDMENT. [California]

VIOLATIVE

OF FOURTEENTH

Since the United States Supreme Court's decision in Shelley v.
Kraemer' in 1948, state courts have given strict effect to, and in some
instances extended, the principle that the granting of an injunction to
enforce a racial restrictive covenant is state action denying to certain
citizens the equal protection of the laws, and, as such, violative of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 2 The Supreme Court of Illinois relied on the
Shelley ruling, which had to do with restrictions on the sale of property,
as the basis for striking down an injunction which would have forced
defendant to adhere to a covenant which prohibited leasing to members of the restricted races. 3 The contention that the defendantgrantee took with notice of the restrictive covenant and was therefore
"estopped" from claiming the constitutional protection accorded the
defendants in the Shelley case 4 has been rejected in cases involving
1344 U. S. 1, 2o, 68 S. Ct. 836, 845, 92 L. ed. 1161, 1184 (1948): "We hold that
in granting judicial enforcement of the restrictive agreements in these cases, the
States have denied petitioners the equal protection of the laws and that, therefore,
the action of the state courts cannot stand.... Because of the race or color of
these petitioners they have been denied rights of ownership or occupancy enjoyed
as a matter of course by other citizens of different race or color." The constitutionality of specific enforcement of racial restrictive covenants was doubted by one
authority before the Shelley case. See McGovney, Racial Residential Segregation
by State Court Enforcement of Restrictive Agreements, Covenants or Conditions in Deeds is Unconstitutional (1945) 33 Calif. L. Rev. 5. But with a single
exception, Gandolfo v. Hartman, 49 Fed. 181 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1892), the courts had
never before refused to enforce a racial restrictive covenant on constitutional
grounds. Note (1948) 34 Va. L. Rev. 3o6.
2

Coleman v. Stewart, 33 Cal. (2d) 703, 204 P. (2d) 7 (1949); Clayton v. Wilkins,
32 Cal. (2d) 892, 197 P. (2d) 162 (1948); Trovey v. Levy, 401 Ill. 393, 82 N. E. (2d)
411 (1948); Malicke v. Milan, 320 Mich. 65, 32 N. W. (2d) 53 (1948); Woytus v.
Winkler, 357 Mo. 1082, 212 S. W. (2d) 411 (1948); Rich v. Jones, 142 N. J. Eq. 215,
59 A. (2d) 839 (1948); Kemp v. Rubin, 298 N. Y. 59o, 81 N. E. (2d) 325 (1948);
Earley v. Baughman, 20o Okla. 649, 199 P. (2d) 210 (1948). In Dorsey v. Stuyvesant
Town Corporation, 299 N. Y. 512, 87 N. E. (2d) 541 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U. S.
981 (195o), the Court of Appeals of New York held that a private housing corp-

oration which had been organized under a special state statute and was consequently subject to certain special limitations and supervision by the state in return
for which it received tax concessions and certain other advantages, could refuse
to accept tenants because of their race, color or religion; its action was not state
action so as to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
There was a strong dissent. See Note (1950) 23 Temple L. Q. 209.
3Tovey v. Levy, 4o Ill. 393, 82 N. E. (2d) 441 (1948).
'The Shelley case originated as a suit in equity for an injunction to restrain
defendants from taking possession of the property and to divest defendants of the
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restrictions on sale, 5 and on use and occupancy and the right to
lease. 6 A decision which denied specific enforcement of a restriction
in the form of a forfeiture provision was sustained by the Texas
Court of Civil Appeals,? which also rejected the plaintiff's contention that the covenant, although admittedly not entitled to specific
enforcement, was a good defense to the defendant's cross-action for
possession.8 in a habeas corpus proceeding, the Supreme Court of
California decided that the petitioners, who had been imprisoned
for contempt for refusing to obey an injunction issued to enforce a
restrictive covenant before the Shelley case, should be released, because "it is unquestionable that commitment for contempt for refusing to obey the order of the court to vacate the restricted property
amounts to 'state action' to enforce the restrictions, within the purview
of the decisions in Shelley v. Kraemer.....,9 And, although it was made
clear in Shelley v. Kraemer that the restrictive covenants standing
alone and without enforcement by the courts were valid,' 0 a California
court has refused to issue a declaratory judgment to that effect."
Despite this general agreement in the interpretation of the effect of
the Shelley decision, 12 however, the courts are in direct conflict on one
issue: whether the covenantee may recover money damages for the
breach of a racial restrictive covenant, or whether the awarding of
damages constitutes judicial enforcement prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. 13
title. Defendants had purchased without actual notice of the restriction on the
property; however, the contract carrying the restriction was recorded. 344 U. S. 1,
68 S. Ct. 836, 92 L. ed. 1161 (1948).

rWoytus v. Winkler, 357 Mo. 1082, 212 S. W. (2d) 411 (1948); Goetz v. Smith,
191 Md. 707, 62 A. (2d) 602 (1948).
6

Tovey v. Levy, 401 Ill. 393, 82 N. E. (2d) 441 (1948).

7Clifton v. Puente, 218 S. W. (2d) 272 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
8

Clifton v. Puente, 218 S. W. (2d) 272 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
9Ex parte Laws, 31 Cal. (2d) 846, 198 P. (2d) 744 (1948).
"Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. i at 13, 68 S. Ct. 836 at 842, 92 L. ed. 1161 at 118o
(1948).
"Claremont Improvement Club v. Buckingham, 89 Cal. App. (2d) 32, 200 P. (2d)
47 (1948)"'here has been speculation as to various means of circumventing this effect.
See Ming, Racial Restrictions and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Restrictive
Covenant Cases (1949) 16 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 203; Scanlan, Racial Restrictions in
Real Estate-Property Values Versus Human Values (1949) 24 Notre Dame Law. 157;
Note (1949) 37 Calif. L. Rev. 493"The American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law considers a judgment
for damages for breach to be enforcement of the contract. Restatement, Contracts (1932) § 14. See Note (1949) 12 Detroit L. J. 81.
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During the year following the Supreme Court's momentous decision,
the Missouri court, in Weiss v. Leaon,14 upheld a judgment for damages for the breach of a racial restrictive covenant on the ground
that damages and injunctive relief are two distinct judicial remedies,
and that the Shelley case, while declaring the injunctive relief to be
unconsitutional, had decided nothing as to the question of damages.
In the absence of any authority bearing directly on the issue, the
court referred to the fact that the Shelley opinion had conceded that
the covenant itself was valid, and then generalized: "For the breach
of a valid agreement there is ordinarily a remedy by way of damages.
The fact that another remedy, specific performance, 15 is ruled out
because of constitutional reasons, need not necessarily affect the remedy
by way of damages .... 16
Although this view has been severely criticized by reviewing
writers,17 the Supreme Court of Oklahoma adopted substantially the
same position in 1951 in Correll v. Earley.18 The specific question
there was the sufficiency of a petition which alleged that the defendants
had conspired to sell restricted land to an insolvent white person, who
would then sell to Negroes, with the intent that the plaintiff should be
damaged. The trial court, acting on the basis of the Shelley case, had
sustained a general demurrer to the complaint, but the highest court of
the state reversed, holding that the complaint stated a good cause of
action for damages. The court professed to be giving full effect to the
principle of the Shelley case, and once more it was emphasized that
the United State Supreme Court had said the restrictive covenants
themselves were valid.' 9 While this was a tort action, rather than one
for breach of covenant, the court made it clear that the "vice of the
"359 Mo. 1054, 225 S. W. (2d) 127 (1949), noted (195o ) 7 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 178.

"The court is here assuming the very thing which needs to be proved. Nowhere
in the Shelley opinion did the Supreme Court refer to "specific enforcement." The
term used throughout the opinion was "judicial enforcement." 334 U. S. 1, 68 S. Ct.
836, 92 L. ed. 1161 (1948).
1359 Mo. 1054, 225 S. W. (2d) 127, 131 (1949).
"'See Crooks, Racial Covenant Cases (1949) 37 Geo. L. J. 514 at 525; Lathrop, The Racial Covenant Cases [1948] Wis. L. Rev. 5o8 at 527; Ming, Racial
Restrictions and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Restrictive Covenant Cases
(1949) 16 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 203; Scanlan, Racial Restrictions in Real EstateProperty Values Versus Human Values (1949) 24 Dotre Dame Law. 157 at 182;
Note (195o) 7 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 178; Note (1948) 21 So. Calif. L. Rev. 358;
Note (1952) 1 Buffalo L. Rev. 304. Cf. Note [195o] Wash. U. L. Q. 437.
"12o5 Okla. 366, 237 P. (2d) 1017 (1951).
20o5 Okla. 366, 237 P. (2d) 1017 at ioao, 1022 (1951).
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conspiracy" was the plan to deprive the plaintiff of his right to pursue
defendants directly for damages for breach of contract.20
Opposing these decisions is the recent California case of Barrows
v. Jackson,21 which finds direct support in decisions of the Supreme
Court of Michigan and the United States District Court for the District of Columbia2 2 in declaring that "The doctrine of the Shelley
case, as we read it, means that no state sanction, direct or indirect,
can constitutionally be imposed for the breach of a restrictive covenant
if such sanction would result in the denial of any civil right guaranteed by the Constitution. Of the civil rights conferred, none is clearer
and few more vital than the right to buy a home and live in it. Distinction between direct and indirect state action is tenuous. The enforcement of a covenant by an action for damages furnishes a prepotent
motive to prevent use or occupancy of property by non-Caucasians .... "23 The California court, concluding that the Weiss case had
confused "enforcement" with "specific enforcement," 24 took the position that the question in the Shelley case did not relate to the nature
of the relief sought, but rather to whether the courts could take any
action at all.25 "The thrust of the decision is aimed at prohibition of
21

The court said, "This is one vice of the conspiracy." 205 Okla. 366, 237 P. (2d)

1017, 1022 (1951). But the language and tenor of the whole opinion bears out the

belief that this was the vice of the conspiracy.
21112 Cal. App. (ad) 534, 247 P. (2d) 99 (1952). Three of the plaintiffs, the predecessor of the fourth plantiff, and the defendant, owners of lots of land in Los
Angeles, entered into a written agreement by which each bound himself and his
successors by a covenant running with the land that no part of his realty should
"be used or occupied by any person or persons not wholly of the white or Caucasian
race." The agreement provided that if any of the lots should be used or occupied
by any person not wholly of the white or Caucasian race, the covenantors of that lot
and his successors would be liable to the other covenantors and their successors for all
damages which they suffered as a result of the breach. The defendant conveyed
one of the restricted lots without incorporating the restriction in the deed or
making any reference to it. The day after the defendant moved off the property,
persons not of the Caucasin race moved in. The action for damages was brought
against the covenantor-conveyor.
2
2Phillips v. Naff, 332 Mich. 389, 52 N. W. (2d) 158 (1952); Roberts v. Curtis, 93
F. Supp. 6o4 (D. C. D. C. 195o).
23112 Cal App. (2d) 534, 247 P. (2d) 99, 112 (1952).
2
See note 15, supra.
21
The Civil Rights Cases declared that the Fourteenth Amendment "nullifies and
makes void all State legislation, and State action of every kind, which impairs the
privileges and immunities of citizen of the United States, or which injuries them
in life, liberty or property without due process of law, or which denies to any of
them equal protection of the laws." lo9 U. S. 3, ii, 3 S. Ct. 18, 21, 27 L .ed.
835, 839 (1883). The court in the Barrows case called attention to this declaration in a footnote, 247 P. (2d) 99, 111. Justice Bradley for the Supreme Court in the
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judicial participation in the maintenance of racial residential segregation.... [Either injunctive relief or the damages remedy] necessarily
calls upon the courts for action; each is, therefore, equally state action
and equally within the proscription of the Fourteenth Amendment." 26
To maintain racial discrimination was the purpose of the covenant;
and liability for a damages judgment would serve that purpose as surely
as would the availability of injunctive relief.2 7 The coercive effect of
the damages remedy would be enhanced by the vexation and expense
of defending a lawsuit. Though the Shelley opinions 28 expressly stated
that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would
not be violated so long as the purpose of racial restrictive covenants
were effectuated by voluntary adherence to their terms, adherence to a
covenant could never be said to be voluntary if the covenantee could
recover damages from the coveantor for its breach.
In the only two other cases involving this question since the Shelley
holding, the same conclusion was reached. A federal district court,
in Roberts v. Curtis, interpreted "the ruling of the Supreme Court"29
Civil Rights Cases also said: "Postive rights and privileges are undoubtedly secured
by the Fourteenth Amendment; but they are secured by way of prohibition against
State laws and State proceedings affecting those rights and privileges....109 U. S.
3, 11, 3 S.Ct. 18, 21, 27 L. ed. 835, 839 (1883).
-112 Cal. App. (2d) 534, 247 P. (2d) 99, 111-112 (1952).
""The coercive device of retribution in the form of damages is as effective as the
coercive effect of injunction relief, although not as immediate." i12 Cal. App. (2d)
534, 247 P-(2d) 99, 112 (1952).
2s344 U. S. i at 13, 68 S. Ct. 836 at 842, 92 L. ed. 1161 at 118o (1948).
2Strict authority for the Roberts ruling was Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U. S. 24,
68 S. Ct. 847, 92 L. ed. 1187 (1948), companion case to Shelley v. Kraemer which
arose in the District of Columbia, a case in which the supreme Court based its
holding against the granting of an injunction to enfore a racial restrictive covenant
not on constitutional grounds, but rather on a federal statute, the Civil Rights Act
of 1866. See Note 34, infra. Strictly speaking, therefore, the Roberts decision is not
based on constitutional grounds, either. But the court there spoke of the Shelley and
Hodge decisions in a single breath, seeming to regard them as separate expressions
of one principle: "In the cases of Hurd v. Hodge and Shelley v. Kraemer, however,
the Supreme Court changed the prior rules of law applicable to these covenants.
The Supreme Court held that such contracts are not invalid so long as their purposes are achieved by voluntary adherence of the parties to the terms of the agreement. [This point was made in both decisions.] The Supreme Court further held that
it was contrary to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution
[this was held in the Shelly case, but not in the Hodge case] and contrary to public
policy to aid in the enforcement of such covenants by judicial proceedings [this
was held in the Hodge case, but not in the Shelley case]." 93 F. Supp. 604 (D. C. D. C.
1950). In any event, the principle of the Roberts holding would seem to be the
same as that of the Barrows decision-i.e., the giving of damages for breach of a
racial restrictive covenant is enforcement of the covenant, and the Shelley and
Hodge decisions barred judicial proceeding of any kind to enforce such covenants.
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as "witholding any assistance by way of judicial action of any kind
from the enforcement of such restrictive covenants." 30 In Phillips v.
Naff3l the highest court of Michigan alluded, as did the California
court, to the "voluntary adherence" language in the Shelley opinion,
and believed that the Supreme Court meant there could be nothing
more than voluntary adherence.3 2 As to the effect of liability for a
damages suit, the point was made, and later concurred in by the
Barrows case, that it "would operate to inhibit freedom of purchase
by those against whom the discrimination is directed.. .. 1,,3
It seems plain that it is the intervention by the state, not the particular form of intervention, that is barred by the Fourteenth Amendment. Persons have a right to acquire, enjoy and dispose of property
without being subject to any state interference based on racial considerations.3 4 If the vendor to persons in racial minority groups is
to be liable in damages when he breaches a covenant not to sell to
them, such persons are being hindered by the state. Vendors bound by
such covenants then usually will be unwilling to sell to the proscribed persons; or, if they do sell, they will be inclined to raise the
sale price of the property by an amount likely to cover any damages
judgments they may incur. The vandees, although themselves members of the proscribed minority groups, may be bound by the covenant
not to sell to another member of their own race unless they, also, are
prepared to pay a damages judgment. 35 And it will be less likely that
they can sell to someone not of their own race for a fair price, since
'93 F. Supp. 604 (D. C. D. C. 1950).
1332 Mich. 389, 52 N. W. (2d) 158 (1952).
"2332 Mich. 389, 52 N. W. (2d) 158 at 16x (1952).
'332 Mich. 389, 52 N. W. (2d) 158, 164 (1952).

31U. S. Const. Amend. XIV; Shelley v. Kraemer, .44, U. S. i at io, 68 S. Ct.
836 at 841, 92 L. ed. 1161 at 1179 (1948); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197 at 215,
44 S. Ct. 15 at 17-18, 68 L. ed. 255 at 274 (1923); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S.

6o at 74, 38 S. Ct. 16 at 18, 62 L. ed. 149 at i6o-i6i (1917); Holden v. Hardy, 169
U. S. 366 at 391, 18 S. Ct. 383 at 387, 42 L. ed. 78o at 79o (1898); Sei Fujii v. State,
38 Cal. (2d) 718, 242 P. (2d) 617 at 624 (1952). Section 1978 of Revised Statutes,
8 U. S. C. A. § 42 (1942), 2 F. C. A. title 8, § 42 (1936), which was derived from § i
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, enacted by the Congress while the Fourteenth
Amendment was under consideration, provides: "All citizens of the United States
shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white
citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property." See also Civil Right Cases, 109 U. S. 3 at 22, 3 S. Ct. i8 at 29, 27 L. ed. 835
at 843 (1883); Strauder v. West Virginia, ioo U. S. 303 at 307-308, 25 L. ed. 664 at
665 (1880).
' Parmalee v. Morris, 218 Mich. 625, 188 N. W. 330, 38 A. L. R. 118o (1922); 3
Tiffany, Real Property (3d ed. 1939) §§ 85o, 859; Restatement, Property (1944)
§ 530. See Ames, Specific Performance For and Against Strangers to the Contract (1903) 17 Harv. L. Rev. 174.

1953]

CASE COMMENTS

their occupancy has made the property less attractive to other persons,
even for investment purposes. 30
The decision in Barrows v. Jackson, and earlier, the decisions in the
Roberts and Phillips cases, more closely adhered to the spirit and language of the Shelley opinion than those decisions which construed that
opinion as leaving untouched the availability of the damages remedy
for the breach of a racial restrictive covenant. It is to be hoped that the
Supreme Court of the United States may soon have an opportunity
to make an express ruling that the damages remedy, like injunctive
37
relief, is barred by the Fourteenth Amendment in these cases.
DONALD S. LATouRETE*

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-VALIDITY

OF STATUTE MAKING MEMBERSHIP IN

SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATON EVIDENCE OF UNFITNESS FOR EMPLOYMENT

IN SCHOOLS.

[United States Supreme Court]

The current congressional investigations directed at communistic
influences among teachers in American schools give renewed significance to the recent controversy over the attempt of the New York
legislature to expel subversive persons from employment in the state
public school system. In 1949 the New York legislature enacted the
Feinberg Law' to implement Section 12-a of the New York Civil
Service Law,2 which authorizes the removal from public employment
of anyone who advocates the forcible overthrow of the government.
The Feinberg Law empowers the Board of Regents, after notice and
hearing, to list subversive organizations, membership in which constitutes prima facie evidence of unfitness to serve as a public school
teacher. After having been under 'attack in the New York courts since
1949, 3 the constitutionality of this enactment has now been confirmed
3See Myrdal, An American Dilemma (1944) 623; Weaver, The Negro Ghetto,

(1948) 212, 297.
-Since the writing of this comment, the Supreme Court has affirmed the decision
and approved the reasoning of the California court. Barrows v. Jackson, 73 S. Ct.
1031 (1953).
*Acknowledgement is made of the contribution of John C. Calhoun, Law Class
of February, 1953, to the preparation of this comment.
'New York Laws (1949) c. 360.
1
New York Laws (1939) c. 547, as amended New York Laws (1940) c. 564.
'L'Hommedieu v. Board of Regents, 342 U. S. 951 (1952) affirming without
opinion 3o N. Y. 476, 95 N. E. (2d) 8o6 (195o) affirming 276 App. Div. 494, 95
N. Y. S. (2d) 443 (195 o ) reversing 196 Misc. 686, 9.1 N. Y. S. (2d) 274 (1949); Thompson v. Wallin, 3o N. Y. 476, 95 N. E. (2d) 806 (195 o) affirming 276 App. Div. 463,
95 N. Y. S. (2d) 784 (195o) reversing 196 Misc. 686, 93 N. Y. S. (2d) 274 (1949).
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by the United States Supreme Court in Adler v. Board of Education of
the City of New York, 4 the first occasion upon which such a statute has
been passed on by the high court. 5 The plaintiffs, who are taxpayers,
parents, and teachers in New York, contended that the Feinberg Law
was unconstitutional because it deprived them of free speech and assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment and made applicable to
them by the Fourteenth, and because the procedure set up to fix guilt
through proof of membership in listed organizations constituted a
deprivation of property without due process of law.
In rejecting these arguments, the Supreme Court followed its
previous pronouncement in United Public Workers of America (C. I.
0.) v. Mitchell6 that public employment is a privilege, not a right,
and consequently that restrictions of speech and assembly which would
be unconstitutional in other circumstances, may be valid when imposed
upon persons in public employment. The New York statute was held
not to deny due process of law, because membership in listed organizations merely raises a rebuttable presumption against the plaintiffs
and is not conclusive of guilt.7 Justice Douglas, with whom Justice
'.42 U. S. 485, 72 S. Ct. s8o, 96 L. ed. 295 (1952).
'Note (1952) 27 Notre Dame Law. 448, 449.

0330 U. S. 75, 67 S. Ct. 556, 91 L. ed. 754 (1947). Federal government employees contested the constitutionality of the Hatch Political Activity Act, 53 Stat.
1147 (1939), 18 U. S. C. Supp. V, Section 6ih (1946), which limits the freedom of
government employees to participate in political campaigns. The Court held
that federal government employees are in a peculiar status, for political activity
on their part would threaten efficient administration, and a Congressional Act to
forestall this occurrence is constitutional.
fruitless contention by the plaintiffs was based upon the theory that
the law proclaimed that membership in an organization listed by the Board of
Regents constituted prima facie evidence of disqualification, whereas the fact
found allegedly bears no relation to the fact presumed. In this instance the fact
found was that an organization of which the person in question was a member had
for its purpose the violent overthrow of the government and that this purpose was
known by the person, and the fact presumed was that such person is disqualified for
employment. The Court rejected plaintiffs' argument and took the view that disqualification follows as a reasonable presumption from membership in and support of
listed organizations. A further due process objection raised by the plaintiffs was
similarly denied by the Court because the presumption growing out of a prima
facie case remains only so long as there is no substantial evidence to the contrary.
Moreover, a hearing is afforded the aggrieved party at which substantial evidence to
rebut the presumption will be heard, and once such evidence is received, the officer
who made the order of ineligibility then has the burden of sustaining the validity
of the order by a fair preponderance of the evidence. At this point should an order
of ineligibility be issued, the party in question may still avail himself of the
review procedure according to Section 12 (d) of the Law. The Feinberg Law was
thus held to provide adequate assurance of due process.
7.This
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Black concurred in dissent, rejected the Court's view that when a
person enters public service he sacrifices his civil rights, and expressed
unwillingness to concur in the Court's acquiescence in "a principle
repugnant to our society-guilt by association.. .."s Justice Frankfurter also dissented, but on the ground that the issue was not ripe for
decision because the plaintiffs had failed to show any present injury
and thus had no standing to raise the question of constitutionality.9
In such controversies involving charges of governmental invasion
of civil rights, courts must decide in favor of one of the two divergent
concepts: the interest that a government has in preserving itself from
those who would destroy it, as opposed to constitutional guaranties
normally enjoyed by citizens.10 In arriving at a decision, a court necessarily employs a balancing process, and it is apparent in the principal
case that the imminent threat of communistic infiltration in the public
schools was deemed sufficiently serious to sway the balance in favor
of the preservation of constitutional government."'
In opposition to the Court's affirmation of the privilege theory,
Justice Douglas' able dissent makes the point that nowhere in this
country's tradition is there support for the view lately taken by the
"Adler v. Board of Education of the City of New York, 342 U. S.485, 508, 72 S.
Ct. 38o, 593, 96 L. ed. 295, 308 (1952). The crux of Justice Douglas' dissent is that
the Constitution guarantees freedom of thought and expression to everyone in our society and that the mere fact that a person enters the employment of the government
is no just reason for denying him his full civil rights. Furthermore, the manner in
which the Feinberg Law proceeds is appalling to Justice Douglas for as he termed
it the use of "guilt by association," when drawn to its extremity, will turn the
school system into a spying project, and the result will become constant surveillance of the teachers-a typical police state measure.
OAdler v. Board of Education of the City of New York, 342 U. S. 485, 497, 72
S. Ct. 380, 387, 96 L. ed. 295, 302 (1952). For a discussion of Justice Frankfurter's
dissent see Davis, Standing, Ripeness and Civil Liberties: A Critique of Adler v.
Board of Education (1952) 38 A. B. A. J. 924.
"ONote (1952) 5 S. C. L. Q. 85, 86.
""The preamble of the Feinberg Law, Section x, makes elaborate findings that
members of subversive groups, particularly of the Communist Party and its affiliated organizations, have been infiltrating into public employment in the public
schools of the State; that this has occurred and continues notwithstanding the existence of protective statutes designed to prevent the appointment to or retention in
employment in public office, and particularly in public schools, of members of any
organizations which teach or advocate that the government of the United States
or of any state or political subdivision thereof shall be overthrown by force or
violence or by any other unlawful means...." Alder v. Board of Education of the
City of New York, 342 U. S. 485, 489, 72 S. Ct. 38o, 383, 96 L. ed. 295, 298 (1952).
"A teacher works in a sensitive area in a schoolroom. There he shapes the attitude
of young minds towards the society in which they live. In this, the state has a vital
concern...." 342 U. S.485, 493, 72 S. Ct. 380, 385, 96 L. ed. 295, 300 (1952).
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Court that when a citizen takes the mantle of public office he no longer
enjoys the full constitutional rights of other citizens. This argument is
persuasive, and Justice Douglas dramatizes its significance by labelling
public school teachers "second class citizens." However, the soundness
of the contention may suffer somewhat upon analysis. Men in the
armed services on this reasoning would have to be termed "second
class citizens,"' 2 because they have relinquished a portion of the full
complement of constitutional rights that other citizens enjoy. It is
recognized that since a serviceman is charged with public responsibility
in defending the national security, he temporarily must give up some
personal rights normally guaranteed by the Constitution, in order
effectively to assure the carrying out of this responsibility. This sacrifice, however, is not regarded as reducing his rank as a citizen.
Similarly a teacher who "works in the sensitive area in a schoolroom"
in shaping "the attitude of young minds toward the society in which
they live," is engaged in public employment in an area in which "the
State has a vital concern" and for which the State may establish requirements of "fitness and loyalty." The teacher should not, for this reason,
be termed a second class citizen when called upon to forego certain
rights normally enjoyed by others not so sensitively situated.
It is notable that the Supreme Court did not expressly mention the
traditional "dear and present danger" test, first announced by Justice
Holmes in Schenck v. United States'5 in 1919, and amplified by Justices
Brandeis and Holmes in their dissenting opinion in Gitlow v. People of
New York' 4 in 1925. In the Gitlow case the majority of the Court up"Adler v. Board of Education of the City of New York, 342 U. S. 485, 508, 72
S. Ct. 380, .92, g6 L. ed. 295, 308 (1952).
"249 U. S. 47, 52, 39 S. Ct. 247, 249, 63 L. ed. 470, 473 (1919). For an excellent
treatise concerning the development of the test see Corwin, Bowing Out "Clear
and Present Danger" (1952) 27 Notre Dame Law. 325"268 U. S. 652, 672, 45 S. Ct. 625, 632, 69 L. ed. 1138, 1149 (1925). Because the
defendant printed and circulated "The Left Wing Manifesto," a journal depicting
the necessity for overthrowing the government by force and violence, he was convicted of violating the New York criminal anarchy statute, under which the advocacy or teaching of the doctrine of the overthrow of the government by force
and violence was made felonious. The majority of the Court upheld the statute
as a reasonable exercise of the police power in the face of a threat to the security of
the state, and rejected the need for a clear and present danger because it was not
deemed reasonable for the state to be required to defer the adoption of measures
for its own peace and safety until the revolutionary utterances lead to actual disturbance of the public peace or imminent and immediate danger of its own destruction.
The dissent, on the other hand, reasoned that the clear and present danger
test should have been applied because an admittedly small minority followed the
defendant's views, and thus the ideas expressed in the "Manifesto" had no real
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held the New York penal law authorizing the arrest and conviction of
any person teaching the violent overthrow of the organized government,
because the statute was deemed a reasonable exercise of the police
power of the State.' 9 The Court held that the clear and present danger
test had no application in the situation where the legislative body
itself has previously determined the danger of substantive evil arising
from utterances of a specified character. Under this view, if the statute
constitutes a reasonable means to avert a threat to public security it
will be upheld. However, the reasonableness test was not followed in
subsequent cases. Rather, the Court returned to the clear and present
danger test, applying it strictly in cases in the 1940's to strike down a
statute prohibiting picketing16 and a statute requiring the registration
of labor organizers. 17 In 1951, in Dennis v. United States,'8 however,
the Court refused to be bound by the "present" aspect of the test, announcing instead that if the threat was sufficiently substantial, the fact
that the danger was not immediate was immaterial. The Court pointed
out that:
"Obviously, the words [clear and present danger] cannot mean
that before the Government may act, it must wait until the
putsch is about to be executed, the plans have been laid and
the signal is awaited. If Government is aware that a group aiming at its overthrow is attempting to indoctrinate its members
and to commit them to a course whereby they will strike when
the leaders feel the circumstances permit, action by the Government is required."' 9
Sustained by this recent precedent, the Court was able to approach
the principal case from the standpoint of a balance of interests, instead
of being bound by a strict application of the dear and present danger
test. On this basis it was ruled that the constitutional right of free
speech and assembly are not abridged in the present situation.
chance of starting a present conflagration. For the statute to qualify as a privileged
withdrawal of First Amendment guaranties under this view, it must be calculated to
avert a clear and present danger to the state's security, and also the threatened
danger must have some chance of success.
,'Gitlowv. People of New York, 268 U. S. 652, 45 S. Ct. 625, 69 L. ed. 1138 (1925).
The defendant, who was convicted of the statutory crime of advocating and teaching
the overthrow of the government by force and violence, attacked the statute as repugnant to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court upheld the statute as a reasonable means taken by the state to insure its primary and
essential right of self-preservation.
"Thornhill v. Alabama, 31o U. S. 88, 6o S. Ct. 736, 84 L. ed. 1o93 (1940).
"T homas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 65 S. Ct. 315, 89 L. ed. 430 (1945).
2'341 U. S.494, 71 S. Ct. 857, 95 L. ed. 1137 (1951).
rDennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494, 509, 71 S. Ct. 857, 867, 95 L. ed. 1137,
1152 (1951).
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Teachers have no right to work for the state on their own terms,20
but rather are subject to reasonable terms imposed by the state authorities. If they do not choose to work on such terms, they are at liberty
to retain their associations and go elsewhere; and certainly, one's associates and conduct are reasonable factors to be considered in determining fitness and loyalty. 2 1 As a prelude to the Adler decision, the
Court had previously upheld a state statute requiring a candidate for
public office to take an oath that he is not a member of a subversive
organization, 22 and a city ordinance requiring a loyalty oath of each
of its officers and employees.2 3 In each of these cases the position was
taken that one who accepts the privilege of public office-holding may
be required to surrender some liberties enjoyed by citizens generally.
The Court unquestionably encountered a difficult balancing process when it was confronted with the Adler case. Having already sapped the strength of the clear and present danger test in the Dennis case,
the Court had to employ a new standard. Thus, the "privilege view" of
the Mitchell case was coupled with a reasonableness test strikingly
similar to the test employed in Gitlow v. People of New York to form
the new criterion for determining the constitutionality of statutes
which infringe First Amendment guaranties. An interesting point of
speculation is whether or not it was intended in the Adler case to
rehabilitate the Gitlow case test of reasonableness. The latter decision
was cited with approval and without qualification. 24 Futhermore, the
"appropriateness" of testing loyalty by considering one's associates,
mentioned in the Adler case, 25 and the "reasonableness" of the statute
as a means to prevent the violent overthrow of the government by force,
mentioned in the Gitlow case, 26 are undeniably similar-if not synonymous-tests. 2 7
JOHN P. VARD

nAccord: Board of Regents v. Updegraff, 2o5 Okla. 301, 237 P. (2d) 131, 137
(1951) (a teacher does not have a constitutional right to government employment,
and the legislature can make reasonable restrictions).
2t
Adler v. Board of Education of the City of New York, 342 U. S. 485, 492, 72
S. Ct. g8o, g85, 96 L. ed. 295, 299 (1952).

12 Gerende v. Board of Supervisors of Elections of Baltimore, 341 U. S. 56, 71 S.

Ct. 565, 95 L. ed. 745 (1951)-

nGarner v. Board of Public Works of City of Los Angeles, 341 U. S. 716, 71
S. Ct. gog, 96 L. ed. 1317 (1951).
2

Adler v. Board of Education of the City of New York, 342 U. S. 485, 492, 72

S. Ct. 38o, 385, 96 L. ed. 295, 300 (1952).
25342 U. S. 485, 493, 72 S. Ct. 380, 385, 96 L. ed. 295, 300 (1952).
20268 U. S. 652, 668, 45 S. Ct. 625, 631, 69 L. ed. 1138, 1147 (1925).

"For further law review comment on the Adler case see: Notes (1952) 66 Harv.
L. Rev. 89, 121; 36 Minn. L. Rev. 961; 1oo U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1244.
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CRIMINAL LAW-PROPRIETY OF INSTRUCTING JURY AS TO POSSIBILITY THAT
SENTENCE SET BY JURY MAY BE AFFECTED BY COMMUTATION OR
PAROLE. [Virginia]

While generally the fixing of punishment for one convicted of
crime is the function of the presiding trial judge, and the jury is
limited to the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused,
a number of states, including Virginia,' have provided by statute that
the jury shall either recommend or actually assess the proper punishment.2 In the operation of this system, the courts are divided as to

the extent to which the jury, in the execution of its sentencing function, is to be informed of the possibility that its sentence may in some
manner be set aside, changed, or modified by the operation of laws
relating to pardons, paroles, or the commutation of sentences. 3 While

there is considerable authority which holds that the jury is entitled
to be fully and adequately informed of these matters, 4 there are decisions sustaining the proposition that no such information should be
given.5 Even among courts adopting the latter position, disagreement
arises as to the consequenses of error committed in the trial court in
this regard. Some courts have ruled that though a voluntary instruction concerning the parole system was "unfortunate," 6 or even
error,1 it was not so serious as to warrant reversal. An opposite result
14 Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950) § 19-267. "The punishment in all criminal
cases tried by a jury shall be ascertained by the jury trying the same within the
limits prescribed by law."
2Lovett v. State, 3o Fla. 142, 11 So. 550 (1892); Brantley v. State, 87 Ga. 149,
13 S. E. 257 (1891); State v. Carrigan, 93 N. J. L. 268, 1oS Atl. 315 (igig); State v.
Knight, 34 N. M. 217, 279 Pac. 947 (1929); State v. Bethune, 86 S. C. 143, 67 S. E.
466 (1910); Notes (1922) 17 A. L. R. 1117; (1933) 87 A. L. R. 1362.
23 C. J. S., Criminal Law § 1379.
'People v. Chessman, 38 Cal. (2d) 166, 238 P. (2d) 1oo1 (1951), cert. denied, 343
U. S. 915, rehearing denied, 343 U. S.937 (1952); State v. Barth, 114 N. J. L. 112, 176
AtI. 183 (1935); State v. Mosley, 102 N. J. L. 94, 131 AtI. 292 (1925); State v. Carrigan,
93 N. J. L. 268, io8 Ad. 315 (1919); State v. Rombole, 89 N. J. L. 565, 99 Atl. 434
(1916); Liska v. State, i 5 Ohio St. 283, 152 N. E. 667 (x926); State v. Carroll, 52 Wyo.
o9, 69 P (2d) 542 (1937); cf., State v. Lammers, 171 Kan. 668, 237 P. (2d) 410 (1951).

GLovely v. United States, 169 F. (2d) 386 (C. C. A. 4th, 1948); People v. Bruno,
49 Cal. App. 372, 193 Pac. 511 (192o); Sukle v. People, 107 Colo. 269, 111 P. (2d)
233 (1941); Bryant v. State, 2o5 Ind. 372, 186 N. E. 322 (1933); Houston v. Commono
wealth, 27 Ky. 125, io9 S. W. (2d) 45 (1937); Glenday v. Commonwealth, 255 Ky.
313, 74 S. W. (2d) 332 (1934); Gaines v. Commonwealth, 242 Ky. 237, 46 S. W. (2d)
75 (1932); Postell v. Commonwealth, 174 Ky. 272, 192 S. W. 39 (1917); Commonwealth
v. Mills, 350 Pa. 478, 3q A. (2d) 572 (1944); Porter v. State, 177 Tenn. 515, 151 S. W.
(2d) 171 (1941); Coward v. Commonwealth, 164 Va. 539, 178 S. E. 797 (1935).
6
State v. Martin, 94 N. J. L. 139, 1o9 Atl. 350 (1920).
7People v. Sukdol, 322 Ill 540, 153 N. E. 727 (1926).
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has been reached in other cases, where such an instruction is held to
constitute reversible error because it induced the jury to impose, a
greater punishment than it would otherwise have done,8 or because
it might result in a compromise verdict.9 One court, while disapproving
of the voluntary instruction concerning parole laws, held that a response to an inquiry by the jury on this subject is not error if fair and
not indicating or suggesting what the jury should or should not do;
however, this court suggested that in the future, the trial court should
fairly answer the inquiry but the answer should be coupled with an
admonition that the jury should not speculate on what might happen
after the verdict.1 0 Yet when this course was followed in another
jurisdiction, it was held to constitute reversible error."1
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia was squarely faced with
this problem recently in Jones v. Commonwealth,12 and while the decision was unanimous that the trial court had committed reversible
error in its directions to the jury in this matter, the Justices were split
4 to 2 in regard to what was the proper course for the trial court to
follow. The defendant was indicted for first degree murder, punishable in Virginia by life imprisonment or death, for having stabbed his
wife to death upon a public street in the presence of a number of
disinterested witnesses. The defense interposed was that the defendant,
while admittedly attempting to disfigure his wife for the avowed purpose of making her less attractive to other men, was suddenly overcome by a blackout spell during which he knew nothing of his actions.
Evidence was admitted that the defendant had previously suffered
such attacks, and medical records, including a medical discharge from
the army, corroborated evidence that the spells were epilectic in
nature.
After the jury had considered its verdict for about two hours, the
foreman came before the court and, in the presence of the defendant,
his counsel, and the commonwealth's attorney, stated that the jury
had decided that the defendant was guilty of murder in the first degree,
but the jurors wanted to know whether, if they gave him life imprisonment, a term of ninety-nine years or any long terms of years, they
would have any assurance that the defendant would not "get out."
The court replied that it could "not give that assurance; that would be
8

Bean v. State, 58 Okla. Cr. 432, 54 P- (2d) 675 (1936).
Lovely v. United States, 169 F. (2d) 386 (C. C. A. 4 th, 1948).
1"State v. Carroll, 52 Wyo. 29, 69 P. (2d) 542 (1937).
nWilliams v. State, 191 Tenn. 456, 234 S.W. (2d) 993 (195o)"194 Va. 273, 72 S.E. (2d) 693 (1952).
9
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in the hands of the executive branch of the government and that the
court was of the judicial branch; that you and I represent the judicial
branch and have nothing to do with that."' 3 Defendant's counsel then
inquired of the court, out of hearing of the jury, whether it would be
proper to advise the jury that a person sentenced to life imprisonment
is not eligible for parole, but the court answered in the negative. Following these colloquies, the jury again retired and after twenty or
twenty-five minutes returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the first
degree and fixed the punishment at death.
The Supreme Court of Appeals, concluding that the court erred
in the nature of its response to the inquiry put to it by the jury and that
such error was sufficiently prejudicial as to warrant reversal, remanded
the case for a new trial. The majority of the court followed the rule
established in 1935 by Coward v. Commonwealth, 4 that, upon inquiry
of this nature by the jury, the trial court shall instruct that it is the
duty of the jury, if it finds the accused guilty, to impose such punishment as it considers to be just under the evidence and within the
limits of the court's instructions, and not concern itself with what may
afterward happen. Therefore, by answering that it could not give the
requested assurance that the accused would not "get out," the trial
court in the principal case had led the jury to believe that the defendant might be released at some future time, whereas in truth, had
the defendant received a sentence of life imprisonment he would not
have become eligible for parole.
The procedure adopted under the Coward decision was designed
to enable the trial court to avoid any semblance of influencing the
jury in its decision, either in increasing or decreasing the severity of
the penalty which it might consider proper. A second consideration
advanced for denying information concerning the operation of posttrial, extra-juridical machinery of pardons and paroles, is that a contrary rule, providing for a fully informed jury, would tend to frustrate
the operation of laws which are designed for the handling of prisoners
23194 Va. 273, 275, 72 S. E. (2d) 693, 694 (1952).

u164 Va. 639, 178 S. E. 797 (935). Defendant, convicted of driving while under
the influence of intoxicants and sentenced to three months in jail and fined $ioo,
excepted to the trial court's action, in response to an inquiry by the jury as to what
time the defendant would get off while confined in jail, of reading the statute providing for commutation of sentence, conditioned upon good behavior, at the rate
of ten days per month of sentence. The court held that the response was reversible error in that it permitted the jury to fix the actual time of confinement; but by
way of dicta, it was indicated that such an error was harmless where the minimum
sentence was imposed and harmless in murder cases where the sentence is death.
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after sentencing. 15 Those laws, relating to the good conduct allowances made to prisoners, are designed to further the interest of both
the public at large and the convict by promoting good conduct in
the penal institutions. Any consideration of the possible operation of
such a system, made at the time that sentence is passed, could well work
an injustice on the accused and defeat the legislative intent. Thus,
a jury which considers ten years imprisonment adequate for the crime
charged, might, upon being apprised of the possible effects of a law
relating to parole or commutation of sentence, impose a sentence
of twenty years in order to be sure defendant would actually be confined for at least ten years. 16 Viewed from the opposite standpoint,
however, the rationale of the Coward rule has been said to rest on
the possibility that a jury will view its task lightly if advised that its sentence may not be carried out, but rather is subject to modification by the
operation of law relative to pardons and paroles. 17 The Virginia court
further noted that since arguments by counsel are precluded from
touching upon the subject of possible subsequent parole action,' 8
it should hardly be the subject of an instruction to the jury, voluntary
or otherwise.' 9 Counsels have been repeatedly warned that comment of
this nature is "improper and out of place;" 20 but usually, while criticizing such conduct, the courts refuse to reverse the case on this point
alone.2 ' However, in the face of general criticism of this practice, the
17 Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950) § 53-213.
""Plainly, such a verdict would be indefensible." Coward v. Commonwealth,
164 Va. 639, 642, 178 S. E.797, 798 (1935); also see State v. Mosley, 102 N. J. L. 94,
131 Atl. 292, 297 (1925) (dissenting opinion).
1
7See State v. Carroll, 52 Wyo. 29, 69 P. (2d) 542, 561 (1937). This consideration
may explain the dicta found in Coward v. Commonwealth (see note 14, supra) that
the giving of such instructions, while generally objectionable, is harmless in murder
cases where the sentence is death, for it could hardly be said then that the jury
viewed its task lightly.
"SDingus v. Commonwealth, 153 Va. 846, 149 S. E.414 (1929).
"Some cases distinguished between instances where the questionable instruction
is "voluntary"-i.e., given by the court as a part of its charges to the jury sui
sponte-and where the instruction is responsive to an inquiry put to the court by
the jury, but the problem is much the same. As an example of a voluntary instruction, see State v. Rombolo, 89 N. J. L. 565, 99 Atl. 434 (1916); the principal
case exemplifies an instruction responsive to an inquiry.
20Commonwealth v. Earnest, 342 Pa. 544, 21 A. (2d) 38, 41 (1941). Also People v.
La Verne, 212 Cal. 29, 297 Pac. 561 (1931); Wechter v. People, 53 Colo. 89, 124
Pac. 183 (1912); Pollard v. State, 2o Ind. i8o, 166 N. E. 654 (1929).
2'People v. La Verne, 212 Cal. 29, 297 Pac. 561 (1931); Wechter v. People, 53
Colo. 89, 124 Pac. 183 (1912); People v. Murphy, 276 Ill. 304, 114 N. E. 6o9 (1916);
Holmes v. Commonwealth, 241 Ky. 573, 44 S. W. (Rd) 592 (1931). Contra, State v.
Hawley, 229 N. C. 167, 48 S. E. (2d) 35 (1948).
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absence of reversal can hardly be viewed as implied permission by
the courts to counsel to make such comments to the juries. 22
The concurring minority of the Virginia court in the principal
case rejected the Coward rule as being against both reason and authority, and asserted that the trial court, instead of refusing completely to
respond to the jury's inquiries, should fully inform the jury of the good
conduct allowances for convicts, 23 of the eligibility of a convict for
parole, 24 and of the constitutional power of the Governor to grant
pardons or reprieves. 25 These Justices felt that "no prejudice would
have resulted had such information been given in simple and direct
language." 26 Under this view, the reversal of the verdict was required
because the trial court's reply to the jury was so grossly inadequate as
to be misleading and prejudicial to the interest of the accused.
In support of its rule, the concurring minority contended not only
that it is in accord with the weight of authority, 27 but also that an
understanding of these laws is necessary to enable the jury to make
a proper and intelligent determination of the sentence. 28 Furthermore, the fact that the jury, of its own volition, directed the inquiry
to the court is indicative that at least one or more of the jurors had
some knowledge of the existence of laws relating to pardon and parole,
and only by an adequate and accurate answer could erroneous concepts concerning such laws be effectively dispelled. A refusal to answer
the jury's inquiry would only leave the jurors confused and subject to
the incomplete knowledge of those having even a remote understanding of these matters. The opinion of the concurring minority also

"But see Note (1941) 9o U. of Pa. L. Rev. 221, 222, adopting a contrary view by
stating that "most courts permit the prosecutor to mention parole possibilities in
addressing the jury."
"37 Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950) § 53-213.
2'7 Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950) § 53-251.
"*7 Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950) § 53-228; Va. Const. (1902) § 73. Since the

gubernatorial pardon is an extraordinary power, rarely restored to, and applicable
to all sentences regardless of their severity, it cannot be thwarted by the jury's varying of the sentence, and would seldom influence their decisions.
'Jones v. Commonwealth, 194 Va. 273, 283, 72 S. E. (2d) 693, 698 (1952) (concurring opinion).
"'State v. Carroll, 52 Wyo. 29, 69 P. (2d) 542 (1937).
1:3Jones v. Commonwealth, 194 Va. 273, 280, 72 S. E. (2d) 693, 697 (1952): "The
object of the penalty is to punish the accused, deter others from crime, and to protect the public. In considering these elements, questions naturally arise whether
the accused will be required to suffer the punishment imposed, or will be able
to escape therefrom by reason of the provision of some other law. In such consideration, the jury cannot act intelligently in determining the measure of punishment
to fit the crime and the man, unless they have knowledge of the possible consequences of the law relating to the payment of the penalty by the convict."
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noted that when the judge is charged with passing sentence, he knows,
or ought to know, whether the penalty imposed will be diminished at
some future time by some other agency; therefore, when the jury is
charged with this duty, it should be similarly informed.
The Supreme Court of Appeals' decision in the principal case is
consistent with its earlier decisions in that the case was remanded because of the possibility that the defendant was prejudiced, yet its application of the procedure laid down in the Coward case seems unwarranted, if not illogical, under the facts and law applicable to this case.
Basically, the Virginia court considers that the Coward rule gives the
accused the benefit of any and all parole laws, by denying the jury the
possibility of increasing the sentence in order to frustrate the operation of these laws. Certainly the procedure which prohibits the trial
court from giving any information to the jury commends itself in the
simplicity of its application, and in cases in which parole possibilities
actually exist, there is little likelihood that this practice will directly

influence the jury. Yet it is subject to the objection that it fails to dispel erroneous notions implanted earlier by partially informed jurors,
despite the fact that the court, in lieu of an answer, admonishes the
jurors that "such matters are not a proper matter of your concern." It
would appear that this objection might be removed by including within
the final instructions to the jury an admonition that it is to exclude any
considerations of possible pardon or parole, 29 since these matters have
no application whatever to a criminal trial.3 0 While this would represent somewhat of an innovation, it would avoid the pitfall of leaving
the matter without proper instruction until brought to the fore by an
inquiry by the jury, and would stifle the exchange of erroneous ideas
by preventing one ill-informed juror from foisting his "little learning"
upon the others.
The rule providing for full information, as applied to cases in
which parole possibilities actually exist, appears defective in that it
indirectly encourages as a part of the present determination of sentence
"Such an instruction to the jury might proceed as follows: "In the event that
you determine that the accused is guilty of the crime as charged, it is then your duty
to impose such penalty as you think appropriate, in view of the nature and circumstances of the crime, and the character of the accused as revealed by his record
and your impressions of him at the trial and at no time during your deliberations
shall the possible subsequent action of laws relating to commutation of sentence
or parole, or possible action by the Governor, enter into, or in any manner affect
these deliberations,for these are matters of which you are not properly concerned."
n°"The Parole Law... has no application whatever to criminal trials and it was
error for the court to give the instruction." People v. Sukdol, 322 Ill. 540, 153 N. E.
727, 729 (1926).
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by the jury, unfounded speculation 3l as to the future actions of the ac32
cused, the Board of Paroles, and, indeed, of the Governor.
However, in order for these considerations to be valid, the case
must be one in which the possibility of commutation of sentence or
parole actually exists, for otherwise there is no legislative intent capable of being defeated, and the jury, in fixing the sentence would have
no occasion to be motivated by commutation or parole possibilities.
The court did not take notice of the fact that in the principal case
the possibilities of parole did not actually exist, since the jury has but
two choices of sentence, either life imprisonment, from which there
is no parole, or death. Thus, the Coward rule, designed as a safeguard
for the accused, could not possibly aid the accused under the circumstances. On the contrary, the procedure required by the Coward rule
could obviously work to the detriment of this defendant, as the facts
of the principal case emphatically demonstrate. Under this self-imposed judicial silence the court leaves the jury in position to believe
erroneously that there is a possibility that if it should sentence the accused to life imprisonment only, he may be eventually paroled. Since
the majority of states do permit life-termers to be paroled, and the newspapers carry frequent accounts of such paroles being granted, it is
entirely reasonable for the jury to entertain such a belief. Thus, the
jury may feel compelled to render a death verdict in order to protect
society from a repetition of such a crime, although it might well feel
that, because his offense was committed involuntarily when under a
mental affliction, the accused does not deserve to be put to death. The
manner in which the jury in the principal case proceeded in fixing the
accused's sentence indicates that it thought he needed only to be isolated from society for the remainder of his life, and that it would have
preferred to impose that sentence if granted the assurance which is in
8As to the length such speculation might be carried, consider the following:
A and B commit the same offense and both are found guilty. The jury deems lo
years confinement as an adequate punishment considering the nature of the offense.
A appears recalcitrant and is obviously an incorrigible, whereas B, on the other hand,
is the epitome of humility and is overcome with remorse. Would a sentence of io
years for A, and 20 years for B, be proper? This would appear absurd, but, had the
jury inquired of the court and been advised of the laws relating to commutation
of sentence or parole, it would realize that B, because of his virtues, would probably become eligible for parole when but one half of his sentence had expired,
whereas A, because of his surly nature, probably would never qualify for parole.
Thus, the jury, by considering parole possibilities, and indulging in sheer speculation, could almost certainly effectuate its desire that each offender serve io years
in prison, but such a result would be an outrage.
'See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 368 Pa. i39, 81 A. (2d) 569, 572 (1951).
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fact provided by the legislature in excluding life-termers from parole. 33
It would seem, therefore, that since the reason for the Coward rule
fails, the rule should not be applied to Virginia cases wherein the
charge is first degree murder. Thus, while the members of the Virginia
court have divided as to which of two rules to adopt, they could have
very properly considered the advisability of applying the one rule or
the other to each case as the circumstances of the individual case dictate, limiting the Coward rule to cases wherein the possibility of parole
or commutation of sentence exists. Regardless of the relative merits of
either the "no-reply" rule or the "fully responsive" rule, the Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals has embraced a rule thought to be most
favorable to the accused, and by doing so has failed to recognize that
it operates to the accused's disadvantage when he is found guilty of
first degree murder. If the adoption of a rule or rules governing the
trial court's instructions to the jury is to depend upon securing
to the accused the greatest advantage, then under its own reasoning,
the Virginia court could well consider the following possibilities:
(a) Where the sentence involves the possibility of parole, then the
Coward rule of refusing to answer an inquiry concerning the effect
of laws relating to parole should be applied.
(b) Where the sentence involves no possibility of parole, then the
full and responsive answer should be given.
KIMBER L.

DOMESTIC

RELATIONS-LIABILITY

OF ESTATE OF DECEASED

VHITE

DIVORCED

HUSBAND FOR SUPPORT OF CHILDREN UNDER DIVORCE DECREE.

[Vir-

ginia]
Among the innumerable problems, legal, social, and moral, which
arise out of divorce, the courts are properly most deeply concerned
with those which affect the welfare of the children of the separated
parents.' One of the perplexing legal issues in that regard, on which
31See Jones v. Commonwealth, 194 Va. 273 at 282, 72 S. E. (2d) 693 at 698 (1952).
'Over 371,ooo divorces were granted in the United States during the calendar
year 1951, a ratio of almost one divorce out of every five marriages performed in

that same year. In the state of Virginia alone 6,003 divorces were granted over the
year, constituting a break-up of one family for every six marriages recorded over
the same period. "The child in every divorce case has ipso facto a status of disadvantage which challenges the judge, and opens to him the duty to reduce it
so far as possible." Waite, Children of Divorce In Minnesota: Between The

Millstones (1948) 32 Minn. L. Rev. 766.
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the decisions are in wide disagreement, is whether the divorced father's
liability for the support and maintenance of his minor children survives his death, thereby operating as an enforceable lien against his
estate.
This question has recently been decided for the first time in Virginia
in the case of Morris v. Heniy.2 Twenty years earlier the present defendant had been granted an absolute divorce from her husband on
grounds of adultery, and that decree ordered the husband to pay the
complainant wife" 'as alimony and support for the infant daughter...,
until further order of this Court,' $4o a month; gave permanent custody of the child to the complainant and terminated all property
rights of each in the property of the other. The decree further provided that an injunction previously granted, restraining the defendant
from disposing of his property, be continued in force; that if the
defendant failed to make the payments required by the decree, the
complainant should have the right to apply to the court for such order
as might be necessary to subject the defendant's property 'held under
the said injunction'; and the cause was retained on the docket
for such further orders relative to alimony and support as the court
should consider necessary and proper." 3 Just two months after the issuance of that decree the husband conveyed his real estate to his father,
and some six months thereafter he died intestate. His infant daughter,
in the custody of the mother, did not reach the age of 21 until nearly
eighteen years later. The deceased husband's father instituted the
present suit asking for a decree that all real estate conveyed to him by
his deceased son be absolved of any lien or encumberance as a result of
the earlier divorce decree against his son; or if such earlier decree did
constitute a lien, then for a determination of the amount of that lien.
On plaintiff's appeal from an adverse decision of the Circuit Court,
the Supreme Court of Appeals held that, under the Virginia statutes
the offending husband in this case was charged with the payment
of a monthly sum for alimony and support of his infant daughter,
which sum was to become a lien upon the land he then owned, and
"to the extent.., that the amount thereof was for the benefit of the infant daughter, was... to... continue in effect after the death of her
father, and until she became twenty-one years old or self supporting....,"4 and that such part of this monthly sum "as the court should,

after hearing evidence, determine to have been for the support of the
2193 Va. 631, 70 S. E. (ad) 417 (1952).
'193 Va. 631, 632, 70 S. E. (2d) 417 (1952).
'193 Va. 631, 641, 70 S. E. (2d) 417, 423 (1952).
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daughter should be a charge against the estate of..." the deceased.5
The conflict in the decisions of the various jurisdictions on this
issue appears to be traceable to four factors.
First: The fundamental common law concept is that a father's obligation to support his minor children operates only during his lifetime
and terminates on his death. Generally, the father's duty to support
his minor children during his lifetime is regarded as a legal duty
which is "correlative to and dependent on the parent's right to the
custody and services of the child..."6 and which "springs from the
fact of parentage." 7 Though the growing tendency of the law is to protect children who are caught in the midst of a statutory marital dissolution,8 the heavy hand of the common law prevails so strictly that
the courts in some jurisdictions are still reluctant to overthrow the
fiirmly entrenched princple that the duty of support terminates on
the death of the father.9
Second: The matter of care and support for minor children of
divorced parents is now generally regarded as governed by divorce
5193 Va. 631, 633, 70 S. E. (2d) 417, 418 (1952).
OWhitsett, Selected Essays on Family Law, Comment on "Extent Of A Parent's
Duty Of Support" (1950) 1072. A minority of jurisdictions say the duty is terminated where custody is lost or awarded to the mother: Finch v. Finch, 22 Conn. 411
(1853); Brown v. Smith, 19 R. I. 319, 33 Atl. 466, 3o L. R. A. 68o (1895). But the
great weight of authority is contra. Gilley v. Gilley, 79 Me. 292, 9 At. 623, 1
Am. St. Rep. 307 (1887). See Pretzinger v. Pretzinger, 45 Ohio St. 452, 458, 15 N. E.
471, 473, 4 Am. St. Rep. 542 (1887); 4 Vernier, American Family Laws (1936) § 234.
7Whitsett, Selected Essays On Family Law, Comment on "Extent Of A Parent's
Duty Of Support" (1950) 1072. Even the strict common law jurisdictions hold the
father liable for support during his life regardless of whether there is a divorce or
separation unless the court expressly orders that the mother support the child instead: Blades v. Szatai, 151 Md. 644, 135 At. 841, 50 A. L. R. 2.32 (1927); Pretzinger
v. Pretzinger, 45 Ohio St. 452, 15 N. E. 471, 4 Am. St. Rep. 452 (1887); 17 Am. Jur.,
Divorce and.Separation § 693. See Mullen v. Mullen, 188 Va. 259, 49 S. E. (2d) 349
(1948); Hawkins v. Hawkins, 187 Va. 595, 47 S.E. (2d)436 (1948).
8
Brockelbank, The Problem Of Family Support: New Uniform Act Offers A
Solution (1951) 37 A. B. A. J. 93; Note (1949) 35 Va. L. Rev. 482, 490, 492. The
common law duty of support is now extended by statute to include adopted and
illegimate children and those in relation to whom he stands in loco parentis as
well in 24 of the 48 states: Brockelbank, Problem Of Family Support: New Uniform Act Offers A Solution (1951) 37 A. B. A. J. 939
Guinta v.Lo Re, 159 Fla. 488, 31 S. (2d) 704 (1947); Blades v. Szatai, 151 Md.
644, 135 At. 841 (1927); Barry v. Sparks, 306 Mass. 80, 27 N. E. (2d) 728, 128 A. L.
R. 983 (1940); Rice v. Andrews, 127 Misc. 826, 217 N. Y. Supp. 528 (1926); Carey
v. Carey, 163 Tenn. 486, 43 S.W. (2d) 498 (1931) [later modified by In Re Moore's
Estate, 34 Tenn. App. 313, 234 S. W. (2d) 847 (1949) saying court had power to
charge estate but only if decree expressly allowed]; Robinson v. Robinson, 131
W. Va. 16o, 50 S.E. (2d) 455 (1948). See Madden, Domestic Relations (1931) § 115;
17 Am. Jur., Divorce and Separation § 706.

1953]

CASE COMMENTS

legislation rather than common law principles. 10 However, since the
statutes speak in extremely broad language" and usually fail to make
express provision on the point, it still remains for the courts to determine whether the law of the state goes beyond the common law
rule by making the divorced father's liability for support continue
after his death. Though it appears that all statutes properly could be
construed as so extending the common law liability,' 2 not all courts

have done so, and the decisions contain numerous instances of inconsistent interpretations of practically identical statutory provisions.' 3
Third: The methods of enforcing a decree of support against
4
the divorced father differ greatly throughout the various jurisdictions.'
Most courts declare that the divorce decree itself operates as a lien on
the real estate of the divorced father, thereby rendering the child a
judgment creditor, who can foreclose against this estate at any time
upon the father's failure to pay the stipulated amount required in
the decree. 1' Generally, this lien is held equally applicable to future
accruals and to presently due installments, and so operates against
the father's estate after, as well as before, his death.'

6

A minority of

'1 Notes (1949) 62 Harv. L. Rev. 1079, 1o8o; (1949) 35 Va. L. Rev. 482, 493;
(1948) 19 Miss. L. J. 249; (1944) 19 Ind. L. J. 162; (1936) 11 Wash. L. Rev. 45.

21E.g., Fla. Stat. Ann (1943) § 65.14 which states that the court shall provide
such support for the children as is "fit, equitable and just."
'See 2 Vernier, American Family Laws (1932) § 95. See also dissenting opinions in Guinta v. Lo Re, 159 Fla. 488, 31 S. (2d) 704, 706 (1947); Robinson v. Robinson, 131 W. Va. 16o, 50 S. E. (2d) 455, 462 (1948). It has been noted that Florida
has a sufficiently broad and comprehensive statute, which the court failed to consider in the Guinta case, to enable it to support the survival of liability for support
against the father's estate. Note (1948) 1 Fla. L. Rev. 95. The same would appear to
be true under the West Virginia type statute as is suggested in the dissent to the
Robinson case.
"Cf. Cal. Civil Code (Deering, 1941) § 138 and Mich Comp. Laws (1929) §
o
12378 and Utah Code Ann. (1943) tit. 4 , c, e, § 5 with Fla. Stat. (1941) § 65.14 and
with W. Va. Code (1943) § 4714. See: Notes (1949) 97 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 736; (1949) 62
Harv. L. Rev. 1079; (1949) 35 Va. L. Rev. 482.
212 Vernier, American Family Laws (1932) § 95; Note (194o) 26 Va. L. Rev.
401. See: Davis v. Davis, 145 Kan. 282, 65 P. (2d) 562, 565 (1937); Ostrin v. Posner;
127 Misc. 313, 215 N. Y. Supp. 259, 260 (1925); Boaze v. Commonwealth, 165 Va.
786, 183 S. E. 263, 266 (1936).
5United States v. Spangler, 94 F. Supp. 301 (S. D. W. Va. 1950); Miller v. Miller,
64 Me. 484 (1874); Creyts v. Creyts, 14.3 Mich. .75, 1o6 N. W. 1111, 114 Am. St.
Rep. 656 (19o6); Murphy v. Moyle, 17 Utah 113, 53 Pac. 1010, 70 Am. St. Rep.
767 (1898); Gain v. Gerling, 1o9 W. Va. 241, 153 S. E. 504 (1930); 17 Am. Jur.,
Divorce and Separations § 700.
uCreyts v. Creyts, 143 Mich. 375, io6 N. W. 1111, 14 Am. St. Rep. 656 (1o6);
Murphy v. Moyle, 17 Utah 113, 53 Pac. 1010, 7o Am. St. Rep. 767 (1898); Isaacs
v. Isaacs' Guardian, 117 Va. 730, 86 S. E. 105 (1915); Goff v. Goff, 6o W. Va. 9, 53

S. E. 769 (19o6).
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courts, nevertheless, are hesitant to carry the judgment lien principle
this far, excluding its application as to all future accruals or installments becoming due after the father's death. 17
Finally: The divorce decrees often fail to make specific provision
for what is to happen with regard to the father's liability for support
in the event of his death. Usually, when the decree states that the payments shall be made "during the minority of the children" the courts
hold the father's estate liable. 18 But the most common type decree, one
which is to take effect "until further order of the court," has been held
susceptible to both constructions. 19 And, in case the decree contains
no provision at all for support or its duration, some courts will take
it upon themselves to modify the decree so as to find the father's
estate liable, while others will not do so. 20 Frequently the problem
of support is erroneously confused with the problem of alimony, 21
though the two concepts are entirely distinct, alimony being an obligation created by statute and support an obligation arising under the
22
common law.
The Virginia court's decision in Morris v. Henry23 is in accord with
the majority view and the present trend in the decisions with regard
to the scope of the divorced father's obligation to support his child.24
2'Robinson v. Robinson, 131 W. Va. 16o, 5o S. E. (2d) 455 (1948). See: Blades
v. Szatai, 151 Md. 644, 135 At. 841, 845 (1927); Note (1948) 33 Iowa L. Rev. 7o3.
laNote (1949) 35 Va. L. Rev. 482, 493. Smith v. Funk, 151 Okla. 188, 284 Pac.
638 (1930); Murphy v. Moyle, 17 Utah 113, 53 Pac. 1oo, 7o Am. St. Rep. 767 (1898).
"Liability was imposed under such a decree in: Newman v. Burwell, 216 Cal.
608, 15 P. (2d) 511 (1932); Miller v. Miller, 64 Me. 484 (1874); Creyts v. Creyts,
143 Mich. 375, 1o6 N. W. 1111, 14 Am. St. Rep. 656 (19o6). Contra: Barry v.
Sparks, 3o6 Mass. 8o, 27 N. E. (2d) 728, 128 A. L. R. 983 (1940); Robinson v.
Robinson, 131 W. Va. 16o, 50 S. E. (2d) 455 (1948).
-"Cf. West v. West, 241 Mich. 679, 217 N. W. 924 (1928); Creyts v. Creyts, 143
Mich. 375, io6 N. W. 1111, 14 Am. St. Rep. 656 (19o6) where the decree was
modified. Contra: Guinta v. Lo Re, 159 Fla. 488, 31 S. (2d) 704 (1947) where
decree did make provision for support but made no mention as to its duration.
"See Roberts v. Roberts, 16o Md. 513, 154 At. 95, 100 (1931); Lukowski v.
Lukowski, io8 Mo. App. 204, 83 S. W. 274, 275 (19o4); Warren, Schouler Divorce
Manual (1944) § 338; 2 Vernier, American Family Laws (1932) § 1o4; Notes (1949)
35 Va. L. Rev. 482, 483; (1948) 33 Iowa L. Rev. 703. Note (1936) 11 Wash. L. Rev. 45,
discusses the question of alimony survival.
"See West v. West, 241 Mich. 679, 217 N. W. 924, 925 (1928); Warren, Schouler
Divorce Manual (1944) § 338; Note (1949) 35 Va. L. Rev. 482, 484: "Thus a child
may have a valid claim for maintenance against his father while his mother
would not be entitled to alimony."
=193 Va. 631, 70 S. E. (2d) 417 (1952).
24 Newman v. Burwell, 216 Cal. 6o8, 15 P. (2d) 511 (1932); Myers v. Harrington,
70 Cal. App. 680, 234 Pac. 412 (1925); Miller v. Miller, 64 Me. 484 (1874); West
v. West, 241 Mich. 679, 217 N. W. 924 (1928); Creyts v. Creyts, 143 Mich. 375,
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On the issue of whether the courts have power to provide for payments
by the father to support the child after the death of the father, it was
noted that the very comprehensive Virginia statutes2 r authorize the
court to make such decree as it deems necessary and expedient "concerning the estate and the maintenance of the parties, or either of them, and
the care, custody and maintenance of their minor children. ."26 under
the circumstances arising out of a divorce suit. In refutation of the view
adopted by the minority jurisdictions that the common law still controls the issue of support of minor children in divorce cases, Virginia
and the majority decisions accept the statutes as the governing factors
in issues which arise out of divorce decrees. Such statutes are remedial
and demand liberal construction "in the protection of the rights and
interests of infant defendants," 27 and "the evident purpose of the
legislature was to give to the court the largest discretion in respect to
the estate of the parties, and not to relieve the offending parents of
any duty, moral, social, or otherwise." 28 As a basis for imposing liability
on the father's estate, the Virginia court embraced the reasoning of
the early Maine case of Miller v. Miller:29 "We do not controvert the
position.., that, by the rules of the common law, a father is under no
legal obligation to provide for the support of his children after his
death. It may be that he can disinherit them and leave them to be
supported by others.... But we think such can only be the law when
the family relations remain intact, and when there is no great danger
lo6 N. W. '11,
114 Am. St. Rep. 656 (i9o6); Garber v. Robitshek, 226 Minn.
398, 33 N. W. (2d) 30 (1948); Silberman v. Brown, 72 N. E. (2d) 267 (Ohio Com.
Pl. 1946); Smith v. Funk, 141 Okla. 188, 284 Pac. 638 (193o); Murphy v. Moyle,
17 Utah 113, 53 Pac. 1010, 7o Am. St. Rep. 767 (1898); Gainsburg v. Garbarsky,
157 Wash. 537, 289 Pac. iooo (193o); Edelman v. Edelman, 65 Wyo. 27i, 199 P. (2d)
840 (1948); 17 Am. Jur., Divorce and Separation § 7o6, p. 536.
-Exemplary are the following provisions from the Virginia Code: 4 Va. Code
Ann. (Michie, 1950) § 2o-1o8 provides for revision, alteration or modification of
such decrees by the court on petition or by its own motion; 2 Va. Code Ann. (Michie,
ig5o) § 8-386 provides that every judgment for money operates as a lien on real
estate of one against whom it was rendered; § 8-343 provides further that every
decree or order of the court which requires payment of money shall have the
effect of a judgment; and § 8-344 provides that those persons who are beneficiaries of
the decree or order which requires the payment of money shall be deemed as
judgment creditors.
"4 Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950 ) § 20-107.
-'Bailey v. Bailey, 172 Va. 18, 22, 2oo S. E. 622, 624 (1939).
3Heninger v. Heninger, 9o Va. 271, 275, 18 S. E. 193, 195 (1893). See dissenting
opinions: Guinta v. Lo Re, '59 Fla. 448, 31 S. (2d) 704, 7o6 (1947); Blades v.
Szatai, 151 Md. 644, 135 At. 841, 845 (1927); Robinson v. Robinson, 131 W. Va.
160, 50 S. E. (2d) 455, 462 (1948).
2 64 Me. 484 (1874).
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that such arbitrary power will be exercised. We think that when,
through the fault of the father, his family is broken up, and his children become in one sense the wards of the court, this power is taken
from him, and he may be compelled, if of sufficient ability, to give security for the support of his children that shall be binding upon his
estate." 30 This point of view thus subscribes to a distinction between
the fathers duty to support his minor children and the effect of a
judgment based on such duty: ".

.

. the duty in absence of any adjud-

ication terminates upon death, the judgment does not." 31
Having determined that the divorce court had the power to provide for such support, the Supreme Court of Appeals concluded that
the 1932 divorce decree did, in fact, impose a lien on the realty of the
father which is enforceable as against the plaintiff, as subsequent
grantee of the property, and that the minor daughter stood as a judgment creditor against her deceased father's estate.
Exemplifying the reasoning of the minority of courts which have
taken a quite positive position contrary to the Morris decision is the
relatively recent case of Robinson v. Robinson.32 There, under facts almost identical with those in the principal case, the West Virginia court
held that a divorce decree against the father requiring him to support
his minor children during their minority added nothing to his common
law obligation, and, therefore, would terminate on his death. The
court argued that it is not logical "that an order of a court for support
of children, based as it must be on his common law obligation, should
be given the force and effect of a judgment for payment of money, and
creating a lien for money not due at his death."3 3 This contention is
supported by the observation of the earlier Maryland case of Blades v.
Szatai, that it is difficult to see why "a child should be in a better position in respect to his father's estate than he would be without the
decree for divorce." 3 4 However, the Virginia court, in common with
those following the majority view, 35 answers with the argument that a
father who has forfeited custody of his children under a divorce decree
against him might easily be embittered as a result, thereby losing interest in his children, and being, therefore, more inclined to exercise
3Morris v. Henry, 193 Va. 631, 636, 70 S. E. (2d) 417, 420 (1952).

=Note (1949) 24 Notre Dame Law. 563, 565 citing dissenting opinion in Robinson v. Robinson, 131 W. Va. 16o, 50 S. E.(2d) 455, 462 (1948).
2131 W. Va. 16o, 50 S. E. (2d) 455 (1948), noted (1949) 6 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
208.

.Robinson v. Robinson, 131 W. Va. 16o, 5o S. E. (2d) 455, 460 (1948).
"151
Md. 644, 135 Ad. 841, 843 (1927).
5

2See note 24, supra.

19531

CASE COMMENTS

his arbitrary common law right to disinherit them than he would have
been had the family remained intact. Similarly, moved by a vengeful
spirit, he could, if the decree for support imposes no lien on his property, defeat the children's right to support by merely squandering the
property or by confessing judgment in favor of his creditors.3 6 As the
Virginia court states, "a court dealing with the health and happiness of
infant children ought not to be... powerless..." to guard against such

possibilities.3 7 The minority jurisdictions further contend that imposing a lien on the father's property for the support of his children would
restrict the marketability of the property by putting the title under a
cloud, and would seriously impair the father's right of testamentary
disposition over his property.3 8 The counter argument under the prevailing viewpoint is that the child's welfare is at least as important as
the father's right of free alienation and testamentary disposition of his
property. It is pointed out that the imposition of a lien for support
affects these rights of the father no more than any other judgment
against him would do. "The right of inheritance does not exist until
debts are paid. So also with the right to give or take by will." 39 However, the West Virginia court argued that since "our law treats the
rights of creditors as superior to any claim children may have for support, during their minority, out of the estates of the parents," 40 to
*Morris v. Henry, 193 Va. 631, 641, 70 S. E. (2d) 417, 423 (1952): "The death
of a father does not end the need of his infant children for food and shelter."
Miller v. Miller, 64 Me. 484, 487 (1874): "We think that when, through the fault
of the father, his family is broken up, and his children become in one sense the
wards of the court, this power is taken from him, and he may be compelled, if of
sufficient ability, to give security for the support of his children that shall be
binding upon his estate." See dissenting opinion in Robinson v. Robinson, 131 W.
Va. 16o, 50 S. E. (2d) 455, 462 (1948).
7193 Va. 631, 641, 70 S. E. (2d) 417, 423 (1952).
Robinson v. Robinson, 131 W. Va. 16o, 50 S. E. (2d) 455, 458 (1948), citing
Blades v. Szatai, 151 Md. 6 44, 135 At. 841 (1927), observes that "to hold otherwise would be to disrupt the general theory of inheritance, prefer one child over
another, and interfere with the common rules firmly established by statute law,
governing the descent and distribution of the property of a decedent." See Note
(1949) 5 Va. L. Rev. 482, 492.
3'Morris v. Henry, 193 Va. 631, 641, 70 S. E. (2d) 417, 423 (1952). Also, Miller v.
Miller, 64 Me. 484 (1874); Stone v. Bayley, 75 Wash. 184, 134 Pac. 820 (1913). See
dissenting opinions, Blades v. Szatai, 151 Md. 644, 135 AtI. 841, 845 (1927); Robinson v. Robinson, 131 W. Va. 16o, 50 S. E. (2d) 455, 462 (1948).
40131 W. Va. i6o, 50 S.E. (2d) 455, 460 (1948). On that same page the West Virginia court adds further that if a ruling were handed down in favor of the infant
defendant in that case, it would necessitate placing the "entire estate of a decedent
beyond the reach of his creditors, and apply it to the support and maintenance of his
children during their minority.... there is simply no law which would authorize
such a procedure...."
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hold such decree as a judgment lien in favor of the minor child would
unfairly prejudice the rights of these creditors. But, under the majority
view, the child himself is elevated to the position of creditor by virtue
of such lien, the general creditors bearing the same relation to such
judgment as they do to other judgments. 41 Finally, it is suggested that,
since the lien is necessarily uncertain in amount and duration, its existence will prolong the administration of the estate of the deceased,
resulting in considerable expense and consequent loss to heirs and
devisees of the father.42 Recognition of the lien will therefore defeat
the sound policy in favor of the speedy settlement of all estates. But,
as noted in the principal case, if the settlement of decedent's estate is
postponed for too great a period, or if the exact amount of the lien
is undetermined, methods can be devised for providing an early
windup in its administration and for determining the amount of the lien
itself. 43 Then, too, if other children of either spouse or children of a
subsequent marriage would be unduly prejudiced by a lien favoring
the child involved in the divorce, payments ordered by the decree are
subject to adjustment under most statutes. 44
Through the considerations relied on to support the minority
view cannot be completely discounted, it appears that in most states
the statutes are adequate to meet and solve such complications as may
arise from holding the father's estate subject to a lien for support of
children under a divorce decree. The majority of the courts today will
not presume that society is to take over the burden of supporting
children when the father's means of supporting the children are not
exhausted, and those courts properly regard the father's obligation of
support as being paramount to his freedom of disposition of his prop1

' Morris v. Henry, 193 Va. 631, 641, 7o S. E. (2d) 417, 423 (1952): "... creditors of
the father bear the same relation to the judgment in favor of the child as to other
judgments."
"See Note (1949) 35 Va. L. Rev. 482, 4943
" It has been held that the father's personal representative will be required to
pay a lump sum out of the estate into the court sufficient to meet the future installments which will accrue from the date of the death of the father and until
the child reaches majority, or becomes self supporting in the meantime. Newman v.
Burwell, 216 Cal. 6o8, 15 P. (2d) 511 (1932).
"Note (1949) 35 Va. L. Rev. 482, 494, illustrating the broad discretionary range
open to the courts under which to meet extraordinary contingencies and fortuitous circumstances arising under these support decrees. It is noted that if the
child dies before reaching majority once the father's estate has been held liable,
then the balance of the sum designated for support is returned pro rata to those
parties who have obtained an interest in the father's estate. See Newman v. Burwell, 216 Cal. 6o8, 15 P. (2d) 511 (1932); Murphy v. Moyle, 17 Utah 113, 53 Pac.
1010 (1898).
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erty by deed, will or intestacy, and to his right of disinheriting his
children. Enabling such child to attain the favored status of a judgment lien creditor against his father's real estate, even after the death
of that father, obviously places a child of divorce in a more favored
position than that held by a child who is not involved in such marital
dissolution. But this benefit merely helps to offset the many serious
prejudices suffered by the children of separated parents. The Virginia court displays foresight in pointing out that the "possession of
the power to bind the parent's estate need not and would not result
in its being exercised in all cases. It should, of course, be used only
where the necessities of the case and the ends of justice require."4 5
Ample provisions are found in the statutes in which to modify, alter,
revise, or abrogate such decrees altogether in the light of the size of
the estate involved, the claims of the creditors against the estate, and
the needs of other children and beneficiaries involved.4 6
ROBERT J.

EQUITY-INJUNCTION

AGAINST ESTABLISHMENT

OF FUNERAL

RESIDENTIAL DISTRICT AS "NUISANCE IN FACT."

INGRAM

HOME
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[Louisiana]

The equity courts generally have approved the classification of
nuisances from the point of view of their nature, as those which are
"nuisances per se" and those which are "nuisances in fact."' A nuisance
per se, sometimes called a nuisance at law, has been defined as an act,
thing, or omission, or the use of property, which in and of itself is a
2
nuisance, and hence not permissible or excusable in a particular area.
However, in seeking to define such a nuisance as an act, occupation, or
structure which is a nuisance at all times and under any circumstances
regardless of location or surroundings,3 the courts have employed the
term per se in a misleading manner, as a nuisance cannot be created
'Mforris v. Henry, 193 Va. 631, 641, 70 S. E. (2d) 417, 423 (1952) [italics supplied].
"°Garber v. Robitshek, 226 Minn. 398, 33 N. W. (2d) 3o (1948).
'Kinney v. Koopman, 116 Ala. 310, 22 So. 593 (1897); Board of Education of
Louisville v. Klein, 303 Ky. 234, 197 S. W. (2d) 427 (1946); New Orleans v. Lenfant,
126 La. 455, 52 So. 575 (1910); 3g Am. Jur., Nuisances § ii.

-Shamburger v. Scheurrer, 198 S. W. io69 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
3Engle v. Scott, 57 Ariz. 383, 114 P. (2d) 236 (1941); Swaim v. Morris, 93 Ark.
362, 125 S. W. 432 (191o); Beckwith v. Town of Stratford, 129 Conn. 506, 29 A.
(2d) 775 (1942); Simpson v. Du Pont Co., 143 Ga. 465, 85 S. E. 344 (1915); McPherson
v. First Presbyterian Church, 120 Okla. 40, 248 Pac. 561, 51 A. L. R. 1215 (1926).
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unless someone is affected by the act.4 It is held in most jurisdictions
that a nuisance per se will not be declared when the act, erection, or
the use of property is lawful and authorized by competent authority,5
as such an activity can by care and precaution be conducted without
danger or inconvenience to others. 6 Activities which are not nuisances
per se, but may become nuisances because of surrounding circumstances or the manner in which an activity is conducted, 7 have been
classified as nuisances "per accidens" or "infact."8 The effect of the
diffeience between a nuisance per se and a nuisance per accidens lies
in the proof of the wrong, rather than in the remedy.9 A nuisance per
se becomes nuisance as a matter of law' 0 and the right to relief is
established by averment and proof of the mere act." However, in the
case of a nuisance in fact, the proof of specific harmful consequences
4Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Whalen, 149 U. S. 157, 13 S. Ct. 822, 37 L. ed. 686 (1893);
Town of Colton v. South Dakota Cent. Land Co., 25 S. D. 3o9, 126 N. W. 507
(191o); Everett v. Paschall, 61 Wash. 47, '1' Pac. 879 (igio). In Melker v. New

York, igo N. Y. 481, 83 N. E. 565 (i9o8), the court observed that whether a thing
is a nuisance per se depends upon the surrounding circumstances, including the
location, and each case depends upon its own facts for classification as a nuisance,
except when the act is malum in se, when the surrounding circumstances have no
bearing upon the question. Under this rule, a business can be a nuisance per se
in some localities, nuisance in fact in other localities and perfectly lawful in other
localities.
'Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United Electric Ry. Co., 42 Fed. 273 (C. C. M. D.
Tenn. 189o); Simpson v. Du Pont Powder Co., 143 Ga. 465, 85 S. E. 344 (1915);
Valparaiso v. Hagen, 153 Ind. 337, 54 N. E. 1o62 (1899); McKay v. City of Enid, .6
Okla. 275, 1o9 Pac. 520 (1910).

OKinney v. Koopman, 116 Ala. 310, 22 So. 593 (1897); Simpson v. Du Pont Powder
Co., 143 Ga. 465, 85 S. E. 344 (1915); Windfall Mfg. Co. v. Patterson, 148 Ind. 414,
47 N. E. 2 (1897).

7Explosives, Murphy v. Ossola, 124 Conn. 366, 199 At. 648 (1938); horse stable
in a city, Thompson v. Elzy, 83 Ind. App. 215, 148 N. E. 154 (1925); gasoline filling
station, Thomas v. Dougherty, 325 Pa. 525, 19o At. 886 (1937). For further examples
see 28 Words and Phrases (Perm. Ed.) 963.
8Asphalt Products Co. v. Marable, 65 Ga. App. 877, 16 S. E. (2d) 771 (1941);
Warren Co. v. Dickson, 185 Ga. 481, 195 S. E. 568 (1938); Rowe v. City of Pocatello, 70 Idaho 343, 218 P. (2d) 695 (1950); Walker v. Wearb, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 548
(1938).
Robinson v. Westman, 224 Minn. 105, 29 N. W. (2d) 1, 174 A. L. R. 746
(1947); Pennsylvania Co. v. Sun Co., 29o Pa. 404, 138 At. 909, 55 A. L. R. 873
(1927).
"Town of Lonoke v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 92 Ark. 546, 123 S. W. 395,
135 Am. St. Rep. 2oo (igog); McPherson v. First Presbyterian Church, 12o Okla. 40,
248 Pac. 561, 51 A. L. R. 1215 (1926); 39 Am. Jur., Nuisances § ii.
"Borgnemouth Realty Co. v. Gulf Soap Corp., 212 La. 57, 31 S.(2d) 488 (1947);
Gainfort V. 229 Raritan Avenue Corp., 127 N. J. L. 409, 22 A. (2d) 893 (1941); Pennsylvania Co. v. Sun Co., 29o Pa. 404, 138 Ad. 909, 55 A. L. R. 873 (1927).
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is necessary,12 and the act will not be enjoined until it is proved that
s
3
unduly offensive consequences will arise from it.
A type of case in which the courts must strike a most delicate
balance of interests in passing on the sufficiency of the proof of the existence of a nuisance arises when property owners attempt to enjoin the
proposed establishment of a funeral home in a strictly residential area.
The operation of a funeral home being an admittedly legal and necessary business, it is conceded that no nuisance per se is involved. 14 Representing the difficulty of determining whether a nuisance in fact is
being threatened is the recent Louisiana case of Frederick et al. v.
Brown Funeral Homes, Inc.' 5 The defendant proposed to erect an
undertaking establishment in a strictly residential community. The
plaintiffs, nearby residents, brought suit to have the opening of the
business restrained on the allegation that it would constitute a nuisance
in fact, because of the locality and surroundings. They contended that
their homes would be rendered physically uncomfortable, that the occupants would be exposed to noxious odors and gases, and that property values would be depreciated. The trial court granted a preliminary injunction, but a stay order was obtained by defendants, pending
an appeal to the Louisiana Supreme Court. On the original hearing
that court, with two Justices dissenting, adopted the rule that "the
inherent nature of the business is such that, if located in a purely residential district, it will inevitably create an atmosphere detrimental
to the use and enjoyment of residential property..." in such a way as
to make it a nuisance in fact.' 6 However, on rehearing, this same
tribunal, with one Justice dissenting, abandoned its original position,
and, admitting that it was reaching a decision contrary to the strong
weight of authority, ruled that, "unless the establishment and operation of the funeral home is prohibited by rules of police or custom of
the place, it cannot be enjoined prior to its operation and then only
if it is operated in such a manner as to cause damage to those living in
17
neighboring houses."'
'2 Gainfort v. 229 Raritan Avenue Corp., 127 N. J. L. 409, 22 A. (2d) 893 (1941);
Pennsylvania Co. v. Sun Co., 29o Pa. 404, 138 At. 9o9, 55 A. L. R. 873 (1927).
'-'Thomson v. Sammon, 174 Ga. 751, 164 S. E. 45 (1932); Board of Education of
Louisville v. Klein, 3o3 Ky. 234, 197 S.W. (2d) 427 (1946); Hamlin v. Durham, 235
Ky. 842,

32 S. W.

(2d) 413 (193o).

"'White v. Luquire Funeral Home, 221 Ala. 44o, 129 So. 84 (1930); Fentress v.
Sicard, 181 Ark. 173, 25 S.W. (2d) 18 (193o); Wescott v. Middleton, 43 N. J. Eq. 478,
ii At. 490 (1887); 54 Am. Jur., Undertakers & Embalmers § 7.
1 62 S. (2d) ioo (La. 1952).
1"62 S. (2d) 1oo, 1o2 (La. 1952).
1762 S.(2d) 1oo, 11o (La. 1952). Justice

Hawthorne, who had written the original
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The majority of the court thought the authority relied on by the
plaintiff's persuasive, but not decisive of the issue, in view of the
Louisiana statute which states:
"Although one be not at liberty to make any work by which his
neighbor's buildings may be damaged, yet every one has the
liberty of doing on his own ground whatsoever he pleases, although it should occasion some inconvenience to his neighbor."' 8

Mere inconvenience to neighboring residents and depreciation of the
value of their properties was declared not necessarily enough to constitute a nuisance. Physical annoyance of the inhabitants must be
proved, and the majority thought it impossible to determine in advance whether the defendant's enterprise would be operated in a
manner to cause such consequences. The Justice who had written the
opinion for the court on the original hearing still maintained his
position that an injunction should issue, declaring:
"I cannot believe that the average person in this jurisdiction
is any less sensitive to the depressing effects of a funeral home
than is the average person in the common-law jurisdiction where
it has been concluded that as a matter of fact funeral homes are
by their very nature so depressing that their close proximity deprives one of the enjoyment of his home and that they can be
enjoined when they seek to intrude themselves into an exclusively residential distric.' 19
A number of jurisdictions in the United States, upon which the
final majority of the court apparently relied, 20 have held in cases involving different fact situations, that if there is no physical danger
from noxious vapors or exposures to disease, the depressing influence
does not constitute the undertaking parlor a nuisance. 21 Thus, in
Westcott v. Middleton2= an injunction sought against the maintenance of an established funeral home on a lot adjoining the one on
which the plaintiff resided was refused, where it appeared that no
opinion, now dissented, and the two former dissenting Justices were now joined by
the rest of the court to form the majority.
"'La. Civil Code (1938) Art. 668.
1162 S. (2d) ioo, i1 (La. 1952).
2'These jurisdictions were not mentioned in the final majority opinion, but were
cited on the original hearing by the two dissenting judges, who became part
of the majority of the court on rehearing.
-11Pearson and Son v. Bonnie, 2o9 Ky. 307, 272 S. W. 375 (1925); Westcott v.
Middleton, 43 N. J. Eq. 478, 11 Atl. 490 (1887); Stoddard v. Snodgrass, 117 Ore. 262,
241 Pac. 73 (1925).
2243 N. J. Eq. 478, 11 Atl. 490 (1887).
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noxious vapors or germs of disease were detectable as a result of the
business, and the main feature of offensiveness resulted from the
plaintiff's over-sensitive nature and repugnance to anything pertaining to death. The New Jersey court relied upon the principle of an
English case, that "the injury [complained of] must be physical, as
distinguished from purely imaginative. It must be something that
produces real discomfort or annoyance through the medium of the
senses; not from delicacy of taste or a refined fancy." 23 The Oregon
court ruled that these principles should govern in a case in which
an adjacent landowner complained of an injury which was of a mental
nature rather than physical, and thereby all persons were not affected
24
adversely, but only those who were over-nervous or supersensitive.
Similarly, the Kentucky court has declared that the injury or annoyance which will warrant relief must be of a real and substantial character and such as impairs the ordinary enjoyment of property, and
not a mere sentimental injury.2 5 These cases can be readily distinguished from the Frederick case in that they dealt with either a permanently established funeral home 26 or a defendant undertaker who
had conducted a home in the past so as not to interfere with the adjoining property owners27 and it is not even clear that the Wescott case
dealt with an establishment located in a strictly residential area.
While the Louisiana court did not believe that a depreciation in the
value of the surrounding property was a sufficient justification for
granting injunctive relief, one of these so-called minority cases admitted that there had been no depreciation of property value during
28
the past conduct of the funeral home.
As the dissent in the principal case contended, a large majority of
the jurisdictions in this country, in accordance with the general principles governing the granting of injunctions against threatened nuisances, 20 have given relief to prevent the establishment of a funeral
2Westcott v. Middleton, 43 N.

J.

Eq. 478, 11 AtI. 490, 494 (1887) relying on

Walter v. Selfe, 4 De G. & Sm. 315, 322, 64 Eng. Rep. 849, 852 (1815).
2
-Stoddard v. Snodgrass, 117 Ore. 262, 241 Pac. 73 (1925).
-Pearson and Son v. Bonnie, 2o9 Ky. 307, 272 S. W. 375 (1925)3Westcott v. Middleton, 43 N. J. Eq. 478, 11 Ad. 490 (1887).
"Pearson and Son v. Bonnie, 2o9 Ky. 307, 272 S. W. 375 (1925); Stoddard v.
Snodgrass, 117 Ore. 262, 241 Pac. 73 (1925).
"Stoddard v. Snodgrass, 117 Ore. 262, 241 Pac. 73 (1925).
"'As a general rule an injunction will be granted only to restrain an actual,
existing nuisance, Reynolds v. Union Savings Bank, 155 Iowa 519, 136 N. W. 529
(1912); Pfingst v. Senn, 95 Ky. 556, 23 S. W. 358 (1893); Adams v. Michael, 38 Md.
123, 17 Am. Rep. 516 (1873). But it is well settled that a court of equity may
enjoin a threatened or anticipated nuisance, where it dearly appears that a nuisance
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home in a residential section of the city, when it appears that the
maintenance of such establishment will substantially interfere with
the comfort, repose, and happiness of the neighboring residents and
will materially decrease the value of their property. 30 Even when the
risks of physical discomfort or harm are not present, the inherent
nature of the business in a strictly residential area has led the courts
to enjoin, as a nuisance, the continuance of the existing funeral
parlor. 31 In support of this practice, the Alabama court has observed:
"The hearse, the ambulance, the morgue, are reminders of the
presence of the dead; the funeral procession and service with
all the incidents of grief-stricken relatives forced upon frequent
attention of those entitled to the quiet, peace, and happiness of
the home, bring depression and discomfort to the normal person
unschooled to such conditions.
"Such discomfort cannot be regarded as fanciful, imaginative, nor due to over-sensitiveness. Conditions, inherent in the
business, bring such an atmosphere about the place as to render
it less desirable as a place of residence, and if less desirable
the
32
property becomes less valuable for residence purposes."
will necessarily result from the contemplated act or thing which is sought to be enjoined. Missouri v. Illinois, 18o U. S. 208, 21 S. Ct. 331, 45 L. ed. 497 (19o); St. Louis
v. Knapp, Stout 8: Co., 104 U. S. 658, 26 L. ed. 883 (1882); 39 Am. Jur., Nuisances
§ 151; Prosser, Torts (1941) § 74.
3°Mutual Service Funeral Homes v. Fehler, 254 Ala. 363, 48 S. (2d) 26 (1950);
Laughlin, Wood & Co. v. Cooney, 22o0 Ala. 556, 126 So. 864 (1930); Brown v. Arbuckle,
88 Cal. App (2d) 258, 198 P. (2d) 550 (1948); Bevington v. Otte, 223 Iowa 509, 273
N. W. 98 (1937); Tureman v. Ketterlin, 304 Mo. 221, 263 S. XV. 202, 43 A. L. R. 1155
(1924). For further authority, see cases cited in Frederick et al. v. Brown Funeral
Homes, Inc., 62 S. (2d) oo, 1o5 (La. 1952); Jackson, The Law of Cadavers (2d ed. 1950)
457. In Higgins v. Bloch, 213 Ala. 209, 104 So. 429 (1925), the court held that if the
consequences of a nuisance about to be erected or commenced will be irreparable in
damages, and such consequences are not merely possible but to a reasonable degree
certain, a court of equity may interfere to arrest the nuisance before it is completed.
In Saier v. Joy, 198 Mich. 295, 164 N. W. 507 (1917), a proposed funeral home was
enjoined when it appeared that the value of the plaintiff's property would be materially decreased by the defendant's business.
'These courts have based their decisions many times on the theory that a constant reminder of death is a nuiance: White v. Luquire Funeral Home, 221 Ala. 44o,
129 So. 84 (593o); Higgins v. Bloch, 213 Ala. 209, 104 So. 429 (1925); Saier v. Joy, 198
Mich. 295, 164 N. W. 507 (1917). For further cases see Jackson, The Law of Cadavers
(pd ed. 1950) 457, n. 82.
-'White v. Luquire Funeral Home, 221 Ala. 440, 443, 129 So. 84, 86 (1930). It is
universally held that a funeral home in a business district does not constitute a nuisance, Kirk v. Mabis, 215 Iowa 769, 246 N. W. 759 (1933); Smith v. Fairchild,
193 Miss. 536, 1o S. (2d) 172 (1942); Jackson, The Law of Cadavers (2d ed. 1950) 458.
See Fentress v. Sicard, 181 Ark. 173, 25 S. W. (2d) 18, 19 (1930). The decisions, however,
are not in accord whether the courts should enjoin a proposed funeral home in a
district undergoing transition from a residential section to a business district. In Daw-
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Although the statute involved in the principal case permits one to
use his property as he pleases even though he should occasion some
inconvenience to his neighbors, the Louisiana court, to be consistent
with the strong majority view, should have found that a funeral home
in a residential district is more than a "mere inconvenience" and
would be a nuisance in fact. In view of the admitted depressive effect of a funeral home on both the use and sale value of residential
property, it seems that the court should have conceded the existence
of such an invasion of a property right as will generally be enjoined
by equity.
ALVIN Y. MILBERG

OF LIABILITY OF INSURER UNDER OMNIBUS CLAUSE
DRIVEN BY OTHER THAN NAMED ASSURED.
AUTOMOBILE
COVERING

INSURANCE-ScOPE

[Federal]
With the increasing use of automobiles and consequent greater
traffic hazards, it has become general practice to incorporate into
automobile liability insurance policies an "omnibus clause" which extends protection to persons other than the owner, using the car with
his permission. Though the terms vary in detail, a generally standardized clause has been developed which provides that "the unqualified
word 'insured'... includes not only the named assured, but also any
person while using the automobile and any person or organization
legally responsible for the use thereof provided,... that the declared
and actual use of the automobile is with the permission of the named
assured....",
son v. Lawfersweiler, 241 Iowa 850, 43 N. XV. (2d) 726 (195o) no relief was given; in
Higgins v. Bloch, 213 Ala. 2o9, 104 So. 429 (1925) relief was given; and in Tureman v.
Ketterlin, 304 Mo. 221, 263 S. W. 202 (1924) relief was given where it was shown to be
still essentially a residential district.
"Hauser v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 187 So. 684, 687 (La. App. 1939); Miller, The
Omnibus Clause (1941) 15 Tulane L. Rev. 422; 5 Am.Jur., Automobiles § 533 (1952
Supp.) For the most part the courts have not given any particular effect to minor
variations in wording. The most important change effected by the "new" clause in the
standard policy is that of substituting the words "actual use" for "use" in the
phrase, "provided that the actual use is with the permission of the named assured...." According to Appleman, Automobile Liability Insurance (1938) 11o,
the change was made to make clear that the use of the car at the time of the accident had to be one actually contemplated by the parties at the time when the
original bailment was made. The Ohio Court followed this construction in Gulla
v. Reynolds, 32o Ohio App. 243, 81 N. E. (2d) 4o6 (1948). However, the weight
of authority rejects this view and holds the change to be of little or no importance.
Vezolles v. Home Ind. Co., 38 F. Supp. 455 (W. D. Ky. 1941), aff'd 128 F. (2d) 257
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It is agreed that the major effect of the clause is to extend the insurance coverage within the limits of the policy to any person using the
automobile with the consent of the assured, but not to enlarge the
insurance coverage as defined in the policy.2 In spite of repeated
holdings that the provision is not ambiguous, however, there has
been a great deal of litigation concerning the specific application of the
omnibus clause. Such controversies arise most frequently over the
meaning and scope of the term "permission" to drive the automobile.
Under the present standard clause, the only person having the capacity to grant permission is the named assured, 4 yet disputes still arise
when the permission is granted by the named assured's legal representative, 5 or where the named assured is a corporation or other impersonal entity, 6 or where the bailee of the vehicle extends permission
7
to a third prson for use of the car.
(C. C. A. 6th, 1942); Stanley v. Cryer Drilling Co., 213 La. 980, 36 S.(2d) 9 (1948);
Note (1949) 5 A. L. R. (2d) 607. There is apparently no difference in the words
"consent" and "permission" as used in omnibus clauses. American Automobile Ins.
Co. v. Jones, 163 Tenn. 605, 45 S. W. (2d) 52 (x932); Appleman, Special Phases of
the "Omnibus Clause" in Insurance Policy (1936) 22 A. B. A. J. 616; 2 Couch,
Cyclopedia of Insurance Law (1945 Supp.) 1303.
2
Farm Bureau Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 104 F. (2d) 477 (C. C. A. 4th,
1939); Gudbrandsen v. Pelto, 205 Minn. 607, 287 N. W. x16 (1939); 45 C. J. S. 894.
3Hawkeye Cas. Co. v. Western Underwriter's Ass'n, 53 F. Supp. 256 (S.D.
Idaho 1944). This view that there is no ambiguity seems to be based on the maxim that policies are to be construed in favor of the insured. However, the rule to
the effect that the terms of the policy cannot be enlarged or diminished by judicial
construction is also employed by the courts. Denny v. Royal Ind. Co., 26 Ohio App.
566, 159 N. E. 107 (1927): 5 Am. Jur. 8o6.
'A common variation on the "standard" clause provides that permission may
be granted by an adult member of the named assured's household who is not a
chauffeur or domestic servant. This provision raises many questions concerning
who has the capacity to grant permission. See Appleman, Special Phases of the
"Omnibus Clause" in Insurance Policy (1936) 22 A. B. A. J. 613, 45 C. J. S. 9o;
Note (1931) 72 A. L. R. 1391.
'Antone v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 335 Pa. 134, 6 A. (2d) 566 (1939). Hobbs
v. Cunningham, 273 Mass. 529, 174 N. E. 181 (1930), is to the effect that under the
omnibus clause, the legal representative of the named assured may give permission
after the assured's death so long as the car remains an asset of the estate. However, under most policies, provision for such eventualities is made in a separate
clause.
6
The president of an insured corporation has the authority to give permission
for use without action of the board of directors, Georgia Cas. Co. v. Waldman, 53
F. (2) 24 (C. C. A. 5 th, 193*). Similar results have been reached in the case of a
managing official, (American) Lumbermens Mutual Cas. Co. v. Timms & Howard,
xo8 F. (2d) 497 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939). A municipal official has no authority to consent to the personal use by a city employee of a municipally owned and insured
automobile, Fox v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp. Ltd., 243 App. Div. 325, 276
N. Y. Supp. 917 (1935), aff'd 267 N. Y. 609, 196 N. E. 604 (1935).
'Where any sub-bailment has been expressly forbidden, the original permit.

CASE COMMENTS
When the alleged permittor has the capacity to give permission,
controversies arise as to what constitutes "permission" within the
meaning of the clause. Either by specific policy provision or by judicial
construction, it is established that the giving of consent may be either
express or implied.8 Both types must involve "a mutuality of agreement," either directly and distinctly stated 0 or based on "an inference
arising from a course of conduct or relationship between the parties,
in which there is mutual acquiescence or lack of objection under circumstances signifying assent.""
The most troublesome problem presented to the courts in the
omnibus clause cases has been the determination of the scope of permissible activity which the law will include within the permission
actually granted by a qualified person. The typical situation, as stated
by the federal court in the recent case of Branch v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 1 2 is that in which "possession of the insured
tee can give no valid permission to a third person within the meaning of the
policy, Columbia Cas. Co. v. Lyle, 81 F. (2d) 281 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1936); Clemons v.
Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co., i8 S. (2d) 228 (La. App. 1944)- Similarly, where the
named assured permitted such a delegation, the bailee is competent to give permission. Odden v. Union Ind. Co., 156 Wash. io, 288 Pac. 59, 72 A. L. R. 1363 (193o).
However where the named assured remained silent as to the right of such delegation, the majority holds that authority does not exist. Samuels v. American Automobile Ins. Co., 15o F. (2d) 221, 16o A. L. R. 1191 (C. C. A. ioth, 1945); Trotter v.
Union Ind. Co., 35 F. (2d) 104 (C. C. A. 9 th, 1929); Cronan v. Travelers Ind. Co.,
126 N. J. L. 56, 18 A. (2d) 13 (1941); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hodsdon, 92 N. H. 233, 29 A.
(2d) 782 (1942); Idemnity Ins. Co. v. Jordan, 158 Va. 834, 164 S. E. 539 (1932). According to the minority rule such authority may be implied from the original bailment. For a fuller discussion of this subject see Note 0946) 16o A. L. R. 1195.
8
American Cas. Co. v. Windham, 26 F. Supp. 261 (M. D. Ga. 1939), aff'd 107 F.
(2d) 88 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1939); Tomasetti v. Maryland Cas. Co., 117 Conn. 505, 169
At. 54 (1933); Conrad v. Duffin, 158 Pa. Super. 3o5, 44 A. (2d) 770 (1945); 45 C. J.
S. 897.
'Kazdan v. Stein, 26 Ohio App. 455, 16o N. E. 5o6 (1927), aff'd ii8 Ohio St. 217,
i6o N. E. 704 (1928).
'(Hinton v. Indemity Ins. Co., 175 Va. 205, 8 S. E. (2d) 279 (1940).
uHinton v. Indemity Ins. Co., 175 Va. 205, 214, 8 S. E. (2d) 279, 283 (1940).
Permission is implied by the courts much more readily when it is shown that a
close social relationship exists between the parties, such as good friends or members of the family. Jordan v. Shelby Mutual Plate Glass & Cas. Co., 142 F. (2d) 52
(C. C. A. 4th, 1944). See United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Brann, 297 Ky. 381, 18o
S. W. (2d) 1o2, 1o4 (1944). Similarly where an employee has broad, general discretion to use the assured's vehicle (as is often the case with salesmen), it has been
held that all of the uses of the automobile come within the protection of the
omnibus clause through implied authority. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Ronan, 37 F. (2d)
449, 72 A. L. R. i56o (C. C. A. 1st, 1930); Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp. v. Bear, 220
Ala. 491, 125 So. 676 (1929); Stovall v. New York Ind. Co., 157 Tenn. 3ol, 8 S. W.
(2d) 473, 72 A. L. R. 1368 (1928).
'1s9S F. (2d) 1007, 1o1o (C. A. 6th, 1952).
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car was obtained by the driver with permission of the owner for a
specific purpose, and the driver, without authority from the owner
used the car for other purposes of his own, in the course of which an
accident occurred." In this case, a garage employee agreed to go to the
car owner's home early the next morning and take the car to the
garage for washing, with the promise that it would be returned to
the owner's home by two o'clock in the afternoon. The car was picked
up as planned but rain interrupted the work about noon, and the
employee thereupon drove the car to the railroad station to meet
his wife. It developed that she was not on the train, and so he drove
to his home and then started for a town thirty-five miles distant to get
his wife, but during this trip, about fourteen miles from the garage, he
met with a serious accident. As a result he was sued for damages and
a judgment for $8,422 was obtained against him. Execution being
wholly unsatisfied, plaintiff brought this action against the insurance
company, from whom the owner held a liability insurance policy,
claiming that the employee was included as an insured under the
omnibus clause extending coverage to "any person while using the
automobile ...providing the actual use of the automobile is with the
permission of the named assured." The Federal District Court dismissed the action and the Court of Appeals, purporting to apply a
Tennessee law, affirmed, on the reasoning that since the employee held
only limited possession for the purpose of doing work on the car,
and had no authority to use it for his own purposes, he was using the
car without the owner's "permission" at the time of the accident.
In determining the extent to which deviation from the purpose
and use for which permission was granted is allowable without precluding coverage for the permittee under the omnibus clause, the
13
courts have followed three general theories.
A small minority of the courts employ what is termed the strict
or conversion rule, that the insurer will be held liable only if permission was given for the particular use being made at the time of
the accident, and the accident took place within the time limits and
geographical area specified or contemplated by the parties at the
time of permission. 14 Unless all three of these elements-purpose,
23Branch v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 198 F. (2d) 1007 (C. A. 6th, 1952);
Lloyds America v. Tinkelpaugh, 184 Okla. 413, 88 P. (2d) 356 (1939); Note (1949)
5 A. L. R. (2d) 622. Such a classification is arbitrary, and some authorities make
only two major classifications. Vezolles v. Home Ind. Co., 38 F. Supp. 455 (W. D.
Ky. 1941); Gulla v. Reynolds, 320 Ohio App. 243, 81 N. E. (2d) 4o6 (1948).
'Johnson v. American Automobile Ins. Co., 131 Me. 288, 161 At. 496 (1932);
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time, and place-are satisfied, the use of the automobile constitutes a
conversion, and permission of the owner cannot be found to exist. This
view, when rigidly adhered to, has the merit of furnishing a very
definite standard for deciding the cases; and since it seems to apply a
literal meaning to the words of the policy, it probably affords the
most logical solution to the issue of the extent of coverage. 15 Yet, one
court even while condemning more liberal rules and declaring that
"a use by the operator outside the scope of the owner's contemplated
permission excludes such use from being a permitted use within the
terms of the policy," went on to concede that "even under this doctrine, a slight deviation would not necessarily exclude coverage.. ..,16
This characteristic modification introduces ambiguity into a rule, the
chief strength of which lies in its definiteness, and defeats the announced purpose to confine liability to the literal terms of the policy.
However, it is obvious that unless some flexibility is allowed in the
application of the rule, it will frequently lead to very unsatisfactory
results.

17

A logical justification for rejecting the rule of strict construction
of the omnibus clause has been found in the reasoning that the liability insurance contract is as much for the benefit of the members of
the public as for the contracting parties, and that therefore when an
injury has occurred an important purpose of the insurance is defeated if compensation is withheld from the injured parties by legal
refinements regarding the status of the wrongdoing driver of the insured
car.' s This view is reinforced by the traditional rule of construction
Blair v. Travelers Ins. Co. 291 Mass. 439, 197 N. E. 6o (1935); Sauriolle v. 0' Gorman, 86 N. H. 39, 163 Atl. 717 (1932); Kazdan v. Stein, ii8 Ohio St. 217, 16o N. E.
704 (1928).
25Appleman, Special Phases of the "Omnibus Clause" in Insurance Policy (1936)
22 A. B. A. J. 613, 616, 617. The Ohio court, pointing out the change in the
standard clause from "use" to "actual use" concluded that "it seems logical to this
court that the term 'actual use' be construed as referable to the use being made at
the time and place of the accident...." Gulla v. Reynolds 320 Ohio App. 243, 81
N. E. (2d) 406, 408 (1948).
"'Gulla v. Reynolds, 320 Ohio App. 243, 81 N. E. (2d) 406, 408 (1948).
27Coverage was denied in Sauriolle v. O'Gorman, 86 N. H. 39, 163 At. 717 (1932)
when an employee, sent on an errand to another town had an accident during a
detour of about one-half a mile made to let a school friend, whom he had picked
up, off closer to her destination.
2IBehaney v. Travelers Ins. Co., 121 F. (2d) 838 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941); Dickinson
v. Maryland Cas. Co., 1o1 Conn. 369, 125 Atl. 866, 41 A. L. R. 5oo (1924); Nyman
v. Monteleone-Ibreville Garage, Inc, 211 La. 375, 3o S. (2d) 123 (1947); Rikowski v.
Fid. & Cas. Co., 117 N. J. L. 407, 189 Atl. 102 (1937).
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that the terms of the policy are always to be construed most strongly
against the insurer. 19
Supported by these considerations, many courts have taken the
extreme position, in favor of the injured party, that the bailee only
need have permission to take the vehicle in the first instance and that
any use he may make of the car thereafter while it remains in his
possession is within the "permission" intended in the omnibus clause,
regardless of whether it was within the contemplation of either of the
partes at the time of bailment.20 This rule has the advantage of applying an easily proved and definite standard of recovery and of providing the broadest possible protection to members of the public who have
become the victims of the negligent operation of automobiles. In its
most absolute form, the liberal view has been held to extend coverage
even to the case in which the particular use being made of the car at
the time of the accident was in express violation of the named assured's instructions. 2 1 But such a result is hardly justified, since express prohibition and permission cannot exist at the same time, and
most of the courts applying the liberal rule have so held.2 2 Thus, again,

the incorporation of necessary qualifications has resulted in the creation of uncertainties in the operation of a rule, of which one of the
23
greatest claimed virtues has been certainty.
The development of Tennessee law over a period of two and one
one half decades presents a study of this process of qualification. In the
first instance, the decision of Stovall v. New York Indemnity Co. very
positively embraced the liberal view in ruling that "If... the automoble ...is delivered to another for use, with the permission of the ...in-

sured, his subsequent use of it is with the permission of the insured,
within the meaning of the policy, regardless of whether the automobile
is driven to a place or for a purpose not within the contemplation of
the insured when he parted with possession."2 4 Subsequent decisions,
however, created successive limitations denying coverage when the
bailee so used the vehicle as to violate the insured's expressed instruc"See cases cited, note 18, supra.
"Jefson v. London Guar. & Acc. Co., 293 II. App. 97, 11 N. E. (2d) 993 (1937);
Parks v. Hall, 189 La. 849, 181 So. 191 (1938); Rikowski v. Fid. & Cas. Co., 117 N. J.
L. 407, x89 At. io (1937); Stovall v. New York Ind. Co., 157 Tenn. 3o1, 8 S. W.
(2d) 473, 72 A. L. R. 1368 (1928).
"United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. DeCuers, 33 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. La. 1940).
"Note (1949) 5 A. L. R. (2d) 650 and cases collected therein.
"Stovall v. New York Ind. Co., 157 Tenn. 3o1, 8 S. W. (2d) 473, 72 A. L. R. 1368
(1928).

"157

Tenn. 307, 8 S. W. (2d) 473, 477,

72

A. L. R. 1368, 1375 (1928).
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tions, or where the bailee permitted a third party to drive, or when
the bailee retained the car after the period of permissive use has expired.25 Finally the court has come to the conclusion that the "initial permission is not controlling where the use is limited to a specific
purpose for a limited time .... , 26 This transition from liberal to what
seems to be an intermediate view has not been smooth, but rather has
been marked by startling reversals, so much so that the federal court,
attempting to apply the Tennessee law in the principal case, encountered much difficulty in determining just what that law was. 27 It thus
becomes manifest that a court which adopts either of the extreme
views will find many situations in which obvious injustice would
arise from the application of its chosen rule. Attempts to avoid such
results have created many exceptions and thereby brought confusion
2 s
into the law.
This insurmountable defect in either of the two extreme rules has
led many courts to adopt an intermediate position, exemplified by
the holding of the principal case, which has come to be known as the
minor deviation rule. This view requires permission as to the time,
place and purpose of the use being made of the vehicle at the time of
the accident in order for coverage to be extended under the omnibus
clause (as in the strict or conversion rule), but provides that minor
deviations in any of these factors will not destroy the protection of the
'-Caldwell v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 98 F. (2d) 364 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938); American
Automobile Ins. Co. v. Jones, 163 Tenn. 6o5, 45 S.W. (2d) 52 0932). See Branch v.
United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 198 F. (2d) boo7, xooq (C. A. 6th, 1952).
-"Moore v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 246 S.W. (2d) 96o, 961 (Tenn. 1952).
"After having reached what appeared to be an intermediate position (discussed
below) in Hubbard v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 240 S. W. (2d) 245 (Tenn.
1951), the Tennesse court distinguished the Hubbard case and pointedly reaffirmed
the Stovall case saying that it has "been the law in this State for many years...."
Foley v. Tennessee Odin Ins. Co., 245 S. W. (2d) 202, 204 (Tenn. 1951). While the
principal case was pending before the Court of Appeals, the Tennessee court in
Moore v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 246 S.W. (2d) 96o, 961 (Tenn 1952) distinguished
both the Stovall case and the Foley case from the Hubbard decision on the ground
that there was a general permission instead of a limited permission (though in
neither of the cases was that made a test, and in reference to the Foley case the
court admits that even though "the opinion does not so show, the Court was of
the opinion that the driver of the truck had a general permission to use it"), and
gives the intermediate (minor deviation) rule as applicable in the cases where limited
permission exists. This rule is, of course, followed by the federal court in the
principal case.
"Compare Dickinson v. Maryland Cas Co., ioi Conn., 369, 125 At. 866, 41 A. L.
R. 500 (1924) which is often cited as a leading case for the liberal view, with Mycek
v. Hartford Acc. 8:Ind. Co., 128 Conn. 140, 2o A. (2d) 735 (1941) which reinterprets the Dickinson case and expressly repudiates the liberal view as presented in
the Stovall case.
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policy. 29 Since this approach involves an attempt to set up a flexible
formula for deciding the cases, it is difficult to apply, 30 the various
jurisdictions differing widely on the question of what constitutes
minor and major deviations.
Despite this serious objection, however, it would seem that this
view is to be preferred above the two extreme rules. Either of the other
rules is too rigid for satisfactory application to all fact situations. The
intermediate position has the necessary flexibility but by the same
token tends to leave both the injured complainant and the insurance
company to the varying whims of juries. It would seem that the insurance companies should attempt to devise a wording of the clause
which would definitely delimit the scope of the coverage, but this
action would tend to remove needed insurance protection from the
public-at-large which is a danger of injury in automobile accidents.
Perhaps a proper solution would lie in a legislative requirement based
on public policy, of a minimum amount of liability coverage to which
the liberal rule would be applied in determining coverage under the
omnibus clause, while a stricter view should be exercised by the courts
in regard to any coverage in excess of the required amount on the
grounds that this coverage is merely for the benefit of the parties to the
policy. 31
EUGENE M. ANDERSON, JR.

2

Frederiksen v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., 26 F. (2d) 76 (C. C. A. 9th,
1928); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Brann, 297 Ky. 381, 18o S. V. (2d) 1o2
(1944); Salitrero v. Maryland Cas. Co., iog S. W. (2d) 26o (Tex. Civ. App. 1937);
Phoenix Ind. Co. v. Anderson, 107 Va. 4o6, 196 S. E. 629 (1938).
TDrhe Virginia court has worked out a helpful formula for guidance in its application to the effect that when the deviation was slight and not unusual, the court
may as a matter of law determine that it was within the scope of permission; where
it was very marked and unusual, the court may determine it was not a use within
the permission; and when the facts fall between the two extremes, the question
should be left to a jury. Phoenix Ind. Co. v. Anderson, 170 Va. 406, 196 S. E. 629
at 633 (1938).
"Massachussetts has approached more closely than any other jurisdiction to the
actual application of such a rule. In Blair v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 288 Mass. 285,
192 N. E. 467 (1934) the court allowed recovery up to the statutory amount although
the actual use at the time of the accident was clearly not within the permission of
the named assured; but Blair v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 291 Mass. 432, 197 N. E. 6o
(1935) denied any additional recovery over the statutory amount. Also Guzenfield v.
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 286 Mass. 133, 19o N. E. 23 (1934).
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INSURANCE-VALIDITY OF ATTEMPTED CHANGE OF BENEFICIARY OF LIFE
INSURANCE WITHOUT COMPLIANCE WITH POLICY REQUIREMENT.

[Texas]
One of the most perplexing problems in the law of life insurance
is posed when an insured, having reserved the right to change the
beneficiary, has before his death manifested a desire that someone
other than the named beneficiary receive the proceeds of the policy but
has failed to comply with all the formalities required by the terms
of the policy for changing beneficiaries.' The various courts follow
widely inconsistent rules in different cases as to what extent the insured must have complied with the policy terms to effectuate the
change of beneficiaries, 2 and the approval of irreconcilable principles
even within the same opinion has been observed. 3 To add to the uncertainty in these controversies, there is sharp disagreement as to
whether the fault of non-compliance with the policy can be asserted
only by the insurer, or whether the original beneficiary can also object
4
to the validity of the attempted change.
In determining the validity of the attempt to change beneficiaries,
courts in different jurisdictions, have followed three basic rules. A few
courts hold that there must be "strict compliance" with the terms of
'Typical policy requirements for change of beneficiary are that the insured
gave written notice to the company of the desired change, accompanied by the
policy for suitable endorsement, such change to become effective only when endorsed on the policy by the company. Brown v. Home Life Ins. Co., 3 F. (2d) 661
(D. C. OkIa. 1925); Rumsey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 59 Colo. 71, 147 Pac. 337
(1915); Teague v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 200 N. C. 450, 157 S. E. 421 (ig3i). Also, see
Note (1951) 19 A. L. R. (2d) x8.

-United States v. Burgo, 175 F. (2d) 196 (C. A. 3 d, 1949) (strict compliance);
Sun Life Assur. Co. v. Secoy, 72 F. Supp. 83 (N. D. Ohio 1947) (insured must
have done all within his power to fulfill the policy provisions in order to effectuate a
change of beneficiary); Goldberg v. Hudson County Nat. Bank, 123 N. J. Eq. 269,
197 Atl. 20 (1938) (substantial compliance); Glen v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 73 Ohio
App. 452, 56 N. E. (2d) 951 (1943) (intent of insured controls although none of

the formalities of the policy were fulfilled); Wilkie v. Philadelphia Life Ins. Co., 187
S. C. 382, 197 S. E. 375 (1938) (strict compliance); Shuler v. Equitable Life Assur.
Soc., 184 S. C. 485, 193 S. E. 46 (1937) (substantial compliance).
-Gill v. Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co., 131 W. Va. 465, 48 S. E. (2d) 65
(1948). After stating that the insured must substantially comply with the terms
of the policy relating to change of beneficiary in order to effectuate a valid change,
the court said that some of these terms were for the benefit of the insurer and may
be waived by it by the filing of a bill of interpleader, thus giving the claimant a
pleferred position.
'Cady, Law of Insurance ( 3 d ed. 1934) § 148; 2 Couch, Cylopedia of Insurance
Law (1929) § 315; 1 Richards, Insurance (5th ed. 1952) §§ 121-122; 29 Am. Jur., In-

surance § 1324.
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the policy in order for the insured to effect a valid change of beneficiary. 5 These jurisdictions regard the right of the named beneficiary
as a vested one, subject to being divested only by a strict fulfilment
of the required formalities of the policy by the insured. 6 However,
most of these courts mitigate the strictness of the rule if the insured did
everything he could possibly have done to effect the change before
his death, and all that remains to be done is some ministerial act of the
insurer. 7
The majority of the courts follow the rule of "substantial compliance," where the insurer has acceded to the attempted change of beneficiary by intepleading the claimants. 8 Under this view it is said that
"the general rule is that to effectuate a change of beneficiary the
method prescribed by the policy must be followed..., but an exception
is made where the insured in attempting to change his beneficiary has
done all he could to comply with the policy requirements and has
substantially complied therewith." 9 Obviously, it is not possible to
lay down an inflexible rule as to how near the insured's actions must
have approached complete compliance,1 0 and so the courts must make
5United States v. Burgo, 175 F. (2d) 196 (C. A. 3 d, 1949); Gerstel v. Arens,
143 Fla. 2o, 196 So. 616 (1940); Warren v. Prudential Ins. Co., 138 Fla. 443, 189 So.
412 (1939); Freund v. Freund, 218 Ill. 189, 75 N. E. 925 (1905).
'"For the New Jersey courts have held that a beneficiary of a life insurance
policy has a vested interest in the policy even though by a change which the insured has reserved the right to make that interest may subsequently be divested.
The New Jersey courts have further held that where a policy stipulates that the
beneficiary may only be changed by following a specified procedure including surrender of the policy for endorsement a change of beneficiary cannot be effected by
any thing short of the procedure specified in the policy." United States v. Burgo,
175 F. (2d) 196, 19 8 (C. A. 3 d, 1949).

7Travelers Ins. Co. v. Davis, 1o2 F. Supp. 5 (S.D. Fla. 1952); Pacific Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Rotondo, 96 F. Supp. 197 (D. C. N. J. 1951), aff'd 191 F. (2d) 624
(C. A. 3d, 1951); Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Reich, 75 F. Supp. 886 (W. D.
Pa. 1948); Bachrach v. Herrup, 128 Conn. 74, 2o A. (2d) 395 (1941).
'John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Douglass, 156 F. (2d) 367 (C. C. A. 7 th, 1946);
Spurlock v. Spurlock, 271 Ky. 70, 111 S. W. (2d) 443 (1937); Henderson v. Adams,
3o8 Mass. 333, 32 N. E. (2d) 295 (1941); Goldberg v. Hudson County Nat. Bank, 123

N. J. Eq. 269, 197 Ad. 2o (1938); Schoenholz v. New York Life Ins. Co., 234 N. Y.
24, 136 N. E. 227, aff'd 234 N. Y. 6o5, 138 N. E. 464 (1922); Teague v. Pilot Life
Ins. Co., 2oo N. C. 450, 157 S. E. 421 (1931); 29 Am. Jur. 989; 46 C. J. S. 75; Note
(1951) 19 A. L. R. (2d) 309Goldberg v. Hudson County Nat. Bank, 123 N. J. Eq. 269, 197 At. 20, 22
(1938).

2'It was amply illustrated by the Colorado court (which usually follows the
substantial compliance rule) in Finnerty v. Cook, 118 Colo. 310, 195 P. (2d) 973
(1948) that substantial compliance is not actually necessary under this doctrine.
The insured, a prisoner of war in Japan who was allowed to write only certain
relatives, wrote his mother a postal card asking that she have the beneficiary
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their decisions rest largely on the facts in the individual situations in
the different cases.11
Other courts have taken the position that the intent to change
the beneficiary should be given effect when that intent is manifested
by some affirmative act on the insured's part even though he has made
no effort to comply with the policy terms concerning change of beneficiary, provided the insurer, by interpleading the claimants, waives
the right to insist upon strict compliance with the policy terms. 12 Thus
it has been held that where the insured scratched out the old beneficiary's name on the policy and substituted the name of another person
as beneficiary, and also left in a box along with the insurance policy a
letter to the insurer requesting that the insurance proceeds be paid
to the substituted beneficiary, there was a sufficient act on the part of
the insured to make a valid change of beneficiary.' 3
The confusion existing in this phase of the law is amply illustrated
in the recent Texas case of Kotch v. Kotch.14 The insured delivered his
insurance policy to his wife, the named beneficiary, who kept it with
other valuable papers in a trunk to which both had access. The inchanged on his insurance. It was impossible for the insured to comply with any of the
policy provisions relating to change of beneficiary, but the court held the change
was valid, and the rule applicable was "that equity will declare a substitution when
and only when, the intention of the insured is established beyond question and
he has done everything possible under the circumstances to effectuate that intention."ii8 Colo. 31o, 195 P. (2d) 973, 974 (1948). In Kelley v. Kelley, 14 N. Y. S.
(2d) 545 at 548 (1939), the court indicated that actually "substantial" compliance
is not required by stating: "...if the insured is unable to comply literally with
the requirements of a policy or certificate because of physical disability, loss of
the policy or certificate, or because it has been wrongfully taken or withheld from
him, equity will, notwithstanding such non-surrender, recognize such attempted
change as a valid one, when it appears that the insured has done all that he could
to comply with the requirements." It was said in Donahey v. Sweigart, 336 Ill.
App. 366, 84 N. E. (3d) 17o at 172 (1949): "We... recognize the rule.., that when
an insured has done everything within his power to effectuate a change of beneficiary, equity will not require exact compliance with all stated conditions in order
to consider that a change of beneficiary has been effected."
uThe statement that when the insured has done all he could to effect the change
of beneficiary equity will regard as done that which should be done and recognize
the change as valid, is often made by courts which follow the substantial compliance
doctrine. Farley v. U. S., 291 Fed. 238 at 241 (D. C. Ore. 1923); Johnston v. Kearns,
107 Cal. App. 557, 290 Pac. 640 at 642 (193o); Barrett v. Barrett, 173 Ga. 375, 16o
S. E. 399 at 402, 78 A. L. R. 962 at 967 (193i); Saiter v. Miller, so8 Ind. App. 373,
27 N. E. (2d) goo at 904 (1940); Parks' Ex'rs v. Parks, 288 Ky. 435, 156 S. W. (2d)
480 at 483 (1941).
"Glen v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 73 Ohio App. 452, 56 N. E. (2d) 951 (1943);
Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Burkholder, 131 Ore. 537, 283 Pac. 739 (1930).
"Glen v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 73 Ohio App. 452, 56 N. E. (2d) 951 (1943).
1251 S. W. (2d) 520 (Tex. 1952).
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sured thereafter went to live with a son by a previous marriage, and
the wife left for a visit with relatives in Florida. Thereafter the insured wrote his wife requesting that she write their landlady to ship_
the trunk to him, so that he might obtain the title to his car, which
was in the trunk with the insurance certificate. The wife returned to
their home, but instead of sending the trunk, sent only the title to the
car. Thereafter, two weeks before his death, the insured sent in an application to substitute his son as beneficiary and an application for a
duplicate of the allegedly lost insurance certificate, but no action had
been taken on these applications when the insured died. Upon the
insured's death, the insurance company interpleaded the claims of
the son and the widow to the proceeds of the policy.
The trial court applied the rule of substantial compliance, and
entered judgment for the widow on the ground that the insured had
not done all that he reasonably could have done to effect the change.
Since he at no time made a demand upon his wife for the return
of the insurance certificate, it was ruled that he had not substantially
complied with the terms of the policy requiring that the certificate
be returned with the application for the change of beneficiary so that
the change might be endorsed on the certificate.
The Court of Civil Appeals reversed that judgment, holding that
the insured had substantially complied with the insurance contract
requirements despite his failure to return the policy to the insurer
with the application for change of beneficiary, because he asked his
wife to send the trunk and because it was never proved that he knew
positively where the original certificate was located. The intermediate
court further ruled that "a former named beneficiary having no vested
right in the policy, not being a party to the contract, will not be heard
to contend that a subsequent change in the beneficiary was made
inconsistent with the provisions contained in the insurance contract... .," and that the insurer, by paying the proceeds of the policy
into court, had waived the requirements that the insured must comply
strictly with the terms of the insurance contract.
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the Court of Civil Appeals
and affirmed the judgment of the trial court holding that the original
beneficiary has legal standing to contest the validity of the attempted
change of beneficiaries, because, while she had no vested interest prior to
.insured's death, nevertheless the provisions in the policy requiring
certain formalities for changing beneficiaries amounted to a "con25Kotch v. Kotch, 247 S. W. (Rd) 587, 589 (Tex. 1952).
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tract between the insurer and insured for the benefit of a third partythe named beneficiary....-16 On the specific issue of whether the attempted change should be sustained, the court ruled that the insured
had not done all that he reasonably could have done to comply with
the policy terms, his failure to make a positive demand on his wife for
the return to the old certificate precluding any showing of substantial
compliance.
Both the trial court and the Supreme Court appear to consider the
requirements that the insured do "all reasonably possible" to carry
out the policy terms, and that he "substantially comply" with those
terms, as alternative forms of stating the same essential factor for a
valid change of beneficiaries. 17 Under this approach there can be no
"substantial compliance" unless insured had done "all reasonably
16Kotch v. Kotch, 251 S. W. (2d) 520, 523 (Tex. 1952). There are two views taken
by the courts as to the interest a beneficiary has in an insurance policy, in which
the insured has reserved the right to change the beneficiary at will, during the life
of the insured. One view is that such a beneficiary has a mere expectancy of a
gift at the time of the death of the insured. The fact that the insured reserves
control of the policy indicates his intention that nothing is to pass to the beneficiary during the life of the insured, and the designation of the beneficiary is only
a manifestation of the desire of the insured, at that time, that the named beneficiary shall have the proceeds of the policy upon insured's death. The formalities
required by the policy to effect a change of beneficiary are for the benefit of the
insurer, and the beneficiary has no standing to complain if the insurer and insured
subsequently agree upon a change of beneficiaries without complying with all of the
required formalities in the insurance contract. Grimm v. Grimm, 26 Cal. (2d) 173,
157 P. (2d) 841 (1945); Shay v. Merchants Banking Trust Co., 335 Pa. iol, 6 A.
(2d) 536 (1939); Vance, Insurance (3d ed. 1951) 677; 29 Am. Jur., Insurance § 1276.
The second view is that the beneficiary has a vested right in the policy at the
time he is designated as beneficiary, and the reservation of the right to change
beneficiaries merely gives the insured the right to divest the beneficiary of the
right he has in the policy if the insured exercises the reserved right during his
life in accordance with the required formalities of the policy. Indiana Nat. Life
Ins. Co. v. McGinnis, i8o Ind. 9, ioi N. E. 289, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 192 (1913); Woehr
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 134 N. J. Eq. 38, 34 A. (2d) 136 (1943); Vance, Insurance ( 3d
ed. 1951) 677.
If the right to change the beneficiary is not expressly reserved in the insurance
contract, the named beneficiary has a "true vested interest" in the policy which can
not be affected by any act of the insurer or the insured, without the consent of the
named beneficiary. The one qualification to this rule is that the interest of the
beneficiary may be destroyed by the insured by any act which would result in the
destruction of the status of the insured, as by forfeiture of the policy. 2 Couch,
Cyclopedia of Insurance Law (1929) § 306; 1 Richards, Insurance (5th ed. 1952) § 116.
""...the purported change will be given effect only if the insured has 'substantially compiled' with them, or 'done all he reasonably could have done' in that
behalf."
"Nor do we regard the request for a new certificate as the equivalent of returning the certificate or 'all he could do' in that direction...." Kotch v. Kotch, 251
S. W. (2d) 520, 523, 524 (Tex. 1952).
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possible" to fulfill the policy formalities, and if he has done the latter,
substantial compliance follows as a matter of course.
It is uniformly held that where insured's failure to submit the
policy to the insurer for endorsement thereon of change of beneficiary
is caused by the named beneficiary's refusal to deliver the policy
upon demand, the change of beneficiary will be held valid if the insured has done everything else required of him by the terms of the
contract to effect the change.' 8 It would appear logical that the claimant relying on the attempted change of beneficiary, in order to prove
a refusal by the named beneficiary to deliver the policy would have
to prove that the insured had made a demand upon that party for
the return of the policy. However, the majority of the courts have
held that it is not essential to prove a demand, for if the evidence establishes that the insurance policy was in the possession of the named
beneficiary, it is a fair inference that the policy would not have been
surrendered even if a proper demand had been made.' 9
While the Court of Civil Appeals thus announced the correct
rule of law according to the majority of the courts, the Supreme Court
seems to have adopted the better view. There should be something
more than an assumption of the court that the beneficiary would have
refused to deliver up the policy had a proper demand been made by
the insured. The insured should be required to fulfill as far as possible
the prescribed formalities of the policy,20 so that he will realize fully
"Farley v. First Nat. Bank, 250 Ky. 15o, 61 S. W. (2d) 1059 (1933); Harris v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 33o Mich. 24, 46 N. W. (2d) 448 (1951); Gayden v.
Kirk, 207 Miss. 861, 43 S.(2d) 568, 19 A. L. R. (2d) 1 (1949); Manley v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 147 Neb. 646, 24 N. W. (2d) 652 (1946); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Swanson,
iii N. J. Eq. 477, 162 Ad. 597 (1932); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Bedford,
36 R. I. 116, 89 Ad. 154 (1914). Vance, Insurance (3d ed. 1951) 687; 29 Am. Jur.
987; 46 C. J. S. 8o. But see Acacia Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Feinberg, 318 Mass. 246, 61
N. E. (2d) 122 (1945), where a written demand on the beneficiary was held insufficient. That court held that the insured had not done all he could do to regain
possession of the policy since he could have instituted a suit in equity for the return of the policy.
"Doering v. Buechler, 146 F. (2d) 784 (C. C. A. 8th, 1945); McDonald v. McDonald, 212 Ala. 137, 102 So. 38, 36 A. L. R. 761 (1924); New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Cannon, 22 Del. Ch. 269, 194 At. 412 (1937); Isgrig v. Prudential Ins. Co., 242 Iowa
312, 45 N. W. (2d) 425 (195o); Bowser v. Bowser, 202 Okla. 97, 211 P. (2d) 517 (1949).
'°In Prudential Ins. Co. v. Mantz, 128 N. J. Eq. 48o, 17 A. (2d) 279, aff'd 13o N. J.
Eq. 385, 22 A. (2d) 241 (1941) a purported change of beneficiary was held ineffective partly on the ground that the insured had not made every reasonable effort
to comply with the terms of the policy relating to change of beneficiary since it
was not proven with certainty that the insured ever made a demand on the beneficiary for the return of the policy, and in Carson v. Carson, 166 Okla. 161, 26 P.
(2d) 738 (1933) it was held that the insured did not do all in his power to effect
a change since he at no time made a demand upon his wife for the policy.
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the import of his acts. A less demanding rule may often ultimately
result in a failure to carry out the intent of the insured. For example,
it could easily happen that an insured might comply with some of
the formalities to effect a change of beneficiary and then decide not
to carry out his purpose, and therefore take no further action. Knowing that he has failed to comply fully with all the requirements to
effect a change, he subsequently goes to his death assuming that the
first named beneficiary is still the valid beneficiary. Any qualifications
of the essential element, "all that he could have reasonably done,"
might serve to defeat the insured's intention to have the originally
named beneficiary collect the proceeds of the policy. Since the strength
of the substantial compliance view lies in the flexibility with which
it may be applied to effectuate the insured's intention, the courts
should avoid embracing any rule of thumb which might often operate
to defeat that intent if regarded as controlling in the many varying
situations of the cases.
LAW ENCE C. MUSGROVE

SALES-LIABILITY

OF WHOLESALER TO CONSUMER INJURED BY EATING

UNWHOLESOME PACKAGED GOODS.

[Texas]

Consumers who have suffered personal injuries from eating un-

wholesome packaged food quite commonly seek to recover from retailers and manufacturers, but in the recent Texas case of Bowman
Biscuit Co. of Texas v. Hines' the consumer chose the relatively rare
course of bringing an action for damages against a wholesaler. Though
the manufacturer, the wholesaler, and the retailer may all be regarded
as in some degree responsible for the harm done, the legal remedies
against any of the three have been surrounded within some uncertainty.
In earlier times, the manufacturer was generally immunized from

liability under the legal reasoning that there was no privity of contract
between manufacturer and consumer,2 or that there was no implied
warranty of wholesomeness from the manufacturer even to the retailer
and no basis for putting the manufacturer under greater duty to the
consumer than to the retailer.3 Modem courts, however, are fairly in
accord that liability can be imposed on the manufacturer, on one of
several bases.4 Some decisions hold that an implied warranty of
1251

S. W. (2d) 153 (Tex.

1952).

"Waite, Sales (2d ed. 1938) 198; x R. C. L., Food § 28.
311 R. C. L., Food § 28.
,'Waite, Sales (.d ed. 1938) 204; 22 Am. Jur., Food §§ 1o4, i5.
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wholesomeness has been breached in the production of unfit food,5 but
most courts insist that liability must rest on tort for negligence,( because a warranty cannot run with the article so as to benefit one not
dealing with the warrantors.7 These theories for allowing recovery are
sometimes supplemented by the arguments that the duty of the manufacturer is based on a general public policy as declared by the pure
food laws, s and that the common law rule of caveat emptor does not
apply because the consumer has no chance to protect himself by inspecting packaged goods before purchasing them.9
The continuing uncertainty on the issue of retailer liability, as
well as on the question of wholesaler liability, is demonstrated by
the Hines case, an action to recover for injuries sustained from swallowing a wire allegedly contained in an "apricot puff" purchased in a
sealed cellophane package by plaintiff's wife from a retail grocery. The
retailer had purchased it in the same package from the defendant
wholesaler, but no negligence or express warranty was alleged by
plaintiff against defendant. The lower court certified the following
question to the Supreme Court of Texas: "Where the ultimate consumer of food, sold in the original sealed package for human consumption, suffers injury and damage from such food being contaminated, is the wholesaler, or middleman, as well as the manufacturer
rDavid v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 lowa 775, 176 N. W. 382 (1920); Catani v.
Swift & Co., 251 Pa. 52, 95 At. 931 (1915); Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622,
135 Pac. 633 (1913).
OBirmingham Chero-Cola Bottling Co. v. Clark, 2o5 Ala. 678, 89 So. 64 (1921);
Tomlinson v. Armour & Co., 75 N. J. L. 748, 70 AtI. 314 (1908); Crigger v. CocaCola Bottling Co., 132 Tenn. 545, 179 S. W. 155 (1915); Norfolk Coca-Cola Bottling
Works v. Krausse, 162 Va. 107, 173 S. E. 497 (1934). It is generally held that foreign
substance found in a sealed package or container raises a presumption of negligence
on the part of the manufacturer under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Bissonette v.
National Biscuit Co., ioo F. (2d) 1003 (C.C.A. 2d, 1939); Watkins v. Dalton CocaCola Bottling Co., 66 Ga. App. 484, 19 S. E. (2d) 316 (1942); Goldman & Freiman
Bottling Co. v. Sindell, 140 Md. 488, 117 Ad. 866 (1922); Hertzler v. Manshum, 228
Mich. 416, 20o N. W. 155 (1924); Ritchie v. Sheffield Farms Co., 129 Misc. 765, 222
N. Y. Supp. 724 (1927). Some authorities hold that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
does not apply and that some additional evidence is required. Evans v. Charlotte
Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 216 N. C. 716, 6 S.E. (2d) 51o (1940); Hollis v. Armour & Co.,
190 S. C. 170, 2 S. E. (2d) 681 (1939). The latter view obviously greatly lessens the
chances of recovery by the consumer, as under modern mass production methods it
is very difficult to prove specific negligence in the producing of any single item of
goods.
"Birmingham Chero-Cola Bottling Co. v. Clark, 205 Ala. 678, 89 So. 64 (1921);
Nelson v. Armour Packing Co., 76 Ark. 352, 90 S.W. 288 (19o5); Crigger v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 132 Tenn. 545, 179 S. W. 155 (1915).
8Meshbesher v. Channellene Oil & Mfg. Co., 107 Minn. 104, 119 N. W. 428 (199o);
Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913).
OTomlinson v. Armour & Co., 75 N. J. L. 748, 70 At. 314 at 317 (1908).
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and retailer, liable to such ultimate consumer for damages proximately
resulting to him by reason of the eating of such food, under an implied
warranty imposed by law as a matter of public policy?"' 1 On original
hearing the question was answered in the affirmative by a five to four
majority. But on rehearing, one of the original majority Justices delivered an opinion concurring with the original minority that the
question should be answered in the negative, and thus on final disposition of the case the liability of the wholesaler to the consumer
was denied by a five to four majority. Eight of the nine Justices agreed
that the wholesaler is liable to the consumer if the retailer is liable,
but the eight were equally divided on whether the retailer should be
liable. The ninth Justice decided on rehearing that the wholesaler
should not be liable, irrespective of the liability of the retailer.
The three possible bases for retailer liability are negligence, express warranty, and a warranty imposed by law on the grounds of
public policy.1 ' The four majority Justices agreed that the first two
factors would justify imposing liability on either the retailer or wholesaler, but neither negligence nor express warranty was alleged in the
complaint in the principal case. An implied warranty must have as its
basis some reasonably inferred reliance,' 2 and these Justices argued that
"it must be assumed that the plaintiff necessarily knew that the wholesaler and retailer had no superior knowledge of the contents of the
sealed package,"' 3 and that it is just as impractical for the retailer
to analyze or inspect the goods as it is for the consumer to do so.
Though at common law a retailer has been held implied to warrant
the fitness of food for immediate consumption,' 4 this rule does not
"Bowman Biscuit Co. of Texas v. Hines, 251 S. V. (2d) 153, 154 (Tex. 1952).
The Court of Civil Appeals assumed the liability of the retailer in its certified
question to the Supreme Court, on the basis of the Texas case of Griggs Canning
Co. v. Josey, 139 Tex. 623, 164 S. W. (2d) 835 (1942), but four of the majority
Justices of the Supreme Court refused to concur with this assumption and based
their decision on the view that the retailer is not liable.
"22 Am. Jur., Food § 94'-"Linker v. Quaker Oats Co., ii F. Supp. 794 (N. D. Okla. 1935); Fleetwood v.
Swift & Co., 27 Ga. App. 502, oS S. E. 909 (1921); Scruggins v. Jones, 207 Ky. 636,
269 S. W. 743 (1925); Bigelow v. Maine C. R. Co., iio Me. ioS, 85 At. 396 (1912).
One writer states: "This [implying a warranty to canned goods] is an obvious departure from any idea of a warranty as a representation reasonably inferrable from
the circumstances." Waite, Sales (2d ed. 1938) 224.
"Bowman Biscuit Co. of Texas v. Hines, 251 S. W. (2d) 153, 166 (Tex. 1952).
Accord: Bigelow v. Maine C. R. Co., iio Me. so5, 85 At. 396 (1912).
"Nelson v. Armour Packing Co., 76 Ark. 352, 9o S. W. 288 (1go5); Davis v. Williams, 58 Ga. App. 274, z98 S. E. 357 (1938); Pelletier v. Dupont, 124 Me. 269, 128 At.
186 (1925); Craft v. Parker, Webb & Co., 96 Mich. 245, 55 N. W. 812 (1893); Cantani v.
Swift & Co., 251 Pa. 52, 95 Ad. 931 (1915).
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apply to food in a can or sealed package because of this lack of opportunity to inspect.' 5
The four dissenting Justices pointed out that in cases decided
under the Uniform Sales Act it has been "presumed"' by the courts
from a completely equivocal term of the statute that the consumer
relied on the retailer's skill and judgment in regard to the fitness of
food sold,' 7 no distinction between packaged and unpackaged goods
being recognized in the application of the rule.' s This being a judicial
assumption, the minority argued that it may be indulged in to justify
retailer liability even in jurisdictions like Texas which have not
adopted the Sales Act.
It has been suggested that there are three reasons to justify this
assumption: it is borne out by human experience in merchandising
fields; it achieves a socially desirable result by providing the victim
with a practicable remedy; and it serves procedural convenience by
allowing the victim to recover from the party he deals with directly,
2-Scruggins v. Jones, 207 Ky. 636, 269 S. W. 743 (1925); Kroger Grocery Co.
v. Lewelling, 165 Miss. 71, 145 So. 726 (1933); Pennington v. Cranberry Fuel Co., 117
W. Va. 68o, 186 S. E. 61o (1936). In Bigelow v. Maine C. R. Co., iio Me. 1o5, 85
At]. 396, 398 (19i2), the court declared: "We know of no rule of law which will imply
a warranty of that of which it is impossible for a defendant to know by the exercise of any skill, knowledge, or investigation, however great."
"°Bowman Biscuit Co. of Texas v. Hines, 251 S.W. (2d) 153 at 158 (Tex. 1952).
'-Uniform Sales Act § 15 (1): "Where the buyer, expressly or by implication,
makes known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required,
and it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's skill and judgment..., there is
an implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose." It is
to be noted that the Act states that an implied warranty will be found if "it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's skill and judgment...." See Waite,
Sales (2d ed. 1938) 224, n. 71. Cf. Uniform Commercial Code, Sales § 2-315: "Where
the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for
which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or
judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified
under the next section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such
purpose." "Under this section the buyer need not bring home to the seller actual
knowledge of the particular purpose for which the goods are intended or of his
reliance on the seller's skill and judgment, if the circumstances are such that
the seller has reason to realize the purpose intended or that the reliance exists.
The buyer, of course, must actually be relying on the seller." U. C. C., Official
Draft (A. L. I. 1952) so8.
'sMartin v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 3o Ky. 429, 192 S. W. (2d) 20o
(1946); Ward v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 231 Mass. go, 120o N. E. 225 (1918);
Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Co., 345 Pa. 559, 28 A. (2d) 913 (1942). In the
Ward case the court stated that § 15 (1)of the Uniform Sales Act is merely a codification of the common law and that at common law the fitness of food is taken
as warranted by the seller. In Waite, Sales (2d ed. 1938) 224, n. 71, the writer points
out the difficulty in application of the Uniform Sales Act § 15 (1)to canned goods.
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after which the retailer can pass the liability on to the manufacturer
with whom he dealt. 19 The four majority Justices refuted two of these
arguments in stating that human experience does not justify the imposition of liability on the basis of superior knowledge which, in fact,
does not exist; nor can it be socially desirable to hold an innocent
party liable by fabricating a warranty on this erroneous basis. And
mere procedural convenience is declared not to be a proper foundation for imposing liability, because an innocent retailer "should not
be required to shoulder an unwarranted burden merely for the convenience of the consumer; ''20 rather, the consumer should be required
to resort directly to his remedy against the manufacturer.
Though Texas has not adopted the Uniform Sales Act, the State
Supreme Court had ruled in 1942 in Griggs Canning Co. v. Josey2=
that a retailer is liable to a consumer under the circumstances of the
principal case, without any express warranty or negligence being shown
as a basis for liability. Since the propriety of that holding is sustained
by the weight of general authority22 and by the fact that the Texas
legislature has not seen fit to change the rule by statute, the dissent
contended that it should control the present controversy. The four
majority Justices, on the other hand, were convinced that the Griggs
case was decided erroneously, and would have overruled it. Since the
ninth Justice turned the principal case decision on grounds other than
retailer liability, he took the position that the question of overruling
the Griggs case was not before the court and could not be decided.
Thus, the rule in Texas remains, however tenuously, in agreement
with the general view in those states having the Uniform Sales Act,
and in a number of states not having the Sales Act in force, that a
retailer is liable to an injured consumer under an implied warranty
23
theory.
nMcCormick and Ray, Evidence § 31, p. 48.
21Bowman Biscuit Co. of Texas v. Hines, 251 S. W. (2d) 153, 167 (Tex. 1952).
'1139 Tex. 623, 164 S. W. (2d) 835 (1942). In this case the defendant retailer
sold an unfit can of spinach to the plaintiff's wife, and the plaintiff's wife and
stepson became ill as a result of eating the spinach. The court held the defendant
retailer liable to the plaintiff on the basis of an implied warranty.
'Swengel v. F. & E. Wholesale Grocery Co., 147 Kan. 555, 77 P. (2d) 930 at
933 (1938). In Waite, Sales (2d ed. 1938) 377, it is stated that thirty-two states have
passed the Sales Act which allows retailer liability on the basis of an implied warranty. There are also a number of states which have not passed the Sales Act but
which hold the retailer liable on an implied warranty. Griggs Canning Co. v. Josey,
139 Tex. 623, 164 S. W. (2d)835 at 838 (1942). Professor Williston also agrees that a
retailer should be liable to the consumer on an implied warranty theory. 1 Williston,
Sales (3 d ed. 1948) § 242.
2See note 22, supra. Also, Waite, Sales (2d ed. 1938) 226.
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The question of wholesaler liability still remains in some doubt,
as does the further question of whether the situation of the wholesaler
should be governed by that of the retailer, although eight of the nine
24
Justices of the Texas court agreed that it should be.
The arguments employed to justify the imposition of liability on
retailers and manufacturers are generally inapplicable to the case of
wholesalers. No such privity of contract exists between consumer and
wholesaler 25 as does between consumer and retailer; and a wholesaler
does not have the opportunity to know the contents of a sealed package 26 and does not make representations to consumers through advertising, as does the manufacturer. Since the consumer has no personal
contact with, or even knowledge of the identity of the wholesaler, he
cannot be presumed to rely on the wholesaler's skill and judgment in
choosing products likely to be wholesome. Further, it may well be that
if the consumer has a cause of action against the retailer or manufacturer of the defective product, he is afforded ample remedy for his
injuries without also allowing him rights against the wholesaler.
In rebuttal, however, it is argued that the injured cousumer may
find his retailer financially irresponsible and the manufacturer so
distantly located as to make suit against him very burdensome or even
impractical. 27 In such case, a remedy against the wholesaler is necessary to provide compensation for the injuries suffered. And since the
wholesaler would presumably have an action over against the manufacturer with whom he had dealt, liability would ultimately be placed
on the party basically at fault in causing the damage. The contention
is also made that if the consumer can recover from the retailer, and
the retailer can in turn pass the liability on to the wholesaler, 28 it is
a sensible expedient to allow the consumer to sue the wholesaler directly, without benefit of contract, as he can do in the case of the
manufacturer. The dissent in the principal case posed this as the next
"Accord: Swengel v. F. & E. Wholesale Grocery Co., 147 Kan. 555, 77 P. (2d) 93o
at 935 (1938).
-Cornelius v. Flippone & Co, 119 N. J. L. 540, 197 At. 647 (1938); Degouveia
v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 231 Mo. App. 477, 100 S. W. (2d) 336 (1936).
2'Degouveia v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 231 Mo. App. 447, ioo S. W. (2d) 336 at
338 (1936).
2Swengel v. F. & E. Wholesale Grocery Co., 147 Kan. 555, 77 P. (2d) 93o at 935
(1938).
2
sSee Degouveia v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 231 Mo. App. 447, 100 S. W.
(2d) 336, 339 (1936). Although this case held that a wholesaler is not liable to a
consumer on an implied warranty, the court stated that a retailer held liable to a
consumer would have a recovery over against the wholesaler.
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logical legal step to take after the recognition of liability in both the
non-negligent manufacturer and retailer to the consumer.29
Though the courts should seek to effectuate the strong public policy
to protect the public health against the menace of unwholesome
food, this aim furnishes no justification for holding wholesalers liable
for damages to injured consumers. While they have an important commercial function in distributing the products, wholesalers do not produce or prepare the food for shipment, do not generally advertise its
merits to the public, and do not sell directly to consumers. Under
modern business conditions, they are virtually powerless to prevent
such injuries as occurred in the principal case. The mere fact that the
customers' remedies against retailers and manufacturers may in some
few cases prove inadequate to provide compensation hardly justifies
burdening all wholesalers with a liability for which the courts can
DoucLAs M. SMTH
find no sound legal basis.

LImITATIONS-TIME AT WHICH LIMITATIONS PERIOD BEGINS
To RUN IN REGARD TO ACTIONS FOR WRONGFUL DEATH. [New
Mexico]

STATUTE OF

Under the common law no civil action could be brought for the
death of a human being resulting from the wrongful act of another;'
personal rights of action were said to die with the person, and the
wrongful death created no new cause of action in the victim's dependents for loss of services or support.2 The orginial basis for the rule
came probably from the doctrine that the wrongful act when amounting to a felony merged in the crime,3 but later cases seemed to find a
policy against allowing the value of human life to be mathematically
-Bowman Biscuit Co. of Texas v. Hines, 251 S. W. (2d) 153 at 154 (Tex. 1952).
Accord: Swengel v. F. & E. Wholesale Grocery Co., 147 Kan. 555, 77 P. (2d) 93o at
935 (1938).
'See 3 Holdsworth, History of English Law (3d ed. 1927) 333-336; 16 Am. Jur.
35, and cases cited.
2Lord Ellenborough laid down the principle a century and a half ago in Baker
v. Bolton, i Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (18o8), disallowing a husband's suit
for loss of his wife's services resulting from her death, stating that a civil forum
provided no remedy. See Holdsworth, The Origin of the Rule in Baker v. Bolton
(1916) 32 L. Q. Rev. 431.
For discussion of the reasons for this rule, see Mobile Life Ins. Co. v. Brame,
95 U. S. 754, 755, 24 L. ed. 58o, 581 (1878). But query what effect the rule has when
there was no felony. See Shields v. Yonge, 14 Ga. 349, 6o Am. Dec. 698 (1854), which
allowed an action for damages when the wrongful act constituted only a misde-

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. X1

fixed by the judiciary.4 Whatever the reasoning behind it, the rule
wrought the double injustice of absolving the malefactor from civil
liability and of leaving the deceased's dependents without right or
remedy.
The first step in eliminating these injustices was made in the English Survival Acts, which abolished the common law rule that personal
causes of action were extinguished on the death of the wronged person.5 Similar enactments in most, if not all, American states now provide that personal actions shall not abate on the demise of the wronged
person but shall survive him and be prosecuted by his personal representative, or if the action has already begun, his personal representative may revive the action. 6 But the Survival Acts left the family without a remedy, since the proceeds of the survival action went to the decedent's estate. It was not until the passage of Lord Campbell's Act
in 1846,7 and subsequent corresponding legislation in the American
states creating a right of action for wrongful deaths, that the dependents of the victim were afforded a remedy for loss of support resulting from the death. Since every state already had a Survival Statute
in effect when the Death Acts were adopted,8 the courts were faced
with the problem of whether there now exists an independent cause
of action under each statute, or only a single cause of action, the newer
statute merely enlarging the recovery under the earlier statute to include
damages for loss to the dependents occasioned by the death.9
One of the significant specific issues that arises in connection with
this problem of interpretation concerns the application of the Statute of
Limitations to wrongful death actions. The general rule, absent express statutory provision, applies the ordinary statute governing actions founded on injuries to the person. 0 But the question remains as
to when the limitations period begins to run. Some statutes include
provisions specifying the date of death or the date of injury to the de'See Philby v. Northern P. R. Co., 46 Wash. 173, 89 Pac. 468, 470 (19o7); Note
(19o9) i L. R. A. (N.s.) 633.
5Tiffany, Death by Wrongful Act (2d ed. 1913) §§ 19, 25.
6
McCormick, Damages (1955) 335; Note (1950) 21 Miss L. J. 592. See also Prosser,
Torts (1941) § io 3 , and Note (195) 48 Harv. L. Rev. ioo8 for a classification of such
statutes.
79 & io Vict. c. 93, 86 Stat. at Large 531 (1846).

sTiffany, Death by Wrongful Act (2d ed. 1913) §§

19, 23, 24.

TProsser, Torts (1941) § 103; 16 Am. Jur. 47, 48 and cases cited.
"Graham v. Updegrave, 144 Kan. 45, 58 P. (2d) 475 (1936); In re Danick Estate, 208 Minn. 420, 294 N. W. 465 (1940). See Note (191o) 17 Ann. Cas. 519 for peculiar applications of the statute of limitations in various jurisdictions.
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ceased." But other statutes merely state the requirement that the
action be brought within a particular time, without defining the point
of time from which the limitation shall run,12 and still others simply declare the necessity of bringing the suit within a certain period after
"the accrual of the cause of action."' 3 Under such provisions the court
must determine whether the enactment on which the suit is based is a
Survival Act, under which the cause of action accrues at the time of
injury to the deceased, 14 or whether the statute is a Death Act creating
a new and independent cause of action, commencing at the death of the
victim. 16
The courts of New Mexico have recently been confronted with this
controversy in the case of Natseway v. Joiola.16 The administrators,
parents of a nine year old boy, sought damages of $15,ooo for his death
occasioned by the wrongful act of defendants in the giving to their
minor son a rifle as a Christmas present, the child carelessly inflicting
a fatal wound on the plaintiffs son. The shooting occurred on December 28, 1949, but no suit was brought until six months after the boy
died on March 28, 1951. The New Mexico Death By Wrongful Act
Statute states that whenever the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act of such nature that it would, if the death had not ensued, have
entitled the party injured to maintain an action for damages, the person
who would have been liable if death had not ensued is liable notwithstanding the death of the injured person. The same Act creates a limitation on the right to sue as "within one year after the cause of action
shall have accrued."' 7 Defendant argued that since the complaint was
uStatutes denoting death as the starting point of the statute of limitations may
be found in the following: Lute's Adm'r v. Gray-Von Allmen Sanitary Milk Co., 254
Ky. 750, 72 S. W. (2d) 720 (1934); Davis v. Norfolk-Southern R. Co., 2oo N. C. 346, 157
S. E. 11 (1931). Illustrative cases denoting date of injury as the point of origin are
as follows: Christilly v. Warner, 87 Conn. 461, 88 Ad. 711 (1913); Collins v. Hall, 117
Fla. 282, 157 So. 646 (1934); Flynn v. Chicago Great W. R. Co., 159 Iowa 571, 141
N. W. 401 (1913).
"It is usually held under such statutes that the cause of action accrues at the
time of death. Hanna v. Jeffersonville R. Co., 32 Ind. 113 (1869); Bowles v. Portelance,
145 Kan. 94o, 67 P. (2d) 419 (1937); Weatherman v. Victor Gasoline Co., 191 Okla. 423,
130 P. (2d) 527 (1942).
=Wheeler v. Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Inc., 207 Ark. 6oi, 182 S. W. (2d)
214 (1944); Gray v. McDonald, 1o4 Mo. 305, 16 S. W. 398 (1891); Hogsett v. Hanna,
41 N. M. 22, 63 P. (2d) 540 (1936).
"Kelliher v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 212 N. Y. 207, io5 N. E. 824 (1914); Tiffany,
Death by Wrongful Act (2d ed. 1913) § ig; 16 Am. Jur. 47.
2Tiffany, Death by Wrongful Act (2d ed. 1913) § ig. Cases pointing up this issue
are found also in Note (1931) 72 A. L. R. 1313.
10251 P. (2d) 274 (N. M. 1952).
27N. M. Stat. Ann. (Bobbs-Merrill, 1941) § 24-102.
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not filed until twenty-two months after the fatal injury was inflicted,
the cause of action was barred; but plaintiffs contended that the limitations period started to run only from the date of the death. The
majority of the court ruled that the action was barred on the reasoning that the Death By Wrongful Act Statute was a Survival Statute
under which the cause of action arises when the tort is committed, not
when death occurs. Without actually examining the statute to determine its proper classification, the court felt that it was bound by precedent, basing its decision on two earlier New Mexico cases' 8 which had
in turn based their rulings on the Missouri court's interpretation of
legislation of that state 19 from which much of the New Mexico Act
had been copied. Though faced with the fact that the Missouri courts
have overruled decisions which had initially followed the survival construction, and further faced with the hardship that this type construction will engender, this court did not find itself able to supply "what
20
the Legislature has omitted or to omit what it has inserted."
A better-reasoned dissenting opinion discounted the authority of
the earlier decisions 21 and argued that the Wrongful Death Act does
not revive a cause of action belonging to the deceased, but rather
creates a new and independent cause of action for the benefit of
named parties. And it was pointed out that "in states having wrongful death statutes similar to ours the courts have almost unanimously
IsThe earlier cases relied on were DeMoss v. District Court, 55 N. M. 135, 227
P. (2d) 937 (1951) and Hogsett v. Hanna, 41 N. M. 22, 63 P. (2d) 540 (1936). Both
cases were regarded as holding the New Mexico statute to be a survival statute. Yet
the court in the principal case evidences a confusion when it first states that the
Hogsett case stood for the rule that the intervention of death following the injury
created no new cause of action, but four paragraphs later, in answering plaintiffs'
contention that infancy of the intestate brings the case under the saving clause for
infants found in the statute, the court states that the statute under which the claim
creates a new right. Natseway v. Jojola, 251 P. (2d) 274, 276 (N. M. 1952).
"The Missouri cases cited and quoted as authority for such ruling in Hogsett v.
Hanna, note 18 supra, were: Proctor v. Hannibal & St. J. Ry. Co., 64 Mo. 112 (1876);
Gray v. McDonald, 104 Mo. 303, 16 S. W. 398 (1891); Casey v. St. Louis Transit Co.,
205 Mo. 721, 103 S. W. 1146 (19o7). DeMoss v. District Court, note 18 supra, reaffirms the decision of the Hogsett case.
nNatseway v. Jojola, 251 P. (2d) 274, 277 (N. M. 1952).
mThe dissent points out that the precedent is not worthy of being followed,
because the statements of the court on the issue now involved were dicta in the
earlier cases, and because the three Missouri cases cited and quoted as authority
for the ruling that the wrongful death statute was a statute of survival rather than
a statute creating a new cause of action had been overruled by the Missouri Supreme Court in Thomas v. Daues, 314 Mo. 13, 283 S. W. 51 (1926), ten years prior
to the decision in the Hogsett case. Natseway v. Jojola, 251 P. (2d) 274, 279, 280 (N.
M. 1952).
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held that the cause of action does not exist or come into being until
death." 22 To the dissenting Justice, the right did not arise from the
decedent's injury, but from his death, which gave rise to the need of
the beneficiaries for compensation; and this right is completely independent from any action the deceased might have had if he had not
died.
The great weight of general authority in this controversy lies with
the dissent, for statutes similar to Lord Campbell's Act are most widely
accepted as creating a new right of action. 2 ' The basic components of
this type Act are that a right of action is maintainable whenever death
is the result of a wrongful act which would have entitled the person
injured to maintain an action if death had not ensued, that such suit
is for designated beneficiaries of deceased's family, and that damages
obtainable are those experienced by the beneficiaries because of the
death.24 The New Mexico Statute contains these identifying factors,
and text writers, 25 legal encyclopedias, 26 and case decisions 27 all construe the New Mexico type Death By Wrongful Act Statute as providing a totally new action independent of the right of action for
personal injuries and based on different principles.
However, the New Mexico holding in the principal case is not
unique, for in a few jurisdictions such statutes allowing actions for
wrongful death are regarded as mere Survival Acts, on the theory that
the cause of action was in decedent from the time of the injury and
that the Act merely enlarged the recovery to include damages suffered by reason of the death. 28 Under this view, the statutes create
no new action upon death, but rather the right which the deceased
had before his death is imparted to the beneficiaries. Though the
statute of limitations normally is held to run from the time of injury
2Natseway

v. Jojola, 251 P. (2d) 274, 279 (N. M. 1952).
=Tiffany, Death by Wrongful Act (2d ed. 1913) § 19; Note (1950) 21 Miss L. J.
392, 393, 397- For list of those states adhering to the new cause of action theory,
see 16 Am. Jur. 48.
"McCormick, Damages (1935) 336. See Schumacher, Rights of Action under

Death and Survival Statutes

(1924) 23

Mich. L. Rev.

114.

=Tiffany, Death by Wrongful Act (1st ed. 1893) §§ 23, 24.
25 C. J. S.1079; 16 Am. Jur. 48, 49.
OChamberlain v. Missouri-Arkansas Coach Lines, 354 Mo. 461, 189 S.W. (2d)
538 (1945); Jordan v. St. Joseph Ry., Light, Heat 9:Power Co., 335 Mo. 319, 73 S.W.
(2d) o05 (1934); Cummins v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 334 Mo. 672, 66 S. W.
(2d) 920 (1933); Thomas v. Daues, 314 Mo. 13, 283 S.W. 51 (1926).

strue the New Mexico type Death By Wrongful Act Statute as pro"Kling v. Torello, 87 Conn. 3o, 87 Atl. 987 (1913); Cincinnati, H. & D. R. Co. v.
McCullom, 183 Ind. 556, 1o9 N. E. 206 (1915); Notes (1948) 174 A. L. R. 844 (195o)
21 Miss. L. J. 392, 393.
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in such a construction, 29 some jurisdictions upholding this interpretation unaccountably rule that the statute of limitations does not
start to run until death occurs.3 0
Such an approach to Death By Wrongful Act Statutes evidences a
confusion with statutes providing for survival of actions in tort. The
two types of statutes are different in intent. A Survival Act provides
that any cause of action, whether in tort, fraud, breach of contract,
etc., accruing to a person is not extinguished by the death of the person
but survives for the benefit of his estate, and the action which survives
is for the original wrong to the deceased. The creation of a wrongful
death action authorizes statutory beneficiaries, rather than the personal
representative, to sue for damages on account of the death.3' It is
manifest that the Death Acts do not merely provide for the survival of
the action which the party injured might have brought, for, though
the suit is allowable only when death is the result of such a situation
as would have entitled the injured party to bring suit, the death action
is not for recovery of damages resulting from the personal injury to the
deceased, and hence by survival to his estate. It is brought only for
damages for loss resulting from death to the surviving members of
the family. Thus, no action can be brought by the beneficiaries against
the wrongdoer until after death of the victim of the wrong. If the
death occurs after an interval longer than the statute of limitations
period, then under the view of the New Mexico court, the remedy
of the beneficiaries of the statute would be destroyed before the right
ever came into existence. That very situation prevailed in the principal
case, as the death did not result until fifteen months after the injury
was inflicted. It seems clear that no such construction should be put
on the ambiguous terms of a remedial statute which would defeat the
purpose the legislation was designed to effectuate.
Rather than approaching the problem of the principal case analyt"Williams v. Alabama G. S. R. Co., 158 Ala. 396, 48 So. 485 (1909); Christilly v.
Warner, 87 Conn. 461, 88 At. 711 (1913); Radezky v. Sargent & Co., 77 Conn. 11o,
58 At. 709 (19o4). See Note 19160 Ann. Cas. 714.
"See Goodwin v. Bodcaw Lumber Co., io9 La. 1050, 34 So. 74 (19o2) and Kennard v. Illinois C. R. Co., 177 Tenn. 311, 148 S. W. (2d) 1017 (1941), holding the
limitation period does not begin until the time of death. For an excellent note
on death by wrongful act and survival of personal injury in Virginia, see Note (1952)
38 Va. L. Rev. 959. There are conflicting decisions in Virginia as to whether that
state adopts the survival theory or the new cause of action theory. Later cases
would evidently classify the Death Act as a Survival Statute but the statute of limitations does not start to run until death. See also Note (1948) 174 A. L. R. 844.
"'Texarkana Gas & Electric Light Co. v. Orr, 59 Ark. 215, 27 S. W. 66 (1894); St.
Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Goode, 42 Okla. 784, 142 Pac. 1185 (1914).
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ically, the New Mexico court has chosen to rest the decision on authority which has been discredited at its source. Instead of immediately
correcting an unsatisfactory situation by overruling the prior decisions
as contrary to the overwhelming weight of authority, as well as logic,
reason, and justice, the majority of the Justices were willing to leave
the problem to future uncertain action of the legislature.
D.

TORTs-LIABILITY

FOR PHYSICAL INJURY
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NEGLIGENT ACTS TowARD THIRD PARTY.

[Maryland]

The common law doctrine which refused recovery to a plaintiff who
had suffered injuries due to the negligent acts of the defendant unless there was a concurrent "impact"' has been abrogated in England 2
and seriously questioned in the United States. 3 Generally, in situations
where the plaintiff suffers physical harm as a consequence of nervous
shock resulting directly from defendant's negligence, recovery is al"The "impact" requirement was announced in England in Victorian Railways Commisisoners v. Coultas, 13 A. C. 222 (1888). It was accepted in the same
year by the New York court in Lehman v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 47 Hun. 355
(N. Y. 1888). The doctrine was also followed in Pennsylvania in Ewing v. Pittsburgh,
C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 147 Pa. St. 40, 23 At. 340 (1892), and Massachusetts followed
in 1897 in Spade v. Lynn & B. R. Co., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N. E. 88 (1897).
-The necessity of "impact" to allow recovery in cases of fright and shock
resulting from the negligent acts of the defendant was questioned in Pugh v. The
London, Brighton and South Coast Ry. Co., [1896 ] 2 Q. B. 248, and subsequently
repudiated in Wilkinson v. Downton, [1897] 2 Q. B. 57, and Dulieu v. White &
Sons, [19o] 2 K. B. 669. The rule of the Coutlas case was not followed in Scotland and Ireland. Gilligan v. Robb, [191o] S. C. 856, and Bell v. Great Northern
Railway of Ireland, 26 L. R. Ire. 428 (1890).
'The Texas court refused to follow the New York doctrine laid down in the
Lehman case and allowed recovery to a woman who suffered a miscarriage resulting from fright incurred when she saw the defendant assault two Negroes in her
yard. The court observed: "That a physical personal injury may be produced
through strong emotion of the mind there can be no doubt." Hill v. Kimball, 76
Tex. 2o, 13 S. W. 59 (189o). In stating the prevailing Maryland rule the court
observed, "It has long been established in this state that recovery may be had
for physical injuries resulting from nervous shock, even though there is no actual
physical impact." Resavage v. Davies, 86 A. (2d) 879, 88o (Md. 1952). Accord: Lindley v. Knowlton, 179 Cal. 298, 176 Pac. 44o (1918); Whitsel v. Watts, 98 Kan. 5o8,
159 Pac. 401 (1916); Simone v. Rhode Island Co., 28 R. I. 186, 66 Atl. 2o2 (19o7);
Throckmorton, Damages for Fright (1921) 34 Harv. L. Rev. 26o.
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lowed.4 However, most courts deny recovery for negligently caused
shock or fright, unaccompanied by physical injury. 5
While the issue in two-party situations, therefore, is well on its
way to settlement in favor of allowing recovery for physical injury, such
is not the case where the plaintiff seeks a recovery for physical harm resulting from nervous shock sustained while witnessing the defendant's
negligent acts toward a third party, which do not place the plaintiff
in a position of personal danger. Formerly, the English courts denied
recovery, but this rule was repudiated in the leading case of Hambrook
v. Stokes Brothers, which is now the accepted authority for granting
recovery. 6 The general American rule denying recovery to the plaintiff in this three-party situation is typified by the recent Maryland case
of Resavage v. Davies.7 The plaintiff was on her front porch watching
her two minor daughters as they stood on the curb of a parkway in
front of their residence, awaiting the arrival of a bus. The defendant
negligently drove her automobile over the curb, striking and killing
the two girls, in full view of the plaintiff. Plaintiff was "petrified with
horror at the sickening scene unfolded before her and torn with anxiety, ran to the children, who were languishing in pools of blood and in
a dying condition. ' 8 Thereafter, plaintiff sought to recover damages for
physical injuries sustained from nervous shock occasioned by the de'Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Kimber, 212 Ala. 1o2, 1oi So. 827 (1924); Orlo v.
Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231, 21 A. (2d) 402 (1941), noted 3 Wash. 8- Lee L. Rev. 177;
Green v. T. A. Shoemaker & Co., i i Md. 69, 73 At. 688 (i9og); Lambert v. Brewster, 97 W. Va. 124, 125 S.E. 244 (1924); Restatement, Torts (1941) § 313, p. 850.
'"The general rule supported by the weight of authority is that mental pain
and suffering will not alone constitute a sufficient basis for the recovery of substantial damages." 25 C. J. S., Damages § 64; Prosser, Torts (1941) 216.
OAfter the abrogation of the "impact" requirement, the English court in Hambrook v. Stokes Brothers allowed the plaintiff to recover damages for the death of his
wife resulting from nervous shock incurred because of the negligence of the defend.
ant's servant when he had allowed an improperly parked truck to roll down the street.
The deceased was not an eye witness but was close enough to appreciate the danger
to her child. Lord Justice Bankes observed: "I am merely deciding that in my opinion the plaintiff would establish a cause of action if he proved to the satisfaction of
the jury... that the shock resulted from what the plaintiff's wife either saw or
realized by her own unaided senses... and that the shock was due to a reasonable
fear of immediate personal injury either to herself or to her children." Hambrook
v. Stokes Brothers, [1925] i K. B. 141, 152; Prosser, Torts (1941) 218.
86 A. (2d) 879 (Md. 1952). The majority of the court followed the rule laid
down in Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N. W. 497, 98 A. L. R. 394 (1935),
where no recovery was allowed to the plaintiff whose intestate had died as a result
of seeing defendant strike and kill intestate's child. The Wisconsin court ruled that
no duty was owed to the plaintiff's intestate by the defendant.
sResavage v. Davies, 86 A. (2d) 879 (Md. 1952).
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fendant's negligence toward her daughters. The trial court sustained
the defendant's demurrer to the declaration and the plaintiff appealed.
By a three to two majority the Court of Appeals affirmed the action
of the lower court on the ground that defendant violated no duty
owed to plaintiff. The majority observed: "We think the operator of a
motor vehicle on the highway is not liable to spectators in a place of
safety off the highway for visible shock to them. If such a rule were
adopted it would involve a tremendous extension of liability to the
world at large, not justified by the best considered authorities." 9 The
minority of the court would have extended the liability of the defendant to include the plaintiff, on the ground that previous decisions in
the Maryland court, such as Bowman v. Williams' ° and Mahnke v.
Moore," had extended the allowable scope of recovery to plaintiffs
who were not put in personal danger by the defendant's acts.
The principal decision concurs with the view of most courts that
in such a situation the defendant is not liable to an injured person
who is out of the scope of foreseeable danger.' 2 The main problem in
these three-party situations is really one of how far the courts will
extend the liability of defendants in allowing or denying recovery
to plaintiffs. The minority in the principal case recognizes this to be
the crux of the problem and proceeds to examine Maryland cases to
ascertain the extent to which they have gone in allowing recovery. The
conclusion is reached that under the test of foreseeability, employing
either a duty or a proximate cause approach,' 3 the courts have allowed
"Resavage v. Davies, 86 A. (2d) 879, 883 (Md. 1952).
10164 Md. 397, 165 Atl. 182 (1933) (plaintiff allowed to recover for injuries resulting from shock and fright incurred through defendant's negligence toward
plaintiff's children directly and toward plaintiff indirectly when defendant's truck
was allowed to crash into side of plaintiff's house).
"77 A. (2d) 923 (Md. 1951) (illegitimate child of deceased allowed to recover
from the father's executor for physical injuries resulting from nervous shock sustained
when she saw her father shoot her mother and then himsel).
"Minkus v. Coco-Cola Bottling Co., 44 F. Supp. 1o (N. D. Cal. 1942); Cleveland,
C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Stewart, 24 Ind. App. 374, 56 N. E. 917 (1900); McGee v.
Vanover, 148 Ky. 737, 147 S.W. 742 (1912); Sperier v. Ott, 116 La. 1087, 41 So. 323
(sgo6); Sanderson v. Nothern Pac. Ry. Co., 88 Minn. 62, 92 N. W. 542 (19o);
Cote v. Litawa, 96 N. H. 174, 71 A. (2d) 792 (195o); Nuckles v. Tennessee Electric
Power Co., 152 Tenn. 611, 299 S. W. 775 (1927).
"Under the duty theory, a duty must be found owing to the particular plaintiff, while in the proximate cause theory the duty runs to society in general, and
the plaintiff need not be specified. Judge Cardozo clarified the former situation in
Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99, ioi (1929), when he
observed: "If the harm was not wilful, he [plaintiff] must show that the act as to
him had possibilities of danger so many and apparent as to entitle him to be protected against the doing of it though the harm was unintended."
Judge Andrews in his dissent in the Palsgraf case, summarized the existence
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recovery for much less foreseeable injuries than were suffered by the
present plaintiff.
In jurisdictions which follow the majority view of the Resavage
case, the cases are turned on the issue of the existence of a duty in
the defendant to the particular plaintiff, and no duty is found because
it is said not to be foreseeable that the plaintiff will suffer physical
harm from mere fright when he is not put in any danger of direct
personal injury by the negligent acts of the defendant.14 Unforeseeability is used here in the sense that to impose liability would place
an onerous and unwarranted burden on the defendant to comprehend that that specific kind of injury will be sustained by that particular plaintiff or that group of plaintiffs who are not within the orbit
of direct and immediate harm or fear of harm.' 5
The dissenting opinion is representative of the minority view which
allows recovery to the plaintiff in three-party situations, on the reasoning that defendant's negligence is the proximate cause of the injury
suffered by the plaintiff.' 6 Under this approach there must be foreof a duty in the proximate cause view when he observed: "Due care is a duty
imposed on each one of us to protect society from unnecessary danger, not to protect
A. B. or C. alone.... Everyone owes to the world at large the duty of refraining from
those acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of others. Such an act occurs.
Not only is he wronged to whom harm might reasonably be expected to result, but
he also who is in fact injured, even if he be outside what would generally be
thought the danger zone. There needs be duty due the one complaining, but this is
not a duty to a particular individual because as to him harm might be expected.
Harm to someone being the natural result of the act, not only that one alone, but
all those in fact injured may complain." Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248
N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99, 102, 103 (1928).
"Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Stewart, 24 Ind. App. 374, 56 N. E. 917
(19oo); McGee v. Vanover, 148 Ky. 737, 147 S. W. 742 (1912); Cote v. Litawa, 96 N. H.
174, 71 A. (2d) 792 (1950); Ewing v. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 147 Pa.
St. 40, 23 Atl. 34o (1892).
"In Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 6o3, 258 N. W. 497, 500, 98 A. L. R. 394, 401
(1935) the court observed: "Fundamentally, defendant's duty was to use ordinary
care to avoid physical injury to those who would be put in physical peril, as that
term is commonly understood, by conduct on his part falling short of that standard .... It is quite another thing to say that those who are out of the field of physical danger through impact shall have a legally protected right to be free from emotional distress occasioned by the peril of others, when that distress results in physical impairment."
' 0Spearman v. McCrary, 4 Ala. App. 473, 58 So. 927 (1912); Bowman v. Williams,
164 Md. 397, 165 At. 182, 184 (1933) ("The physical damages which the plaintiff
sustained naturally, directly, and reasonably arose from this negligent act or omission, without the intervention of any other cause, and so the causal connection
between the injury and the occurrence is established."); Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex.
21o, 13 S. W. 59 (189o); Frazee v. Western Dairy Products, 182 Wash. 578, 47 P.
(2d) 1037 (1935); Hambrook v. Stokes Bros., [1925] i K. B. 141.
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seeability of some harm to someone as a result of defendant's act. Once
this is established, however, defendant is liable for all harm to anyone
flowing in an unbroken causal sequence from the act and which is the
17
"proximate result" of the act.
Support for the minority view is also found in certain situations in
the decisions of jurisdictions which normally adhere to the majority
doctrine. Such support arises in cases granting recovery to the plaintiff when the acts of the defendant toward the third party are intentional,' s when such acts are perpetrated merely as a practical joke,'9
or when the plaintiff is pregnant and subesquently suffers a miscarriage. 20 Similarly, courts have imposed liability on the defendant when
it can be established that a specific duty was owed to the plaintiff as
well as to the person directly injured.21 Illustrative of this latter ten17Judge Andrews in the Palsgraf case observed: "...-when injuries do result
from our unlawful act, we are liable for the consequences. It does not matter that
they are unusual, unexpected, unforeseen, and unforeseeable. But there is one limitation. The damages must be so connected with the negligence that the latter may
be said to be the proximate cause of the former.... what we do mean by the word
"proximate" is that, because of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of
justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain
point. This is not logic. It is practical politics." Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co.,
248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99, 1o3 (1928.)
" 'Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni, 15 Ala. App. 316, 73 So. 205 (sg96) (defendant shot plaintiff's dog which was near plaintiff's child); Rogers v. Williard,
144 Ark. 587, 223 S. W. 15 (1920) (defendant pointed pistol at plaintiff's husband);
Ex parte Heigho, i8 Idaho 566, 11o Pac. xo29 (191o) (defendant attacked son-in-law
of plaintiff in her presence); Mahnke v. Moore, 77 A. (2d) 923 (Md. 1951) (plaintiff
saw her father shoot her mother and himself); Renner v. Canfield, 36 Minn. go, 3o
N. W. 435 (1886) (defendant shot plaintiff's dog while she was watching); Hill v.
Kimball, 76 Tex. 21o, 13 S. W. 59 (189 o) (plaintiff witnessed defendant asasult
two Negroes on her premises).
u'Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Roch, i6o Md. 189, 153 At. 22 (1931); Wilkinson v.
Downton, [1897] 2 Q. B. 57"Spearman v. McCrary, 4 Ala. App. 473, 58 So. 927 (1912); Rogers v. Williard, 144
Ark. 587, 223 S. W. 15 (900); Renner v. Canfield, 36 Minn. 90, 30 N. W. 435 (1886);
Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 21o, 13 S. W. 59 (189o); Frazee v. Western Dairy Products,
182 Wash. 578, 47 P. (2d) 1037 (1935); Lambert v. Brewster, 97 W. Va. 124, 125 S.
E. 244 (1924). Contra: McGee v. Vanover, 148 Ky. 737, 147 S. W. 742 (1912); Cote
v. Litawa, 96 N. H. 174, 71 A. (2d) 792 (195)o; Hay or Bourhill v. Young, [1943] A. C.
92.
"Spearman v. McCrary, 4 Ala. App. 473, 5 8 So. 927 (1912) (plaintiff and her husband were standing beside their buggy, in which plaintiff's children were riding,
when defendant's negligently driven automobile frightened plaintiff's horses causing them to run away; plaintiff allowed to recover for physical injuries resulting
from fright suffered from fear for safety of her children as well as for a breach of
duty to her personally); Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 Atl. 182 (1933)
(plaintiff allowed recovery for nervous shock and fright suffered due to his fear
for safety of his children when he saw defendant's negligently operated truck run
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dency is the Maryland case of Bowman v. Williams, in which the defendant was held liable for injuries suffered by the plaintiff when the defendant's negligently driven truck crashed into the side of the plaintiff's
home and protruded into a basement room, above which the plaintiff was standing and in which two of his children were known to be
playing. In finding a duty running both to the plaintiff and his children, the court observed, "The master has the right to drive the truck
upon the highway, but, in the exercise of this right, the master owes
a duty to . . occupants of the contiguous premises so... that an injury to [them] .. will not be inflicted by the failure of the master

to operate the truck with reasonable care and caution under the cir22
cumstances."
The differing legal theories of the duty approach on the one hand
and proximate cause view on the other are not the true legal basis for
the apparently divergent results achieved by their use. Since both
turn on the test of foreseeability, it appears clear that the same result
may be attained by the application of either approach in a given situation. The minority in the principal case gave guarded expression to
this point by observing that "There is a difference between the question of proximate cause and the question of duty, but not as great a
difference as defendant argues.... the element of forseeeability has not
the same but a similar place in each question." 23 In a situation like
that of the Resavage case, it is submitted that the presence of a parent
in the vicinity of the endangered child is quite as foreseeable as the
coming of a rescuer to the aid of a victim imperiled by the wrong
of another party. Of the latter situation, Judge Cardozo wrote in
Wagner v. InternationalRy. Co.: "The cry of distress is the summons
into the side of his house); Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Coopwood, 96 S. W. 102
(Tex. Civ. App. 19o6) (plaintiff allowed to recover for injuries resulting from nervous shock sustained when she witnessed the negligence of the defendant railroad
toward her daughter who was ill); Frazee v. Western Dairy Products Co., 182 Wash.
578, 47 P. (2d) 1037 (1935) (held a jury question whether recovery should be allowed when, due to defendant's negligence, his truck was allowed to run up on the
plaintiff's lawn upon which plaintiff knew her son was standing); Hambrook v.
Stokes Brothers, [1925] 1 K. B. 141 (plaintiff allowed to recover for wife's death
caused by shock and fright when she found out that her daughter had been injured
by the negligence of the defendant; plaintiff did not see the accident, but was close
enough to appreciate the risk of harm to her child); Richards v. Baker, [1943]
5 Austr. St. 245 (plaintiff allowed recovery for injuries suffered from fright as a
result of seeing her child struck by defendant's car as plaintiff and child were walking down highway). Contra: Kelly v. Fretz, 19 Cal. App. (2d) 356, 65 P. (2d) 914 (1937);
Keyes v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. Co., 36 Minn. 29o, 3o N. W. 888 (1886); Lone
Star Gas Co. v. Haire, 41 S. W. (2d) 425 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
2Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 At. 182, 183 (1933).
2'Resavage v. Davies, 86 A. (2d) 879, 886 (Md. 1952).
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to relief. The law does not ignore these reactions of the mind in
tracing conduct to its consequences. It recognizes them as normal. It
places their effects within the range of the natural and probable. The
wrong that imperils life is a wrong to the imperiled victim; it is a wrong
also to his rescuer.... The wrongdoer may not have foreseen the
coming of a deliverer. He is accountable as if he had." 24 So, it may be
argued, is the wrongdoer accountable as if he had foreseen the presence of the mother, and this is true whether the Wagner case is accepted
as a proximate cause decision or is reinterpreted in the light of Judge
Cardozo's later opinion in Palsgraf v. Long Island Ry. Co.,2 5 as a
"negligence-duty" decision.
Since the legal theories employed offer no adequate explanation
for the decision reached by the courts in three-party situations, it is
apparent that the real issue with which the courts are confronted is
how far they are willing to go in constricting or expanding the limits
of liability. Those jurisdictions which follow the circumscribed view
of liability base their decisions on the policy ground that an expanded
liability would subject the courts to a flood of litigation, 26 and would
impose upon users of the highway an unreasonable and disproportionate burden.2 7 However, in a Resavage situation the fear of the
parent for the safety of her child is just as real and injurious as the
fear of the parent for her own safety would be if she were placed in
personal peril of bodily harm. The imposition of liability for these
injuries, while it increases the penalty for negligent driving, does not
add to the degree of care required, for if drivers operate their cars in
the manner necessary for the protection of those within the area of
direct danger, they very seldom will be subjected to suits of third
parties.
ROBERT R. KANE, III

"4Wagner v. International Ry. Co., 232 N. Y. 176, 133 N. E. 437, 438 (1921).
-.248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99, 59 A. L. R. 1253 (1928).
-'Cleveland C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Stewart, 24 Ind. App. 374, 56 N. E. 917
(19oo); Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N. XV. 497, 95 A. L. R. 394 (1935).
"Cote v. Litawa, 96 N. H. 174, 71 A. (2d) 792, 795 (1950); "Such consequences
are such an unusual and extraordinary result of the careless operation of an automobile that to recognize such a right and impose such a duty would, in our opinion,
place an unreasonable burden upon users of the highway." Waube v. Warrington,
216 Wis. 603, 258 N. W. 497, 501, 98 A. L. R. 394, 401 (1935): "The liability imposed by such a doctrine is wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the negligent trotfeasor [and] would put an unreasonable burden upon users of the highway, open the way to fraudulent claims, and enter a field that has no sensible or just
stopping point."
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Though workmen's compensation legislation 1 now governs the
liability of the employer to an employee for injuries arising out of the
employment, the question of whether the employee's statutory right
against his employer affects the generally recognized common law right
of recovery from a negligent fellow-employee at whose hands he was
injured remains a point of disagreement. In at least one state, the
Compensation Act specifically denies such recovery, providing that
"The right to compensation or benefits under this chapter, shall be
the exclusive remedy to an employee, or in case of death his dependents, when such employee is injured or killed by the negligence or
wrong of another in the same employ." 2 In some other jurisdictions,
provisions making the compensation award. the exclusive remedy for
"any injury arising out of the employment " have been applied to bar
any action against a negligent fellow-employee, where the injury occurred in the course of their mutual employment.3
The statutes of most states, however, are ambiguous on this specific point.4 They normally contain sections providing that the employee's cause of action against third parties causing injury is preserved,
and that an employer who has paid compensation to the injured employee under the Workmen's Compensation Act is subrogated to
such right; and, on the other hand, they specify that an employee included under the Act can collect from his employer and "those conducting his business" only by means of a workmen's compensation
'Workman's Compensation statutes have been passed in all states, all United
States territories, and by the federal government. For an indexed collection and
comparison of the statutes of the different jurisdictions, see 4 Schneider, Workmen's Compensation Statutes (1940)) 4411-4443.

2New York Workmen's Compensation Law (Baker, Voorhis, and Co., 1952) § 29-1
(6). Pantolo v. Lane, 185 Misc. 221, 56 N. Y. S. (2d) :227 (1945); Puccio v. Carr, 177
Misc. 706, 31 N. Y. S. (2d) 8o5 (1941).
3The Workmen's Compensation Laws of the following have provisions making
the compensation award the "exclusive remedy" [all citations refer to Schneider,
Workmen's Compensation Statutes (1939-40)]: Alabama, i Schneider 4; Arizona, i
Schneider 118; Colorado, i Schneider 325; Montana, 3 Schneider 2o69; Oklahoma, 4
Schneider 3127; Oregon, 4 Schneider 3185; Washington, 4 Schneider 4102. Kowcun
v. Bybee, 182 Ore. 271, 186 P. (2d) 790 (1947); Peet v. Mills, 76 Wash. 437, 136 Pac.
685 (1913).

'No state has a statute specifically conferring a right of action against a fellow
employee.
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award. 5 This form of legislation gives rise to the issue of whether a coemployee causing injury is liable under the first type of provision as a
"third party," or is immune under the second type of provision protecting "those conducting his [employer's] business."
The recent case of Nolan v. Daley0 pointedly illustrates the divergence of opinions under such indefinite statutes. The plaintiff was injured on the job as a result of his co-employee's negligent operation of
a crane. 7 After having collected an award from his employer under the
South Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act,8 he sought to recover
additional damages in a negligence action against the co-employee.
The South Carolina statute provides: "Every employer who accepts
the compensation provisions of this article shall secure the payment
of compensation to his employees in the manner hereinafter provided; and while such security remains in force, he or those conducting his business shall only be liable to any employee who elects to come
under this article for personal injury or death by accident to the extent and in the manner herein specified." 9 The majority of the court,
finding itself faced with a case of first impression but drawing on Virginia and North Carolina authority,1 0 denied recovery, resting the decision on the premise that the negligent employee is within the scope
of the immunity offered by the statute to those conducting the employer's business. To prove that the intent of the legislature was to include fellow-employees under the immunity clause, the majority opinion argued that to allow such suits as the plaintiff here seeks to bring
would defeat the fundamental purpose of the law to put industrial accidents in the category of general business risks, compensable by the
employer from the profits of his enterprise. In support of this conclusion, the court reasoned that if the plaintiff were allowed a right to recover from his co-employee, as an unprotected third party, the employer, having paid the compensation award, could exercise his right
of subrogation to the injured employee's cause of action against the
rThe Workmen's Compensation Acts of the following states are typically ambiguous: N. C. Gen. Stat. (1950) § 7035-1o; 9 Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 195o) § 6599.
o73 S. E. (2d) 449 (S. C. 1952).
7
The employee operating the crane negligently swung the boom into a high
tension wire on the premises of the employer, seriously burning the plaintiff employee.
84 S.C. Code (1942) § 7035-21.
'4 S. C. Code (1942) § 7035-10.
'lWarner v. Leder, 234 N. C. 727, 69 S. E.(2d) 6 (1952); Essick v. City of Lexington, 232 N. C. 200, 60 S. E. (2d) io6 (1950); Feitig v. Chalkley, 185 Va. 96, 38 S.
E.(2d) 73 (1946).
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co-employee, thus passing the loss on to his employees instead of absorbing it as a general business risk. 1 In reference to the implication
arising from the section excluding common law liability of employers
and those conducting their business, but not mentioning rank and file
employees in this respect, the majority opinion cited the unfairness of
immunizing employees of a managerial nature while leaving lower employees subject to personal liability, and pointed out that the purpose of the Act would be defeated by the subjection of either category
of employee to liability. It was concluded that the legislature would not
have intended to establish such an unjust distinction or allow for an
incidental right which would undermine the primary objective.
The dissent, which is well supported with persuasive authority,
contended that the words of the immunity section of the South Carolina statute 12 do not provide immunity to a co-employee, since a mere
employee cannot be considered to be "conducting business" for his
employer. It was further pointed out that, while another section of the
Act expressly precludes an employee from exercising his common law
rights and remedies against his employer,'3 there is no term abrogating
his right against his fellow-employee, this omission indicating that the
latter rights are still in effect. The purpose of the statute was asserted
not to be to relieve wrong-doing persons causing injury from liability,
but rather to assure just compensation to the injured person.
Under the interpretation put on the inconclusively phrased statutes
in other jurisdictions, a co-employee is generally held to be a third
party liable for his negligent injury to his fellow servant, even though
4
both are covered by the compensation provisions of the Act.' Some

"'To hold otherwise would, in a large measure, defeat the very purpose for
which our Workmen's Compensation Act was enacted. Instead of transferring from the
worker to the industry, or business in which he is employed, and ultimately to the
consuming public, a greater proportion of the economic loss due to accidents sustained by him arising out of and in the course of his employment, we would,
under the provisions for subrogation contained in our Workmen's Compensation
Act, G. S. § 97-1o, transfer this burden to those conducting the business of the
employer to the extent of their solvency'." Nolan v. Daley 73 S. E. (ad) 449, 452
(S. C. 1952).
24 S. C. Code (1942) § 7035-10.
34 S. C. Code (1942) § 7035-11.
"'Hudson v. Moonier, 94 F. (2d) 132 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938); Wallace v. Pacific
Electric Ry. Co., io 5 Cal. App. 664, 288 Pac. 834 (1930); Stulginski v. Cizauskas, 125
Conn. 293, 5 A. (2d) 10 (1939); Kimbro v. Holladay, 154 So. 369 (La. App. 1934);
Webster v. Stewart, 2io Mich. 13, 177 N. W. 230 (igo); Behr v. Soth, 17o Minn.
278, 212 N. W. 461 (1927); Sylcox v. National Lead Co., 225 Mo. App. 543, 38 S. W.
(2d) 497 (1931); Churchill v. Stephens, 91 N. J. L. 195, 1o2 At. 657 (1917); Morrow v. Hume, 131 Ohio St. 319, 3 N. E. (2d) 39 (1936); Zimmer v. Casey, 296 Pa.
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courts go so far as to allow this right even after the injured employee
has accepted payments under the Compensation Act, thus creating a
problem of double compensation for a single injury.15 The decisions
following this view are based upon the prinicple that an employee
who contributes nothing to the compensation fund and who is himself
a potential beneficiary of it has done nothing to deserve protection
under the statute from liability for his own wrongdoing. 16 These
employees are held still to owe the common law duty of due care to
their fellow employees, and it is argued that refusal to allow actions
against co-employees would encourage carelessness among workmen
and result in generally greater occupational hazards. 17 One opinion
expresses the idea that as each employee is under a separate contract
of labor, even though contracting with a common employer, their
relationship to each other is separate and independent.'5 The decisions
529, 146 Atl. 30 (1929); McGonigle v. Gryphan, 2O1 Wis. 269, 229 N. W. 81 (193o);
3 Schneider, Workmen's Compensation (3d ed. 1943) § 842 (c); 7x C. J., Workmen's
Compensation Acts § 1565.
':The benefits under the Workmen's Compensation statutes of the various
states are generally "held to be exclusive only as applies to the employer and not
to interfere with the employee's common law right of action against a third party
who was responsible for his injury. It is quite generally provided in the statutes that
the employee cannot recover in full from both the employer and the negligent
third party, though he may bring simultaneous actions against both parties under
some statutes. Some of the Compensation Acts require the employee to elect whether
be will claim compensation or prosecute his remedy against the negligent third
party, while others permit him to go against the employer if the amount of his
recovery from the third party is not sufficient to cover his damages. The statutes
of the various states present a wide variety of modifications of these types of provisions. The following cases represent some of these variations: Arkansas Valley Ry.,
L. and P. Co. v. Ballinger, 65 Colo. 548, 178 Pac. 566 (1919); U. S. F. & G. Co. v.
N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co., lox Conn. 2oo, 125 Atl. 875 (1924); Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Georgia Power Co., 51 Ga. App. 579, 181 S. E. 111 (1935); Lebak v. Nelson, 62 Idaho
96, 107 P. (2d) 1054 (1940); O'Brien v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 305 II. 244, 137 N. E.
214 (1922); Black v. Chicago G. WV.R. Co., 187 Iowa 904, 174 N. W. 774 (1919);

Lowe v. Morgan's La. & T. R. & S. S. Co., i5o La.

29, 90

So.

429 (1921);

Bunner v.

(2d) 153 (1938); Corria v. Fink Bros., 45 R. I. 8o, 120
At. 321 (1923); Merrill v. Marietta Torpedo Co., 79 W. Va. 669, 92 S. E. 112 (1917).
See also 3 Schneider, Workmen's Compensation (3 d ed. 1943) § 834. See Note (1952)
9 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 316 for a discussion of one phase of the double recovery
problem arising out of workmen's compensation legislation.
1
"See Nolan v. Daley, 73 S. E. (2d) 449, 453 (S. C. 1952) (dissenting opinion).
7
" "To hold that a fellow servant is not liable for his tortious acts in such an
action as the one at bar would... 'mean a free hand to everybody to neglect
his duty toward his fellow servant, and escape with impunity from all liability for
damages for the consequences of his own carelessness or neglect of duty'." McGonigle v. Gryphan, 201 Wis. 269, 229 N. W. 81, 83 (1930). See also Rehn v. Bingaman, 11 Neb. 196, 36 N. W. (2d) 856, 86o (1949).
"Zimmer v. Casey, 296 Pa. 529, 146 Ad. 13o at 131 (1929).
Patti, 343 Mo.
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following this view reason that the preservation of the cause of action
against a fellow servant furnishes the employer a deserved right of
reimbursement, through the subrogation procedure provided for in
most compensation statutes. 19
In spite of the dear statement in the Acts that only statutory compensation can be collected from the employer and "those conducting
his business,"the courts seem to make no consistent distinction between an employee in some type of managerial capacity and a mere
workman in the ranks. Thus, despite the fact that the employer was
covered by workmen's compensation, liability has been imposed on
such employees as the chief of a municipal fire department,20 the vicepresident of the corporation employing the injured employee,21 a railway company which was the agent of an express company employing
the plaintiff, 22 the manager of an electric company employing an injured lineman, 23 and a foreman in charge of the gang in which the
the injured party was working. 24
The view followed by the majority in Nolan v. Daley25 has been
adopted in only a few jurisdictions, 26 and in denying liability these
courts also make no dear delineation between the employee in an
executive or managerial position and a mere employee.27 Like the South
Carolina court in the principal case, they predicate their decisions on
the logical ground that workmen's compensation legislation was conDThe Workmen's Compensation Acts of all but three states-New Hampshire,
Ohio, and West Virginia-contain such provisions, which allow subrogation against
negligent third parties. See 3 Schneider, Workman's Compensation Statutes (1940)
2275 (N. H.); 4 Schneider, Workmen's Compensation Statutes (1940) 2985 (Ohio),
4163 (W. Va.)
"Behr v. Soth, 170 Minn. 278, 212 N. W. 461 (1927).
"Webster v. Stewart, 21o Mich. 13, 177 N. W. 23o (1920).
"Wallace v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 105 Cal. App. 664, 288 Pac. 834 (1930).
"Kimbro v. Holladay, 154 So. 369 (La. App. 1934).
"Churchill v. Stephens, 91 N. J. L. 195, 1O2 At. 657 (1917).
"73 S. E. (2d) 449 (S. C. 1952).
"Murphy v. Miettinen, 317 Mass. 633, 59 N. E. (2d) 252 (1945); Caira v. Caira,
296 Mass. 448, 6 N. E. (2d) 431 (1937); Tscheiller v. National Weaving Co., Inc., 214
N. C. 449, 199 S. E. 623 (1938); Rosenberger v. L'Archer, 31 N. E. (2d) 70o (Ohio App.
1936); Landrum v. Middaugh, 117 Ohio St. 6o8, 16o N. E. 691 (1927); Feitig v.
Chalkley,
,85 Va. 96, 38 S. E. (2d) 73 (1946). See Bresnahan v. Barre, 286 Mass. 593,
i9° N. E. 815, 816 (1934)"See cases cited in note 26, supra. While all these cases (with the exception of
Landrum v. Middaugh, in which the negligent employee is a foreman) involve
mere employees, the opinions in denying liability make no mention of the type
of position which they occupy. The court in Landrum v. Middaugh bases its
opinion on the argument that the foreman is the alter ego of the employer, upon
whom the liability is placed under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
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ceived as a means of affording to an employee speedy relief at a uniform rate of damages, such damages to be borne by the employer as one
of the risks of business. To impose upon a fellow employee liability to
to a workman whom he has negligently injured, and to allow their
common employer to be subrogated to the right of an injured employee
by statutory provision, 28 would be to make the employees, rather than
29
the business which they carry on, the ultimate bearers of the loss.
These courts also argue that the workmen's compensation statutes
were intended to abolish all common law rights of an employee against
fellow servants as well as employers, unless expressly reserved by a
statutory provision. 30 As a matter of principle, it would appear that
the view expressed by the majority of the South Carolina court has
logic and fairness on its side. From a practical standpoint, the argument advanced by the advocates of preserving the fellow employee's
common law liability that a denial of such liability would encourage
carelessness among workers seems unsound; it is probably safe to assume
that the average workman will exercise the same degree of caution and
humane consideration toward the men with whom he works daily
regardless of the extent of his legal liability. It is also questionable in
the light of the expressed purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Acts
whether the argument in favor of giving the employer a right of reimbursement is a valid one, since, as argued by the courts following the
majority view, this would allow him to foist the ultimate loss off on
1

The underlying reason behind such provisions is to provide the employer a
means of recovery from a third party stranger, not connected with the industry,
whose negligence has resulted in injury to an employee who has in turn claimed
compensation from the employer. To hold the employer liable for such injuries
which do not arise from his business without chance for repayment would be to
pervert the express intention of the Workmen's Compensation Acts and overextend the employer's already broad liability. Such injuries were not intended to
be ultimately cast upon the business, and the purpose of the subrogation provisions
was to give the employer an opportunity to recoup that loss from such negligent
third parties. See Feitig v. Chalkley, 185 Va. 96 at 102, 83 S. E. (2d) 73 at 76 (1946),
for an excellent discussion of this point.
-,"One purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act was to sweep within its
provisions all claims for compensation flowing from personal injuries arising out
of and in the course of employment by a common employer insured under the act,
and not to preserve for the benefit of the insurer or of the insurer and those
injured liabilities between those engaged in the common employment which but
for the act would exist at common law." Bresnahan v. Barre, 286 Mass. 593, 190
N. E. 815, 817 (0934)*OCaira v. Caira, 296 Mass 448, 6 N. E. (2d) 341 (1937); Dresser v. New Hampshire
Structural Steel Co., 296 Mass. 97, 4 N. E. (2d) 1012 (1936); Tscheiller v. National
Weaving Co., 214 N. C. 499, 199 S. E. 623 (1938); Feitig v. Chalkley, 185 Va. 96, 38
S. E. (2d) 73 (1946).
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his employees. It would seem only logical that an employee who elects
to accept the benefits of a workmen's compensation award should forego any additional right of recovery against a fellow employee, where
the injury occurred within the scope of the employment. While the
fellow employee has contributed to no specific fund for his relief, he
has given up his common law rights against the employer for a guaranteed award under the Compensation Act.
Since no state statute expressly allows a right of action against a
fellow employee, the responsibility for the seemingly illogical rule in
the majority of jurisdictions rests with the courts, and the legislatures in those states should amend their workmen's compensation
laws so as to effectuate fully their intended purpose of making compensation for industrial injuries a risk of business.
J. HUNTER

LANE, JR.

